Re Shahzad Khurram
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CACV 484/2020 [2021] HKCA 785 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 484 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 2003 OF 2018) ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Barma JA and Lisa Wong J in Court Date of Hearing: 24 May 2021 Date of Judgment: 4 June 2021 ________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Shahzad Khurram, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 15 June 2020 (“Judge’s Decision”) refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 24 August 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”). Such rejection was embodied in, and communicated to the applicant by, a notice of decision dated 15 March 2017 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of Pakistan now aged about 35, is a fear of being harmed or even killed by a member of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (“PML(N)”) named Razaq Bhatti (“Bhatti”) and other PML(N) workers from his home village because he was a member of, and refused to quit, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (“PTI”), a rival political party. 3.The circumstances giving rise to such fear have been set out in detail in paragraph 7 of the Director’s Decision and in gist in paragraph 18 of the Board’s Decision and in [2] to [6] of the Judge’s Decision embodied in the Form CALL-1 dated 15 June 2020, [2020] HKCFI 1128 (“Form CALL-1”). 4.Briefly:
Illegal entry into Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 5.On 21 April 2015, the applicant departed for Guangzhou, China. He sneaked into Hong Kong on 16 December 2015 and was arrested by the police on 18 April 2016. He raised the NRF Claim by written representations dated 10 and 24 May 2016. Director’s Decision 6.In processing the NRF Claim, the Director took into account the information provided by the applicant in his Non-refoulement Claim Form dated 10 January 2017 and at the screening interview on 28 February 2017. The applicant then had legal advice and representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”). 7.The Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated under any of the applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4].
Appeals to Board and Board’s Decisions 8.The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board. 9.The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 23 May 2018, at which the applicant was represented by a lawyer assigned by the DLS and testified before, and answered questions by, the Board and the senior government counsel appearing for the Director through an interpreter. 10.The Board dismissed the appeal on all 4 applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection as it found the applicant’s case to be built on mere speculations. More specifically, it was a figment of the applicant’s imagination that the unidentified callers who made the threatening phone calls were Bhatti and other PML(N) supporters. Likewise, it was just his speculation that the shooting outside his house was ordered by Bhatti. He did not know the people who twice beat him up but assumed that they were PML(N) workers. It was a smear attack on the Pakistani police to say that they did not take any action. He could not identify his attackers and speculated, without any basis, that they were PML(N) workers. 11.The Board further reached the same conclusions as the Director regarding the availability of state protection and reasonable internal relocation options. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (“Form 86”) issued under HCAL 2003/2018 on 21 September 2018, supported by an affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision on grounds which the Judge summarised as follows in [11] of the Form CALL-1:
13.After hearing the application in open court at which the applicant was present and was assisted by an interpreter, the Judge refused leave. His reasons can be found in [12] to [16] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal - grounds of appeal and submission 14.The notice of appeal filed herein on 17 December 2019 stated (sic):
15.By his written submission dated 22 April 2021, after reiterating the alleged events underlying the NRF Claim, the applicant asserted (sic):
16.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 24 May 2021. He was provided with an Urdu interpreter. He had nothing to add to his notice of appeal or written submission. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 17.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 18.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[5]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)]. Discussion 19.The applicant has not identified any basis whatsoever upon which he suggests that the Judge had not read the decisions by the Director or the Board or that he had not made any attempt to find any error of law in the Board’s Decision. And we find such suggestions to be groundless. They should not have been made. 20.The applicant has simply failed to state in the notice of appeal or the written submission in what ways (if any) the Judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. 21.Although the applicant had seemingly raised 11 grounds for seeking leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision, as the Judge noted in [12] of the Form CALL-1, they were just broad and vague assertions without any particulars. The court cannot act on such bare allegations. In the circumstances, the Judge’s conclusion that the applicant had failed to show any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board cannot be faulted. The Judge had no alternative but to refuse leave for judicial review. Disposition 22.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
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