Re Butt Asif Ellahi
Read the full judgment text of CACV 491/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 4 June 2021.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr BUTT Asif Ellahi, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 28 July 2020 (“Judge’s Decision”) refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 24 September 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration
Cited by 1 case · Cites 7 cases
|
CACV 491/2020 [2021] HKCA 786 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 491 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 2100 OF 2018) ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Barma JA and Lisa Wong J in Court Date of Notice of Appeal: 21 September 2020 Date of Judgment: 4 June 2021 _________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr BUTT Asif Ellahi, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 28 July 2020 (“Judge’s Decision”) refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 24 September 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”). Such rejection was embodied in, and communicated to the applicant by, a notice of decision dated 1 March 2017 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of Pakistan now aged about 43, is a fear of (1) being harmed or even killed by one Abdul Rahman (“Rahman”), a key supporter of a rival political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid e Azam Group) (“PML(Q)”), over the death of a man of Rahman in a fight; and (2) being arrested by the Pakistani police and/or authority if he should return to Pakistan. 3.The circumstances giving rise to such fear have been set out in detail in paragraph 8 of the Director’s Decision and paragraph 11 of the Board’s Decision and in gist in [2] to [5] of the Form CALL-1 dated 28 July 2020, [2020] HKCFI 1593 (“Form CALL-1”). 4.Briefly:
Illegal entry into Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 5.The applicant entered Hong Kong illegally on 8 October 2015. He surrendered to the Immigration Department on 13 October 2015. He raised the NRF Claim by written representations dated 5 and 19 July 2016. Director’s Decision 6.In processing the NRF Claim, the Director took into account the information provided by the applicant in his Non-refoulement Claim Form dated 24 November 2016 and at the screening interview on 3 February 2017. The applicant then had legal advice and representation from the Duty Lawyer Service. 7.The Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated under any of the applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4].
Appeals to Board and Board’s Decisions 8.The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board on 9 March 2017. 9.A rehearing of the NRF Claim was scheduled on 8 May 2018. An English/Punjabi interpreter was present to assist the applicant. The applicant, however, refused to answer any questions by the Board, saying that it could make its decision based on the evidence in the hearing bundle. The applicant maintained the same stance and left the hearing despite having been told by the Board that it had a number of questions which raised issues as to the credibility of the NRF Claim and that if they were not answered, the Board might not be satisfied that there is a real risk of harm to the applicant if he returns to Pakistan. 10.The Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal on all the said grounds for non-refoulement protection on 24 September 2018. 11.More particularly, the Board found the credibility of the NRF Claim undermined by the applicant’s inconsistent evidence as to whether he is a member of the PPP or not. The Board was not satisfied that the alleged incident in early 2015 occurred at all either. The Board also did not accept any of the chain of events alleged by the applicant that occurred from that time until his departure from Pakistan or that the applicant faces any risk of harm whatsoever from the PML(Q), Rahman or his associates. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review issued under HCAL 2100/2018 on 3 October 2018, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. By the supporting affirmation of the same date and submission by letter dated 22 November 2019, he proposed grounds for judicial review which the Judge summarised in [10] of the Form CALL-1 as follows:
13.After a hearing in open court, at which the applicant was present and assisted by a suitable interpreter, the Judge refused leave for the reasons stated in [11] to [17] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal - grounds of appeal and submission 14.By a notice of appeal filed herein on 21 September 2020, the applicant appealed against the Judge’s Decision on the following ground (sic):
15.In breach of paragraph 3(1) of the directions given by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 17 March 2021, the applicant failed to lodge skeleton submissions 28 days before the hearing of the appeal, despite having been warned in paragraph 4 that the hearing date would be vacated and the appeal dealt with on paper in the event of non-compliance with such direction. 16.The requirement for the lodgment of skeleton submissions in a civil appeal is prescribed by Practice Direction 4.1. The filing and service of skeleton submissions by the parties are important for the preparation of an appeal, both for the court and the litigants. Non-compliance substantially impairs the exercise of case management power of the presiding judge in an appeal, including the effective management of the oral hearing. Nowadays, this court no longer permits unfocused oral presentation of material at a hearing. In view of the heavy demand on the court’s time due to the large volume of appeals, in recent times this court has taken a firm stance on the requirement to lodge skeleton submissions. Non-compliance is treated as the abandonment of the right to an oral hearing. 17.The hearing date on 24 May 2021 was therefore vacated and the applicant was debarred from lodging any written submission. We will deal with the appeal on paper on the basis of the materials already filed with the court. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 18.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 19.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[5]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)]. Discussion 20.As summarised in [7] and [11] above, the NRF Claim failed on the facts at both stages of the unified screening mechanism. The questions whether the applicant would be at risk of life or torture if he is refouled to Pakistan and, if so, whether the danger would be lowered or negated by the availability of state protection and/or reasonable internal relocation options are all questions of fact within the province of the Board (after the Director). The applicant has not advanced any ground of appeal, properly so called, that tackles the negative findings of fact against him. Indeed, the much-repeated bare assertion in the notice of appeal that his life is in danger in his home country is inconsistent with the findings of both the Director and the Board. 21.In short, the applicant did not in the notice of appeal identify any error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was plainly wrong. We cannot discern any either. Disposition 22.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 491/2020