Wong Shu Keung v. Li Sing Ming
Read the full judgment text of HCPI 610/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 May 2021.
1. The plaintiff (“ P ”) claimed that on 11 March 2010 he suffered the following accident (“ Accident ”) and thereby sustained personal injuries, loss and damages:
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HCPI 610/2016 [2021] HKCFI 1798 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 610 OF 2016 ________________________
________________________ Before : Hon Marlene Ng J in Chambers (paper disposal) Date of joint written submissions by both parties : 27 May 2021 Date of Handing Down Decision on Costs : 30 June 2021 ____________________ DECISION ON COSTS ____________________ I. INTRODUCTION 1.The plaintiff (“P”) claimed that on 11 March 2010 he suffered the following accident (“Accident”) and thereby sustained personal injuries, loss and damages:
II. HCPI686/2010 2.On 28 December 2010, P commenced HCPI686/2010 to claim against Kam Luen Consolidator Limited (“Kam Luen”) for personal injuries, loss and damages as a result of the Accident on the basis that the Accident was caused by the negligence, breach of statutory duty, breach of common duty of care and breach of contract of employment by Kam Luen and its representatives, agents and/or servants. 3.On the same day, P filed his Statement of Claim (“SoC”), Statement of Damages (“SoD”), and Medical Reports. The SoC alleged that:
4.Although Kam Luen’s solicitors on 21 February 2011 filed Notice to Act, Kam Luen on 10 March 2011 acted in person in filing Acknowledgment of Service to give notice of intention to defend. On 8 September 2011, this court as PI Master entered judgment on liability in favour of P against Kam Luen for damages to be assessed with costs on liability reserved (“HCPI686/2010 Liability Judgment”), and granted case management directions for further conduct of the case. On 23 September 2011, MSIG Insurance (Hong Kong) Limited (“MSIG”), Kam Luen’s employees’ compensation (“EC”) insurer, was informed about the HCPI686/2010 Liability Judgment. 5.On 20 January and 5 June 2012 respectively, P filed his Revised SoD and Re-Revised SoD. Kam Luen elected not to file/serve any Answer to P’s Re-Revised SoD.[1] On 22 November 2012, P filed Notice of Appointment of Assessment of Damages, which assessment of damages was scheduled to be heard by Master J Wong on 10 April 2013. 6.On 3 April 2013 (ie about a week before the scheduled hearing of the assessment of damages on 10 April 2013), MSIG applied to be joined as the 2nd defendant. The supporting affidavit by MSIG’s solicitor Tai Bing Shun (“Tai”) filed on the same day explained that:
7.MSIG’s summons was returnable at the hearing of the assessment of damages in HCPI686/2010 before Master J Wong on 10 April 2013. Although P opposed the application, Kam Luen did not. The learned master allowed MSIG’s application with costs reserved on the basis that (a) Kam Luen’s solicitors had not taken active steps to defend P’s claim due to Kam Luen’s instructions, (b) permission for MSIG’s solicitors to cross-examine P and to make submissions without introduction of new evidence would facilitate the court in assessing damages, and (c) the hearing of the assessment of damages should not be adjourned,[2] and the learned master then proceeded to hear the assessment of damages. 8.On 6 May 2013, Master J Wong handed down reasoned judgment on the assessment of damages. Judgment was entered against Kam Luen and MSIG to pay awarded damages in the sum of $1,485,972 with interest to P with a costs order nisi (“HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment”). At the hearing before Bharwaney J on 15 October 2018 referred to as the “2018 Hearing” in paragraph 33 below, P through his counsel conceded that the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment should have been entered against Kam Luen alone, and that such judgment was mistakenly entered against MSIG because at the assessment hearing MSIG “has made the position very clear that they are going to dispute about the validity of the insurance policy”.[3] Nevertheless, I note that MSIG merely participated in the assessment of damages and did not apply to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability Judgment. III. DCEC638/2010 9.On 9 June 2010, P commenced DCEC638/2010 against Kam Luen to claim for EC.[4] Since 11 March 2011, Kam Luen was self- represented by its director Li Ho Cheong (“Li Jr”). On 23 June 2011, DDJ Thomas Lee granted case management directions in line with those in HCPI686/2010 in relation to discovery and expert medical evidence.[5] On 5 October 2012 when Li Jr on behalf of Kam Luen appeared before HHJ Poon (as he then was), judgment on liability in DCEC638/2010 was entered by consent in favour of P against Kam Luen.[6] 10.On 2 July 2013, MSIG applied to be joined as the 2nd respondent in DCEC638/2010.[7] In the supporting affidavit of MSIG’s solicitor Tai filed on the same day (“Tai Aff”), MSIG relied on the written submissions dated 12 April 2013 by Kam Luen’s former solicitors in HCPI686/2010 (“Kam Luen Submissions”) that alleged (a) P was engaged by Kam Luen as a messenger and welding work was outside the ambit of his employment with Kam Luen, (b) P’s claimed Li Jr’s father Li Sing Ming (“Li Sr”) asked him to do welding work, so (c) Li Sr was P’s employer for welding work and Kam Luen was his employer for messenger work, which meant the Accident occurred in the course of P’s employment with Li Sr and not with Kam Luen.[8] MSIG made clear its intended joinder as the 2nd respondent in DCEC638/2010 was to defend P’s claim in such proceedings. On 25 July 2013, DDJ Eric Tam granted the joinder application.[9] 11.On 1 August 2013, MSIG applied by summons in DCEC638/2010 for an order that the judgment on liability entered by consent on 5 October 2012 be set aside.[10] P opposed the application, and Li Jr on behalf of Kam Luen also insisted on the validity of such judgment on liability.[11] MSIG’s summons came for hearing before HHJ Kent Yee on 18 October 2013. HHJ Kent Yee was aware of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments which MSIG did not apply to set aside. On 31 October 2013, the learned judge handed down reasoned judgment, and ordered that (a) the judgment on liability entered by consent in DCEC638/2010 between P and Kam Luen be set aside, and (b) MSIG be allowed to challenge both liability and quantum of P’s claim in DCEC638/2010.[12] 12.On 29 November 2013 and 27 June 2014 respectively, leave was granted for Li Sr to be joined as the 3rd respondent and for the Employees Compensation Fund Board (“Board”) to be joined as the 4th respondent in DCEC638/2010.[13] By this time, P’s Re-Amended Application in DCEC638/2010 pleaded that at the time of the Accident he was employed by Kam Luen and/or Li Sr even though the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments had not been set aside.[14] 13.The trial of P’s EC claim in DCEC638/2010 took place on 11 September 2014. Kam Luen did not appear at the trial, but by its Answer Kam Luen (a) admitted P was under its employ at the time of the Accident, (b) claimed the Accident did not arise out of and in the course of such employment, and (c) denied the circumstances of the Accident (since P allegedly called Li Jr shortly after the Accident to say he fell from a flight of stairs and could not recall what happened and why he fell). MSIG denied (i) P was employed by Kam Luen, or (ii) the Accident happened in the course of P’s employment with Kam Luen when P in fact was a general worker working for Li Sr. Li Sr did not file any Answer or witness statement, and did not appear at the trial. The Board did not admit any aspect of P’s claim.[15] 14.On 12 November 2015, DDJ Brian Mak handed down reasoned judgment in DCEC638/2010, and granted judgment for (a) Li Sr to pay P EC in the sum of $326,558.30 with interest, (b) dismissal P’s claim against Kam Luen, and (c) a costs order nisi among the parties[16] (“DCEC638/2010 Judgment”).[17] The learned judge found (i) Li Sr was P’s employer from 1 January 2010 up to the time of the Accident, (ii) Kam Luen was not P’s employer, and (iii) P’s injuries from the Accident arose out of and in the course of his employment with Li Sr.[18] IV. HCPI610/2016 and HCA2384/2018 15.On 31 May 2016, P commenced the present action (HCA610/2016) against Li Sr as employer, tortfeasor and contractor for negligence, breach of statutory duty, breach of the common duty of care and breach of P’s contract of employment with Li Sr in relation to personal injuries, loss and damages he suffered as a result of the Accident. 16.On 2 February 2017, P filed his SoC alleging inter alia that:
17.In the SoC, P also pleaded that:
18.So P in the present action claimed against Li Sr for (a) personal injuries, loss and damages as a result of the Accident, and also for (b) wasted costs that he incurred by HCPI686/2010. 19.On 23 February 2017, Li Sr’s solicitors on behalf of Li Sr filed Acknowledgment of Service to give notice of intention to defend. By the order of Master Roy Yu dated 1 March 2017, case management directions were granted for filing pleadings, making discovery, exchanging witness statements, and considering need for expert evidence. 20.Upon extension of time granted by Master Roy Yu by way of an unless order dated 10 May 2017, Li Sr by his solicitors filed his Defence on 18 May 2017 to deny liability. Although Li Sr agreed he was at all material times carrying on transportation business, he denied the matters in paragraph 16(a)-(b) and (d)-(e) above, and in particular denied he employed P as a general worker at the Site at all material times. Instead, Li Sr claimed that all material times P was employed by Kam Luen, and Lot 431 DD77 (which was stated in the accident report dated 4 August 2010 to be the Site of the Accident) was at all material times owned by the estate of Wong Po Sun deceased, leased to Fu Yang Agency Limited, and sub-let to Ma Shing Hang. 21.Further, Li Sr in his Defence in the present action pleaded inter alia that:
22.Li Sr in his Defence in the present action admitted (a) his son Li Jr was a director of Kam Luen and (b) Kam Luen as P’s employer submitted to LD a Form 2 in relation to the Accident, but denied (c) he was in way obliged to submit Form 2 to LD in relation to the Accident, (d) P and LD “were misled by [Li Sr] or his cronies (whom [P] has failed to identify or particularise) either as alleged or at all” and/or (e) his identity and/or full name was made known to P on/about 2 July 2013. It was averred that if P were employed by Li Sr at the time of the Accident, he would have known of such fact. 23.Li Sr reiterated the matters in paragraphs 10-11 above in his Defence in the present action, and pleaded that P must have known of the existence of Li Sr since April 2013 at the latest. Li Sr averred he did not participate in DCEC638/2010 and was absent at the trial before DDJ Brian Mak. He also denied any liability to pay any wasted costs that P allegedly incurred in HCPI686/2010. Li Sr further averred P’s claim against him in the present action was time-barred as the Accident took place on 11 March 2010, and (without prejudice to the aforesaid defences) Li Sr also claimed P was contributorily negligent. 24.On 12 July 2017, P filed his Reply, and averred as follows:
25.On 29 June 2017, Master Roy Yu granted case management directions, including directions for expert medical evidence on quantum and directions for further pleadings on quantum. 26.On 27 February 2018, Master Roy Yu ordered a stay of the present action for 6 weeks due to concerns over the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments in favour of P against Kam Luen in respect of the Accident. On 3 April 2018, P’s solicitors wrote to the court, saying they had sought counsel’s advice as follows, and proposing case management directions for continued conduct of the present action, including collating expert evidence, filing/serving revised pleadings on quantum, preparing trial bundle index, etc:
27.At the hearing on 9 April 2018, Master Roy Yu adjourned the Checklist Review (“CLR”) to 21 August 2018 for the parties to report to him on the manner of disposal of HCPI686/2010, and for P to inform Li Sr about his stance 4 weeks before such adjourned CLR. On 24 July 2018, P’s solicitors wrote to inform Li Sr’s solicitors that at the next CLR P would give an undertaking to the court not to enforce the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment. On 1 August 2018, Li Sr’s solicitors replied that such proposal failed to address the concerns raised by Master Roy Yu, ie that it was not whether P would or would not enforce the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment, but whether “it is an abuse of Court process and also irregular to have a conflicting judgment in existence in respect of the same alleged Accident”. Li Sr’s solicitors further noted P still maintained a claim in the present action against Li Si for costs in obtaining the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments. Li Sr’s solicitors pressed P’s solicitors for P’s proposal on how to dispose of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments, and for confirmation as to whether P would set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments and/or withdraw his claim in HCPI686/2010. 28.At the CLR on 21 August 2018, Master Roy Yu granted the following order (“Yu Order”):
29.On 10 September 2018, P filed Notice of Appeal against the Yu Order, and sought the following reliefs on appeal (“Appeal”):
30.On 9 October 2018, Li Sr’s solicitors sent a “without prejudice as to costs” letter to P’s solicitors in relation to the Appeal, saying the Appeal was misconceived since the Yu Order did not debar P from continuing to proceed with the present action, and on the contrary such order actually gave opportunity for P to continue to proceed with the present action subject to P disposing of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments. Li Sr’s solicitors urged P to withdraw the Appeal with costs to Li Sr, otherwise Li Sr would seek costs against P on indemnity basis upon dismissal of the Appeal. 31.On 10 October 2018, P commenced HCA2384/2018 against Kam Luen for (a) an order that the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments be set aside, and/or (b) a declaration that such judgments were null and void on the ground that they were “entered into by mistake and/ or misrepresentation solely and wholly on the part of Kam Luen that it was the lawful and/or de facto employer of [P] at the material time, and also for costs and damages with interest to be assessed”. 32.On 11 October 2018, Bharwaney J granted written directions to both parties in the present action asking for a chronology of events/ steps in HCPI686/2010, DCEC638/2010 and the present action, and for an explanation why the EC insurer (ie MSIG) and/or the Board did not satisfy the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment. On 12 October 2018, P’s solicitors replied to the court to explain inter alia as follows:
33.The Appeal was heard by Bharwaney J on 15 October 2018 (“2018 Hearing”). Upon hearing counsel for both parties, the learned judge granted the following order (“Bharwaney Order”):
34.On 13 November 2018, P’s solicitors wrote to Li Sr’s solicitors to (i) serve sealed copy of the Bharwaney Order, (ii) enclose a draft consent summons (engrossed by them) for the following reliefs, and (iii) explain that such draft consent summons was proposed pursuant to inter alia the 1st Order which directed the parties to agree on case management directions:
35.On 22 November 2018, Li Sr’s solicitors replied to ask for information as to the progress of P’s application for setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment to enable them to consider P’s proposal. On 17 September 2019, P’s solicitors wrote to Li Sr’s solicitors, saying that in order to restore the CLR P was willing to undertake not to enforce the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment pending the result of the present action “or alternatively [P] to set aside the [HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment] with costs under HCPI686/2010 be reserved and to be dealt with in the present action”, and seeking other case management directions to progress the present action, such as expert directions on quantum, fixing next CLR and providing for costs. 36.On 30 September 2019, Li Sr’s solicitors replied to say (a) Li Sr’s stance as regards P’s proposed undertaking had been made clear in their earlier letter dated 1 August 2018 (see paragraph 27 above), and (b) whilst it was for P to decide whom he wished to deal with in respect of the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment, Li Sr claimed there was no legal basis for costs under HCPI686/2010 to be dealt with in the present action. 37.On 3 October 2019, P’s solicitors wrote to Bharwaney J’s clerk, saying they had provided proposed case management directions to Li Sr’s solicitors on 13 November 2018, 16 July 2019 and 17 September 2019 for consideration, but had not received any counter proposal, and proposing the following case management directions for the court’s direction:
38.On 21 February 2020, P’s solicitors lodged Notice of Intention to Proceed (when the High Court Registry was closed due to public health considerations). On 9 March 2020 (when the High Court Registry was closed due to public health considerations), P lodged (but did not file) a summons to seek inter alia the following reliefs (“Summons”):
39.On 9 March and 20 May 2020 respectively, P’s solicitors wrote to Bharwaney J’s clerk to propose available dates in March-May and in June-July 2020 for the hearing of the Summons. On 20 May 2020, Li Sr’s solicitors wrote to P’s solicitors, referring to their earlier letters dated 23 April, 5 May and 12 May 2020, and seeking confirmation as to whether P had set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments, and what the progress had been made in HCA2384/2018 (which legal action was commenced on 10 October 2018). Li Sr’s solicitors reminded that the Yu Order remained valid, ie the present action was adjourned sine die with liberty to restore pending P setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment, and that at the 2018 Hearing Bharwaney J endorsed Li Sr’s view that “without having the [HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment] set aside, the present action cannot be proceeded with. Needless to say, even if the [HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment] is set aside, the question of liability in the present action is still a live issue and [Li Sr’s solicitors] are of the unfettered view that no liability will be attached to [Li Sr]. As [P] is legally aided, [Li Sr’s solicitors] trust [P’s solicitors] will properly protect the public funds”. 40.On 22 June and 4 September 2020, P’s solicitors wrote to Bharwaney J’s clerk urging that a hearing date be fixed for the Summons. On 24 September 2020, P filed Notice of Intention to Proceed. On 5 March 2021, P’s solicitors wrote to my clerk, expressing concern that no hearing date had been fixed for the Summons, and urging for a hearing date to be given as soon as practicable. On 23 March 2021, I granted inter alia the following written directions to the solicitors for P, solicitors for Li Sr and Kam Luen in the present action and in HCA2384/2018 (“Ng Directions”):
41.On 9 April 2021, P’s solicitors wrote to the court in relation to the Ng Directions, but it was not apparent on the face of such letter that it had been copied to Li Sr’s solicitors. In such letter, P’s solicitors gave a brief chronology of HCPI686/2010, DCEC638/2010 and the present action, and further explained as follows:
42.The letter dated 9 April 2021 to the court by P’s solicitors went on to say as follows:
On such basis, P’s solicitors sought directions (a) to set aside the Yu Order, and (b) upon undertaking by P not to enforce the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment pending the result of the present action, to deal with case management matters such as expert evidence and fixing date for the next CLR. 43.According to the affirmation of the process server of P’s solicitors filed on 4 May 2021 in HCA2384/2018, P served on Kam Luen the Ng Directions under cover of a letter dated 4 April 2021 sent by post to Kam Luen’s last known address. But I note that the Ng Directions sent by the court to Kam Luen were returned the court by reason of “incomplete address”. 44.At the 2021 Hearing on 6 May 2021, after hearing Mr Sun, solicitor for P, and Ms Sum, counsel for Li Sr, I granted the following order (“Ng Order”):
45.On 10 May 2021, P filed the Summons pursuant to the Ng Order. 46.On 27 May 2021, P filed Notice of Intention to Proceed in HCA2384/2018. On the same day, P and Li Sr by their respective solicitors submitted to the court their joint written submissions setting out their respective stance on the Costs Issues in the present action. V. COSTS ISSUES : PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE STANCE 47.In respect of the 2nd Costs Issue,
48.In respect of the 1st Costs Issue,
49.Should Li Sr successfully obtain costs under the Costs Issues, Li Sr asked for his costs to be taxed on indemnity basis. P disagreed, and his solicitors drew my attention to Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong[22] as follows:
In fact, the learned text went on to state as follows: “In deciding whether or not to award indemnity costs, each case must of course be considered on its own facts. The attributes of the parties and the character of the proceedings may both be relevant in the exercise of the court’s discretion to award indemnity costs. The grounds for making such an order must, however, be connected with the case and might extend to any matter relating to the litigation and the parties’ conduct in it and also to the circumstances leading to the litigation, and no further. An award of indemnity costs will, therefore, generally be restricted to situations which involve the manner in which the litigation has been conducted rather than the conduct which constitutes the cause of action or matter giving rise to the litigation.” VI. 2018 HEARING 50.The Appeal came before Bharwaney J at the 2018 Hearing. As I was not the presiding judge at the 2018 Hearing, I have reviewed the transcript of such hearing (“Transcript”). A few matters were of note. 51.First, Bharwaney J noted that pursuant to the assessment of damages in HCPI686/2010 before Master J Wong, the sealed copy of the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment was entered against both Kam Luen and MSIG.[23] It transpired that P’s solicitors “made a mistake in entering judgment against [MSIG]”, and P’s counsel admitted that at the hearing of the assessment of damages MSIG “has made the position very clear that they are going to dispute about the validity of the insurance policy”.[24] 52.Secondly, Bharwaney J queried why, P having obtained the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments, would proceed to trial to seek EC in DCEC638/2010.[25] The learned judge was of the view that the DCEC638/2010 Judgment of 12 November 2015 was “an embarrassment” when the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments “remained intact”, and queried (a) how DDJ Brian Mak could proceed to make a core finding of fact (ie Li Sr was P’s employer) that contradicted the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments (which judgments were premised on Kam Luen being P’s employer),[26] and why P’s counsel did not submit to DDJ Brian Mak and MSIG that the trial in DCEC638/2010 could not proceed:
Upon query by the learned judge, P’s counsel clarified that P did not resist MSIG’s application to set aside the judgment on liability entered by consent between P and Kam Luen on 5 October 2012 in DCEC638/2010,[27] and that HHJ Kent Yee knew about the proceedings in HCPI686/2010 when he acceded to MSIG’s application to set aside such consent judgment on liability in DCEC638/2010.[28] Bharwaney J questioned how MSIG could “fight strongly [ie dispute liability] in [HCPI686/2010] without setting aside the interlocutory judgment [HCPI686/2010 Liability Judgment] …… [MSIG’s solicitor] should have applied to set aside the interlocutory judgment [ie HCPI686/2010 Liability judgment] because of his late joinder [in HCPI686/2010]. He just participated with the assessment …… That’s why we are here”.[29] 53.P’s counsel tried to submit that P’s claim in HCPI686/2010 was against Kam Luen in dual capacity as employer and occupier,[30] so it was an “open finding” as to whether Kam Luen was liable as employer and/or occupier (even though (a) P’s SoC pleaded that Kam Luen was P’s employer and occupier of the Site,[31] and (b) “solicitors for both parties [P and Kam Luen] agreed that judgment should be entered on liability, leaving them just to be assessed”), which led to the interlocutory HCPI686/2010 Liability Judgment.[32] On such basis, it was suggested that it was not necessary to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments “because Kam Luen can be liable as an occupier. Because there is evidence before the court to so find in the – in the pleading”.[33] Still Bharwaney J was concerned that the DCEC638/2010 Judgment was an embarrassment because “the whole [SoC in HCPI686/2010] reads on the basis that [Kam Luen] is the employer” and P got “a High Court admission on the basis that [Kam Luen] was the employer”.[34] The learned judge further noted the written notes of this court (as PI Master) at the hearing on 8 September 2011 in HCPI686/2010 “only relate to the directions in relation to quantum. There was no – nothing expressed to [this court as PI Master] that the admission on liability is on a limited basis of liability as occupier”.[35] P’s counsel next submitted P should be able to claim against joint tortfeasors under CLCO, but the learned judge pointed out “[there’s] no joint liability here. It’s either the employer was Kam Luen or the employer was [Li Sr] …… It’s not joint employment …… [DDJ Brian Mak] found that [Li Sr] was the sole employer”.[36] When P’s counsel ultimately complained of the “trick” played on P about the true identity of his employer,[37] the learned judge maintained his observations that proceeding further in the present action would be an embarrassment:[38]
54.Thirdly, Bharwaney J queried why P claimed the Yu Order was wrong when Master Roy Yu “just adjourned [the present action] sine die for [P] to set aside [the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments]. He didn’t strike out [the present action]”.[39] It was then that P’s counsel revealed P’s Writ of Summons in HCA2384/2018, which at that time had not been served and which Li Sr’s counsel was unaware. On that note, the learned judge made suggestions on the further conduct of the matter before him:[40]
55.Fourthly, given that Li Sr was not insured and there was uncertainty whether he could satisfy the damages awarded under the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment (which were about $1.4 million), Bharwaney J urged the involved parties to try to see if overall resolution of the matter was possible to obviate throwing further money into legal costs.[41] Then on such note the learned judge went on to say as follows:[42]
VII. DISCUSSION 56.Costs under the 2nd Costs Issue concerned costs reserved under the 2nd Order, and costs under the 1st Costs Issue concerned costs incurred in “agreeing case management directions” under the 1st Order. By the Ng Order, I have ordered that costs of the Summons and the Appeal (save for the Costs Issues) be paid by P to Li Sr to be taxed forthwith if not agreed. This meant that in relation to the 2nd Costs Issue, the costs reserved by Bharwaney J under the 2nd Order would cover costs of and occasioned by the 2018 Hearing, the other costs of the Appeal having been disposed of under the Ng Order. 57.Since the 1st and 2nd Orders were made at the 2018 Hearing, and such hearing came before Bharwaney J as a result of the Appeal filed by P, it would be important to understand what the Appeal was about and what transpired at the 2018 Hearing. 58.The Appeal was an appeal against the 2-limbed Yu Order (see paragraphs 28-29 above). First, Master Roy Yu rejected P’s application to proceed with the present action upon P’s undertaking not to enforce the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments. Secondly, the present action was adjourned sine die with liberty to restore pending P setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments. In summary, Master Roy Yu was of the view that the very existence of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments themselves would prevent P from proceeding with the present action, but P could progress the present action if and when the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments were removed. 59.By the Appeal, P disagreed that the very existence of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments themselves formed any legal hurdle to progressing the present action, and proposed that the present action proceed towards trial notwithstanding such judgments, or to proceed towards trial notwithstanding such judgments and upon P undertaking not to enforce such judgments or undertaking to start a fresh action to set aside such judgments (see paragraph 29 above). In summary, P wanted to keep the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments for common law damages in relation to the Accident against Kam Luen intact whilst he would proceed with the present action to seek judgment again for common law damages in relation to the Accident against Li Sr, and at most P would only refrain from enforcing the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment or P would only start (but not have to complete) a new action to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments. 60.However, P’s claim against Kam Luen in HCPI686/2010 for common law damages in respect of personal injuries, loss and damages suffered as a result of the Accident mirrored exactly his claim against Li Sr for the same common law damages for the same personal injuries, loss and damages for the same Accident in the present action (see paragraphs 2-3 and 15-16 above). More significantly, in each of HCPI686/2010 and the present action, P respectively sued Kam Luen and Li Sr as P’s employer, contractor of the Site, proprietor of the industrial undertakings at the Site, person responsible for the workplace at the site under OSHO and OSHR, and the occupier of the Site under OLO (see paragraphs 3 and 16 above). In summary, P made the same allegations against Kam Luen and against Li Sr in the same capacities in 2 separate legal actions over the same Accident and the same personal injuries, loss and damages, but without any plea or averment in P’s pleadings in HCPI686/2010 (which proceedings had been completed) and in the present action (which proceedings were still ongoing) that there was at the material time any co-employer, co-contractor, co-proprietor, co-responsible person and/or co-occupier in respect of P and/or the Accident. 61.In such context, issue arose as to whether P could continue to pursue his claim against Li Sr in the present action given (a) the HCPI686/2010 Liability Judgment by which Kam Luen already admitted liability for P’s claim for common law damages for personal injuries, loss and damages as a result of the Accident, which claim mirrored P’s claim against Li Sr for common law damages for personal injuries loss and damages as a result of the Accident in the present action and (b) the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment being a final judgment by which Master J Wong awarded common law damages against Kam Luen in favour of P for personal injuries, loss and damages as a result of the Accident were still in existence and binding on P. As of now the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments still have not been set aside. 62.In my view, the answer to the question posed in the above paragraph must be in the negative. The rationale was that by virtue of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments against Kam Luen, P’s cause of action in respect of his personal injuries, loss and damages as a result of the Accident had merged in such judgments, and such cause of action was extinguished and would no longer support and/ or maintain P’s claim in the present action. I need look no further than to refer to the succinct summary of the law in Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata as follows:[43]
This, in my view, would be a complete answer to P’s contentions in the Reply set out in paragraph 24(b) above and in the letter dated 3 April 2018 by P’s solicitors (see paragraph 26(c)-(d) above). The suggestion that the principle of estoppel did not apply because P had not received any payment of the awarded damages under HCPI686/2010 was irrelevant since it was the merger (not estoppel) of the cause of action in the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments that extinguished P’s cause of action for his personal injuries, loss and damages as a result of the Accident. The fact he had not received payment of the awarded damages would not detract from the legal effect of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments. 63.Indeed, Bharwaney J at the 2018 Hearing made clear that P could not proceed against Li Sr in the present action (and should not have proceeded against Li Sr in DCEC638/2010) as they amounted to “embarrassments” in view of the existing HCPI686/2010 Liability/ Damages Judgments that had not been set aside (see extracts from the Transcript in paragraphs 52-54 above), so the setting aside of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments “must happen first” (see paragraph 54 above). 64.Turning to P’s contentions in his Reply in the present action (see paragraph 24(a) above), at the 2018 Hearing (see paragraph 53 above) and in his solicitors’ correspondence before/after such hearing (see paragraph 42 above) that Kam Luen and Li Sr were joint and/or several tortfeasors such that if Kam Luen did not satisfy the damages awarded under the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment P would be entitled under CLCO to sue Li Sr as the co-tortfeasor to recover common law damages, I find there were no merits to such arguments. Such contentions were no answer to the legal principles/effect of the merger of cause of action discussed in the paragraph 62 above. Such legal principles/effect of the merger of cause of action would also destroy the argument by P’s counsel that the HCPI686/2010 Liability Judgment amounted to an “open finding” as to the basis of Kam Luen’s liability (eg whether Kam Luen was liable as employer and/or, say, as occupier). In any event, P’s contentions were debunked by Bharwaney J at the 2018 Hearing when he pointed out the following:
65.In the circumstances, the “embarrassment” in P proceeding with the present action in face of the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments was not salvageable by P undertaking (a) not to enforce of HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment and/or (b) to forthwith start a fresh action to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgment (without actually setting aside such judgments). As a result, by the Ng Order, I granted leave for P to withdraw the Summons, and I also dismissed the Appeal. The Yu Order was plainly correct. It is important to note that these matters were canvassed not only in the 2021 Hearing but also in the 2018 Hearing as evident from paragraphs 63 and 64(a)-(b) above (see also Part VI above). So P could not be heard to say he was unaware of the views of the court when he embarked on trying to agree case management directions with Li Sr under the 1st Order after the 2018 Hearing. 66.As to what transpired at the 2018 Hearing, I have described the same in some detail in Part VI above. Of importance was Bharwaney J’s views and guidance set out in paragraphs 63 and 64(a)-(b) above and also as follows:
67.Thus, the whole tenor of Bharwaney J’s observations was that the present action which was brought on the same footing as the finding in the DCEC638/2010 Judgment that P’s employer was Li Sr was an “embarrassment” when the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments had not been set aside, which was why he said those judgments had to be set aside first (see paragraphs 52 and 54 above). It was plain that Bharwaney J considered the necessary “further conduct” was to get on with setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments, which was in line with the Yu Order that the present action be stayed pending P setting aside those judgments. By the time of the 2018 Hearing, P had gone beyond “just talk” about setting aside those judgments and had taken “one step more” by having issued the Writ of Summons in HCA2384/2018 against Kam Luen for such purpose (see paragraph 54 above). But nothing much further could be done at the 2018 Hearing because P had not served the Writ of Summons in HCA2384/2018 on Kam Luen, and Li Sr’s counsel was only made aware of such proceedings at the 2018 Hearing and had to take instructions (see paragraph 54 above). 68.The matters in the above paragraph were the very reasons why Bharwaney J treated the 2018 Hearing as a directions hearing instead of the hearing of the Appeal. It was why the learned judge’s initial focus was to say he would case manage HCA2384/2018, why he told P’s counsel to “[proceed] with the setting aside”, and why he told Li Sr’s counsel that he would in due course grant leave for Li Sr to participate in HCA2834/2018, that he would need to know whether Li Sr would resist P’s claim to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments, and that “it all turns on [Li Sr’s] position and whether or not [he] will resist the setting aside”, and then on such basis the learned judge said he would also case manage the present action (see paragraph 54 above). To make it even more abundantly clear, the learned judge said “it all depends on whether or not the first High Court action [HCPI686/2010 Liability/ Damages Judgments] is set aside …… That must happen first” (see paragraph 54 above). 69.On the above premise, P would not be proceeding with the present action until the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments were set aside (which was in line with the Yu Order), and hence the Appeal would be redundant. This was why Bharwaney J suggested he would treat the 2018 Hearing not as a hearing for the Appeal but a directions hearing, and he asked the parties to try and see if amicable overall resolution was possible (see paragraph 55 above), failing which “to put your heads together and give some directions for the new action” (my emphasis), ie to progress HCA2384/2018 for setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments (see paragraph 55 above). It was made even more clearly later on at the 2018 Hearing when Bharwaney J said if there were no overall resolution, the parties were to “agree some directions in relation to joining [Li Sr] …… to this new action [HCA2834/2018]. And for directions that the case management of this new action [HCA2834/2018] would be conducted by [the learned judge] and that [the learned judge] will be the trial judge in this new action [HCA2834/2018]”, and then he would have conduct of and give further directions in the present action” (see paragraph 55 above). This led to the 1st Order granted by the learned judge. 70.In light of the plain observations/directions by Bharwaney J, it was not easy to understand why after the 2018 Hearing P would come up with proposed case management directions merely for the further conduct of the present action, and to repeat the contentions that P could continue with the present action upon undertaking not to enforce the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment or to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Damages Judgment with costs of such action to be dealt with in the present action (see paragraphs 35-38 and 41 above). 71.First, since the Appeal was not determined, the Yu Order as an inter partes order was still valid and binding on P and Li Sr, so the stay of proceedings in the present action was still in place. Without any agreed directions or court order to lift such stay (if possible), P simply could not propose case management directions to progress the present action. This was pointed out in the letter dated 20 May 2020 by Li Sr’s solicitors (see paragraph 39 above). 72.Secondly, P’s proposed case management directions flied against the observations, guidance and directions by Bharwaney J in the 2018 Hearing that directions for progressing HCA2384/2018 to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments should be put forward first and foremost. So Li Sr’s solicitors rightly queried this in their letters dated 22 November 2018, 30 September 2019 and 20 May 2020 (see paragraphs 35, 36 and 39 above). I disagree that Li Sr’s solicitors failed to give constructive reply. It must be remembered that Li Sr was not a party to HCA2384/2018, and if P chose not to serve the Writ of Summons in such action (which he did not even by the time of the 2021 Hearing), Li Sr could not even begin to ponder any proposal for joinder as a party to HCA2384/2018. Li Sr could hardly be blamed for raising the queries as he did through his solicitors. I cannot see how Li Sr was in breach of the 1st Order. 73.P claimed it was incumbent upon Li Sr to propose directions for “setting aside with time frame and other case management” and/or for restoring the Appeal. I disagree. It was P and not Li Sr who had to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments in order for the present action to proceed. Alternatively, it was P and not Li Sr who had to restore the Appeal and to overturn the Yu Order in order for the present action to proceed. Indeed, as P confessed, P had not served the originating process in HCA2384/2018 on Kam Luen let alone Li Sr. Li Sr was not a party to and was not served with process in that action, and hence had no capacity to propose case management directions in that action. What P should have done was to (a) forthwith serve the Writ of Summons in HCA2384/2018 on Kam Luen and seek Li Sr’s stance on P’s claim to set aside the HCA686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments and on joinder of Li Sr in such action, and (b) propose directions on these matters for restoring the matter before Bharwaney J for case management. But P did not do so, and in my view he could not blame Li Sr for the so-called “inaction”. I bear in mind that even before the 2018 Hearing Li Sr had made clear his stance in his solicitors’ letters dated 1 August and 9 October 2018 (see paragraphs 27 and 30 above), which stance was reiterated after the 2018 Hearing in his solicitors’ letters dated 22 November 2018, 30 September 2019 and 20 May 2020 (see paragraphs 35, 36 and 39 above). Further, not having served the Writ of Summons in HCA2384/2018 and not having suggested to join Li Sr in such action (which was the guidance by Bharwaney J on the way forward at the 2018 Hearing), P’s alternative proposal to Li Sr to set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments with costs to be dealt with the present action (see paragraphs 35, 37 and 38 above) had no meaning as Li Sr had no locus in HCA2384/2018 that was between P and Kam Luen, and it was difficult to see how costs as between P and Kam Luen in that action could be dealt with in the present action of which Kam Luen was not even a party. 74.The letter dated 9 April 2021 by P’s solicitors tellingly demonstrated that P’s stance of not progressing HCA2384/2018 despite Bharwaney J’s observations/directions at the 2018 Hearing was a conscious decision on the part of P. Such letter stated that as the Appeal was not determined at the 2018 Hearing, the issue of whether the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments could be set aside before the present action could be proceeded with was not determined, so “[P] had changed his mind and withhold service of the Writ of summons under HCA2384/2018” (see paragraph 41(c) above). Such contention was flawed because if the Appeal was not determined then the Yu Order remained valid and binding on P and Li Sr, in which case the present action was stayed and P could not have proceeded with the present action without setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments. The reason why Bharwaney J treated the 2018 Hearing not as a hearing of the Appeal was because the Yu Order would stand and P would first proceed with setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments, and the learned judge treated such hearing as a directions hearing so that P and Li Sr would put their heads together for proposing case management directions for progressing HCA2384/2018, which necessarily entailed service of the Writ of Summons in that action and hopefully eventual joinder of Li Sr to that action. Notwithstanding such clear guidance from Bharwaney J and further reminders by correspondence from Li Sr’s solicitors, P’s decision to treat the 1st Order merely as a direction to agree case management directions in the present action alone and to withhold service of the Writ of Summons in HCA2834/2018 must be a conscious decision under legal advice, but in my view such decision could not be supported. 75.Again, I am unable to see how it could be said that P was constrained by Li Sr’s “inaction” and by the fact that the Appeal was not determined to take out the Summons, and/or that it was Li Sr’s breach of the 1st Order that caused the unnecessary costs of the Summons and the 2021 Hearing:
76.By reason of the above matters, I have no hesitation in concluding that P must pay Li Sr’s costs under the 1st Costs Issue to be taxed forthwith if not agreed. 77.As for costs under the 2nd Costs Issue, ie costs of the 2018 Hearing reserved under the 2nd Order, I cannot see how P could avoid paying costs of and occasioned by the 2018 Hearing. As explained above, the Appeal was not determined at the 2018 Hearing and Bharwaney J treated such hearing as a directions hearing because the learned judge was of the firm view that P must first set aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/ Damages Judgments, such that there was no need to deal with the Appeal or to disturb the Yu Order, but there was need for P to move ahead with HCA2384/2018 for setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments and to have directions in place for such purpose. Further, the learned judge could not have made such directions and had to leave it to the parties try to agree directions because P had yet to serve the Writ of Summons in HCA2384/2018, and Li Sr’s counsel only lately become aware of such proceedings and had to take instructions from Li Sr. Given the whole rationale of the Bharwaney Order was to put arrangements in place to move ahead with first setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/ Damages Judgments, which was contrary to P’s stance in the Appeal and thereafter, I am persuaded P should pay Li Sr the costs under the 2nd Costs Issue, ie costs reserved under the 2nd Order, to be taxed forthwith if not agreed. 78.As for the basis of costs under the Costs Issues, Li Sr sought costs on indemnity basis. I have set out the broad principles for awarding indemnity costs in paragraph 49 above. It is useful to refer also to the guidance of the Court of Final Appeal in Town Planning Board v Secretary for Protection of the Harbour Ltd (No 2) as follows:[44]
79.In my view, costs under the 2nd Costs Issue should not be on indemnity basis. At the stage of the 2018 Hearing, P’s insistence that he could press ahead with the present action without actually setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments despite some reminders otherwise by Li Sr’s solicitors prior to the 2018 Hearing was, in my view, unmeritorious, but it could not be said to so patently hopeless as to warrant costs reserved under the 2nd Order (ie costs of and occasioned by the 2018 Hearing) to be payable by P to Li Sr on indemnity basis. 80.But the same could not be said for costs under the 1st Costs Issue. In the period after the 2018 Hearing, P had the benefit not only (a) reminders by Li Sr’s solicitors prior to such hearing as to the lack of merits as regards P’s stance, but also (b) clear and cogent explanation by Bharwaney J at the 2018 Hearing that debunked P’s contentions and that shined a clear light on way forward for P (and in this respect I refer to the above discussions and analysis), and (c) further letters by Li Sr’s solicitors after the 2018 Hearing that reiterated the learned judge’s observations. Despite these reminders, P, who all along had legal advice, obstinately clung to the stance that the present action could proceed without actually setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments. This was a conscious decision by P (which would keep the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments against Kam Luen intact whilst he would proceed with the present action against Li Sr) because even though he commenced HCA2384/2018 and heard what fell from Bharwaney J at the 2018 Hearing (as I have explained in the analysis and discussions above), he “changed his mind” after the 2018 Hearing and withheld service of the Writ of Summons in HCA2834/2018 (see paragraph 41(c) above). In my view, after the 2018 Hearing, P’s stance was an obviously hopeless and unwarranted one, which caused unnecessary stagnation of the present action for a significant period, and which put P at litigation uncertainty that the court might or might not exercise the discretion to extend the validity of the Writ of Summons in HCA2384/2018 for service on Kam Luen. In my view, it is plainly appropriate that Li Sr’s costs under the 1st Costs Issue, ie costs consequent upon the 1st Order, should be paid on indemnity basis. VIII. CONCLUSION 81.In the premises, I grant the following costs orders:
82.In respect of the costs of the dispute over the Costs Issues, there is no reason why costs should not follow event. I grant a costs order nisi that P shall pay Li Sr costs of and occasioned by the Costs Issues (including all costs reserved if any) to be taxed forthwith if not agreed. 83.In respect of all of the above costs orders, I also order that P’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations. IX. POSTSCRIPT 84.Bharwaney J at the 2018 Hearing colourfully described the developments in HCPI686/2010, DCEC638/2010, the present action and HCA2384/2018 that led to the current confused state of P’s claim for common law damages in respect of the Accident as a “nightmare”. The fact P suffered the Accident more than 10 years ago and was thwarted from final resolution of his common law claim by legal conundrums is, to say the least, regrettable. Delay in litigation gathers costs as a rolling stone gathers moss. Delay in litigation also puts the litigant at litigation risk over legal time limits and over closefisted exercise of post-CJR discretion that sets its face against delay. Here, P was legally aided, so he was at risk over hike in the Director of Legal Aid’s first charge as litigation dragged on over the years. 85.At the 2021 Hearing, I urged P’s solicitors to henceforth take prompt action on behalf of P. Further, as P now has to progress HCA2384/2018, P’s solicitors should carefully assess whether there is any potential conflict of interest, and whether their handling solicitor(s) will have to be witnesses in that action to justify and explain the need for setting aside the HCPI686/2010 Liability/Damages Judgments, in which case they should carefully consider whether they can and/or ought to remain as solicitors on the record for P in that action. 86.Finally, to ensure that there be prompt progress in the future conduct of litigation on behalf of P as an aided person, I direct P’s solicitors to forthwith provide a copy of this Decision to the Director of Legal Aid, so that there will be close monitoring to avoid any further delay in progressing the relevant pieces of litigation arising from the Accident as a result of need to issue appropriate certificates and/or other solicitor-client considerations.
Yu Sun Yau Mak & Lawyers, for the plaintiff Cheng, Yeung & Co, for the defendant [1] see para 4 of the order of this court (as PI Master) dated 13 September 2012 [2] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor HCPI686/2010, Master J Wong (unreported, 6 May 2013) paras 2-3 [3] see Transcript of the 2018 Hearing referred to in para 50 below at pp 10F-L and 13H-K [4] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) para 9 [5] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited DCEC638/2010, DDJ Thomas Lee (unreported, 23 June 2011) [6] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) paras 1 and 10 [7] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) para 14 [8] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) paras 5-8 and 12-13 [9] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) para 14 and Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & ors DCEC638/2010, DDJ Brian Mak (unreported, 12 November 2015) para 3 [10] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) para 1 [11] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) para 2 [12] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) paras 19-29 and Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & ors DCEC638/2010, DDJ Brian Mak (unreported, 12 November 2015) para 4 [13] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & ors DCEC638/2010, DDJ Brian Mak (unreported, 12 November 2015) paras 5-6 [14] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & ors DCEC638/2010, DDJ Brian Mak (unreported, 12 November 2015) para 7 [15] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & ors DCEC638/2010, DDJ Brian Mak (unreported, 12 November 2015) paras 9-16 [16] DDJ Brian Mak subsequently varied the costs order nisi – see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & ors DCEC638/2010, DDJ Brian Mak (unreported, 4 February 2016) [17] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & ors DCEC638/2010, DDJ Brian Mak (unreported, 12 November 2015) paras 17-95 [18] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & ors DCEC638/2010, DDJ Brian Mak (unreported, 12 November 2015) paras 18-48 [19] see Wong Shu Keung v Kam Luen Consolidator Limited & anor DCEC638/2010, HHJ Kent Yee (unreported, 31 October 2013) paras 2 and 6 [20] see letters dated 13 November 2018, 17 September 2019 and 21 February 2020 by P’s solicitors in paras 34,35 and 38 above [21] see letters dated 22 November 2018 and 30 September 2019 by Li Sr’s solicitors in paras 35-36 above [22] 2nd ed Vol 11 para [90.1344] at pp 900-918 [23] see the Transcript at pp 7A-C, 8H-R and 9K-S [24] see the Transcript at pp 10G-L and 13H-I [25] see the Transcript at p 8T-U [26] see the Transcript at p 11N-U [27] see the Transcript at p 25P-R [28] see the Transcript at pp 26O-U and 27A [29] see the Transcript at p 27B-O [30] see the Transcript at pp 13N-14E [31] see the Transcript at pp 14D and 15E-N [32] see the Transcript p 17B-E [33] see the Transcript p 14P-H [34] see the Transcript at p 15O-R [35] see the Transcript at p 21B-D [36] see the Transcript at pp 18S-U and 19A-D [37] see the Transcript at p 21K [38] see the Transcript at p 21 L-R [39] see the Transcript at p 22A-C [40] see the Transcript at pp 22K-U, 23A-M, 24T-U, 25A-F and 28F-J [41] see the Transcript at p 28I-T [42] see the Transcript at pp 29O-U, 30A-U and 31A-I [43] 5th ed paras 1.03-1.04 at p 2 [44] [2004] 2 HKLRD 95, 101-102 (see also Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021 Vol 1 para 62/App/12 at p 1352) |
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