Re Le Anh Hong

Read the full judgment text of CACV 309/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 10 August 2021.

1. This is the appeal by the applicant against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Deputy Judge”)  set out in the Form CALL-1 dated 15 July 2020 refusing her leave to apply for judicial review (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”) [2020] HKCFI 1548 .

Cited by 1 case · Cites 9 cases

Case No.CACV 309/2020[2021] HKCA 1160
Court
Court of Appeal
Date10 Aug 2021
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CACV 309/2020

[2021] HKCA 1160

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 309 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1888 OF 2018)

________________________

RE: LE ANH HONG Applicant

________________________

Before:  Hon Cheung, Au and Chow JJA in Court

Date of Judgment:  10 August 2021

________________________

J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.This is the appeal by the applicant against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Deputy Judge”)  set out in the Form CALL-1 dated 15 July 2020 refusing her leave to apply for judicial review (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”)  [2020] HKCFI 1548.

2.The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”)  dated 27 August 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”)  dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”)  dated 27 November 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”)  rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

3.The applicant filed her Notice of Appeal on 28 July 2020.  On the same date, she consented to have this application to be disposed of on paper without an oral hearing.  This is our judgment.

A.  Background

4.The applicant is a national of Vietnam.  She entered Hong Kong illegally on 16 June 2015 and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 23 July 2015.  She lodged her non-refoulement claim on 20 March 2017.

5.The details of the applicant’s claim and her personal background were set out in paragraph 6 of the Director’s Decision, and paragraph 11 of the Board’s Decision.

6.The applicant claimed that she would be harmed or killed by Dung and his family members if refouled.  The applicant was a café owner.  In around April 2015, she was requested by the police to act as a prosecution witness in court proceedings against one of her customers, Dung.  Shortly after such request, she was threatened and assaulted by Dung’s followers who did not want her to be the witness.  Later in June 2015, Dung was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.  The applicant was threatened and assaulted by someone who blamed her for Dung’s imprisonment.  Out of fear, she fled to Hong Kong for protection.

B.  The Director’s Decision and the Board’s Decision

7.The Director assessed the BOR3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2], the torture risk[3], and the BOR2 risk[4] in the Director’s Decision.  The Director did not accept that the applicant was a genuine non-refoulement protection seeker and rejected the applicant’s claim.

8.The applicant appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board.  The Board decided not to hold an oral hearing for the applicant and proceeded to consider her appeal on paper.  It further found that the applicant’s credibility was in doubt as she failed to provide any concrete proof of her claim, and that, even taking the applicant’s claim to the highest, her dispute with Dung was only private in nature (paragraphs 29 - 35 of the Board’s Decision).  In any event, the Board found that her suggestion that Dung and his family could locate her anywhere in Vietnam and cause her harm was speculation, and internal relocation was available to the applicant (paragraphs 26, 83 - 89 of the Board’s Decision).  Thus, the Board dismissed her appeal.

C.  The Deputy Judge’s Decision

9.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 10 September 2018 seeking leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision.  She only repeated her fear in her supporting affirmation without advancing any grounds of review.

10.After hearing the applicant and considering the materials before him, the Deputy Judge dismissed the applicant’s leave application with reasons at [14] - [17] of the Deputy Judge’s Decision:

“DISCUSSION

14.  The applicant appeared before me. She said that she was treated fairly by the immigration officer and the Adjudicator of the Board. Her lawyer had explained the Director’s Decision to her. The interpreter of the Board had explained to her the Board’s Decision. She had no comments on the Board’s Decision.

15.  In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:

‘13. (1)  … …Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.’

16.  There is nothing to show that the Board had committed any error in its application of the law to her case or in coming to its conclusions on the facts of the case.

17.  The applicant fails to show that she has any reasonable prospect of success in her proposed judicial review.”

D.  Grounds of appeal

11.The applicant’s ground of appeal in her Notice of Appeal was that:

“the grounds of this appeal are that the gravity of my circumstances have noted been weighed or realized by both putative Respondents while considering my non-refoulement claim. I should be given an opportunity to plead my case properly.” [sic]

12.In her supporting affirmation filed on the same date, she simply submitted that there was a good ground of appeal that was not considered by the Deputy Judge.  Yet, she failed to elaborate on what the said good ground was.  In her written submissions, she quoted passages from ST v Director of Immigration[5][2014] 4 HKLRD 277 and Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, and other decisions on Wednesbury unreasonableness.  It is pertinent to note that none of these arguments were put forward before the Deputy Judge.

E.  Discussion

13.The relevant principles regarding appeals on non-refoulement cases have been set out comprehensively in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  They can be summarized as follows.

14.First, the role of the court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board.  While the court in non-refoulement cases will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, it should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence and COI materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.

15.Second, an appeal against the refusal of leave by a judge in the Court of First Instance is not an occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge.  In determining an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and we would only reverse that decision if an appellant can demonstrate that the judge has made errors of law or failed to take into account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

16.Third, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge, the appeal should be dismissed.  It is not the role of the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if it is a fresh application for judicial review.  Otherwise, an applicant could flagrantly disregard the time limit in Order 53, rule 4(1)  of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A).

17.In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the applicant to point out with sufficient particularity the errors allegedly committed by the Deputy Judge in assessing the Board’s Decision.

18.Bearing these principles in mind, we are of the view that this appeal has no merit.

19.The applicant’s ground of appeal as set out at [11] above is clearly not sustainable.

20.As mentioned, the arguments advanced by the applicant on this appeal were not put forward before the Deputy Judge.  As this Court has repeatedly said, in an appeal of this nature, new arguments directed against the Board which have not been canvassed at the Court of First Instance would not generally be entertained: see Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160; United Muslim Association of Hong Kong v Yusuf Yu [2018] HKCA 451 at [40] and [41].  In this light, there is simply no viable ground of appeal against the Deputy Judge’s Decision.  On this basis alone, we will dismiss the appeal.

21.In any event, we have reviewed both the Board’s Decision and the Deputy Judge’s Decision and the reasons they gave for their decisions.  We agree with the Deputy Judge that there is no ground warranting any interference of the Board’s Decision by the court by way of judicial review.

22.For all these reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

(Peter Cheung) (Thomas Au) (Anderson Chow)
Justice of Appeal Justice of Appeal Justice of Appeal

The applicant acting in person



[1]  This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[2]  This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[3]  This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[4]  This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.

[5]  The correct case name for this citation should be ST v Betty Kwan.

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