Aslam Mohammad v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 781/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 September 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 6 May 2021 (“ the Director’s Decision ”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 585 of 2017 under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“ the Ordinance ”).
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HCAL 781/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2507 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 781 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 6 May 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his application for a subsequent claim of HCAL 585 of 2017 under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“the Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh. He had raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 7 March 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life risk under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 27 April 2016 and Notice of Further Decision dated 23 June 2017. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). By its Decision dated 25 August 2017, the Board rejected his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 25 June 2018. 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his appeal was dismissed on 19 November 2018. 8.He applied by notice of motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 27 February 2019. 9.He applied to the Director for subsequent claim by letter dated 7 August 2020 and was rejected by the Director’s Decision. The subsequent claim application 10.The factual basis of his claim is that if he is refouled, he would be harmed or killed by members of Hefazat-e-Islam and/or Jamaat-e-Islam (“mainstream Muslims”) because he was a follower of Mohammad Barkat but his belief was not accepted by some mainstream Muslims. 11.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated as the level of the alleged risks if he returned to Bangladesh was assessed to be low; that state protection was available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 12.The Board agreed with the Director. The adjudicator found that his evidence on his abductions, attacks and vandalism by his enemies was suspicious and unreliable. In the circumstances, he has no factual basis in support of his claim. 13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 14.The applicant had regular contacts with his wife. He relies upon the information from his wife that his enemies are still looking for him. They go to make the enquiry with his wife every 3 months of his whereabouts. He has also produced some documents to the Director. 15.The Director considered that the documents produced by the applicant including his wife’s affidavit are not cogent evidence in support of his subsequent claim. They are hearsay evidence, which cannot be tested. The threat from the mainstream Muslims is the same issue in the original claim. The Director therefore considers that the additional information does not amount to change of circumstances, which, together with the original claim, will not give reasonable prospect of success to his subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 16.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application where he only exhibited the Director’s Decision without specifying any grounds to challenge the Director’s Decision. In Court, he said that he had nothing to say. 17.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 18.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering his evidence as he did in this case. The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision or finding of the facts. 19.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 20.Since there is no reasonable prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.In accordance with Practice Direction 11.3, RPO should be made under the following circumstances:
22.As shown by the procedural history above, it is plain that the applicant refused to accept the unfavourable decisions made by the Director, the Board and the courts. His reasons in support of his subsequent claim are clearly insufficient to overcome the reasons given by the Director and the Board in rejecting his claim. He should be well aware of those reasons himself as he was legally represented for his subsequent claim. 23.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his claim for a subsequent claim, categorically fitting the description of
The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him.[2] 24.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 25.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. The Court should take preventive measures against any abuse. 26.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why a RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 27.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he had nothing to say. 28.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.A RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant. Dated the 7th day of September 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1, §48 [2] Ibid §§7 & 8 |
Cases cited in this judgment