Re Ononiwu Okechukwu Raymond
Read the full judgment text of CACV 613/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 29 September 2021.
1. This is an appeal against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“ Judge ”) on 12 November 2020 (“ Judge’s Decision ”) refusing to grant leave for judicial review. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“ Board ”) given on 18 October 2018 (“ Board’s Decision ”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”) of his non-refoulement claim (“ NRF Claim ”).
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CACV 613/2020 [2021] HKCA 1440 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 613 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 2935 OF 2018) ________________________
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________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“Judge”) on 12 November 2020 (“Judge’s Decision”) refusing to grant leave for judicial review. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 18 October 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”). Such rejection was embodied in, and communicated to the applicant by, a notice of decision dated 12 October 2017 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of Nigeria now aged about 53, is a fear of being harmed or even killed by members of the Boko Haram (“BH”), a Jihadist terrorist group in Nigeria which is affiliated with the ISIS and targets Christians and their properties in order to convert them to Islam so as to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. 3.The circumstances giving rise to such fear have been set out in paragraphs 13 to 40 of the Director’s Decision; paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Board’s Decision; and [1] to [13] of the Judge’s Decision embodied in the Form CALL-1 dated 12 November 2020, [2020] HKCFI 2876 (“Form CALL-1”). 4.Briefly:
Overstaying in Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 5.The applicant arrived in Hong Kong as a visitor on 15 May 2015 after stopping over in, inter alia, South Africa where he stayed for about a week to conduct certain business negotiations. He did not encounter any problems throughout his journey with the use of his Nigerian passport. 6.Instead of leaving before the expiry of his visa, the applicant overstayed since 6 June 2015. He surrendered to the Immigration Department on 11 June 2015. He raised the NRF Claim by written representation dated 5 October 2015. Director’s Decision 7.After considering the information provided by the applicant in his Non-refoulement Claim Form dated 9 September 2017 and at the screening interview on 29 September 2017, the Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated under any of the applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4].
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 8.The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board on 23 October 2017. In the notice of appeal/petition, the applicant added that the BH have incorporated elements of Fulani herdsmen into their organisation. He also raised a new claim that the Nigerian government is killing the Igbo people to which the applicant belongs. 9.The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 30 July 2018, where the applicant gave evidence and answered the Board’s questions through an Igbo/English interpreter. 10.The Board dismissed the appeal on all 4 applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection. In summary,the Board did not find the applicant a credible witness and considered his entire account to be fanciful, inconsistent and implausible. The applicant had been working in Lagos from 1984 to 2012. The Board found it difficult to understand and accept why he would move to Maiduguri in 2013 where BH insurgency had been going on for a number of years and why when he was threatened by the BH to convert to Islam, he did not escape with his family when there were opportunities to do so. The Board did not accept that the applicant had lived in Maiduguri for any period of time, nor had he ever been directly threatened by the BH, or that the BH had killed his wife or parents. In any event, reasonable state protection is available having regard to the relevant COI and internal relocation to Lagos, where the applicant had lived and worked for 28 years, is a reasonable and viable option. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 11.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (“Form 86”) issued under HCAL 2925/2018 on 12 December 2018, the applicant applied for judicial review of the Board’s Decision without stating any proposed grounds for relief. 12.In the supporting affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant put down the following bullet-points:
13.The applicant did not ask for an oral hearing and the Judge considered the application on paper. The Judge dismissed the application for leave for judicial review for the reasons set out in [31] to [33] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal - grounds of appeal and submission 14.By a notice of appeal filed herein on 20 November 2020, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on the grounds that he would face hardship if he should return to Nigeria (“Ground1”); and that the Board made groundless speculations as a result of relying on non-officially recognised or hearsay new and outdated cases (“Ground 2”). 15.On 21 May 2021, the applicant lodged written submission, by which he referred to ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[5] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, exparte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514 for the trite propositions (1) that high standards of fairness are required in the adjudication of non-refoulement claims (and the rationale for such requirement); (2) that the courts will on judicial review subject such adjudication to rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny to ensure that high standards of fairness have been met; and (3) that the necessary high standards of fairness require the claimant to be given every reasonable opportunity to establish his claim. 16.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 20 September 2021. He stated that the situation in Nigeria is still volatile and chaotic and asked for more time to wait and see if the country would become stabilised. Discussion Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 17.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 18.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[6]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2) & (4)]. Ground 1 19.As summarised above, the NRF Claim failed on the facts at both stages of the unified screening mechanism. The questions whether the applicant would be at risk of life or torture if he is refouled to Nigeria and, if so, whether the danger would be lowered or negated by the availability of state protection and/or reasonable internal relocation options are all questions of fact within the province of the Board (after the Director). The applicant’s much-repeated bare assertion that he would face hardship if he should return to Nigeria is inconsistent with the findings of both the Director and the Board. The applicant has not advanced any ground for judicial review, properly so called, that indicates any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board (or the Director) in reaching the negative findings of fact against him. Ground 2 20.As for Ground 2, the applicant has not identified what unofficial or hearsay news or outdated cases that the Board had improperly relied on and in what respects the Board had made “groundless speculations”. 21.Turning to the written submission, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate on whether and, if so, how the legal principles he cited had not been honoured in the processing of the NRF Claim. 22.In short, the applicant did not in the Form 86 or the accompanying affirmation point to any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the findings by the Board. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was hopeless and rightly dismissed. Nor did he in the notice of appeal or the written or oral submission before us identify any error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was plainly wrong. We cannot discern any either. 23.In any event, we have anxiously scrutinised the Board’s Decision and the Judge’s Decision and are satisfied that they are both in order. Disposition 24.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant was unrepresented and absent [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] The correct citation should be ST v Betty Kwan. [6] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
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