Hoshen Mohammad Monir v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1201/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 8 October 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 July 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 407 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
|
HCAL 1201/2021 [2021] HKCFI 2885 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1201 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 July 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 407 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written representation on 27 June 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently on BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance. His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 8 July 2016 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 3 August 2017. 4.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 7 March 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board rejected his appeal. 5.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 11 December 2018 (the “Court’s Order”). 6.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his application was refused by the Court of Appeal on 25 June 2019. 7.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 October 2019. 8.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 16 March 2021. 9.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 23 March 2021. 10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of his claim is that if he is refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the people from the Awami League (“AL”) and the Chatra League as you were a member of the Chatra Dal, which was the student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) and he refused to join them. 12.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that there was no evidence for believing that he would be harmed or killed by the AL people upon his return to Bangladesh; that the credibility of his evidence was in doubt as he was not a politically prominent member in BNP; that there was no evidence to show acquiescence of any public officials and reasonable state protection was available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 13.The Board agreed with the Director. The Board also found that he had fabricated a story to corroborate his claim. 14.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 15.He relied upon the information that the AL people are still targeting him. His younger brother was killed by them. 16.The Director rejected his grounds in support of his subsequent claim for the reason that the information was hearsay evidence from his friend, which could not be tested. The report of his younger brother’s death was the hearsay evidence. The Director does not accept that those are significant change of circumstances as his threats are the same from the AL people in his original claim. Such information, coupled with the original claim, would not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He enclosed the Director’s Decision with his affirmation without setting out specific grounds in support of his application. 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he did not know what to say. 20.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering his evidence as he did in this case. The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the fact. Before me, the applicant said he came to Hong Kong for safety only. 21.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. According to the Director, the incidents after the determination of the original claim are the continuation of the facts in the original claim. I agree. 22.The applicant has no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 8th day of October 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 |
Cases cited in this judgment