Millan Immaculada Traiso v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1351/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 October 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 8 September 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1644 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
|
HCAL 1351/2021 [2021] HKCFI 3146 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1351 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 8 September 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1644 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from the Philippines. She raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 25 July 2016. 4.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 19 January 2018. 5.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 8 August 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal. 6.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 16 July 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.She appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and her application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 October 2019. 8.Her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 19 December 2019. 9.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 2 March 2021. 10.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter of 1 April 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of her claim is that if refouled, she will be harmed or killed by the creditor because she was unable to pay back her loan. 13.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that the level of risk of her being harmed or killed if she returned to the Philippines was assessed to be low; that reasonable state protection was available to her and that internal relocation was an option open to her. 14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. The Board also found that her evidence at the hearing was vague and unpersuasive; that her evidence regarding the loan for repairs to the property was fabricated and that she gave evidence not speaking from personal experience, showing that she was fabricating her evidence. 15.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.She relied upon the fact that her friend in the Philippines told her that the creditor was still looking for her. The Director said that this fact had been considered in the original claim. 17.The Director does not accept that there is significant change of circumstances. Such information, coupled with the original claim, would not give her subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application. She enclosed the Director’s Decision with her affirmation without specifying any grounds in support of her application. 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant agreed that the Director was not wrong in his decision. 21.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering her evidence as he did in this case. The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the facts. 22.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating her original claim in her subsequent claim application. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Before me, the applicant said the law is not wrong for the RPO. 28.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts of the original claim for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant. Dated the 27th day of October 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 |
Cases cited in this judgment