Urgel Narcisa Anadia v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1367/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 October 2021.
1. Pursuant to Order 20, rule 8 and Order 53, rule 3(6) of the Rules of the High Court, Form 86 is amended to the effect that the proposed respondent is the Director of Immigration.
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HCAL 1367/2021 [2021] HKCFI 3154 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1367 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.Pursuant to Order 20, rule 8 and Order 53, rule 3(6) of the Rules of the High Court, Form 86 is amended to the effect that the proposed respondent is the Director of Immigration. 2.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 9 September 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 664 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 3.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 4.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from the Philippines. She raised torture claim with the Immigration Department, which was rejected by the Director on 20 January 2012. She did not appeal against this Decision, which has become final. She raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written representation received on 24 October 2013 on the grounds of BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 16 August 2016 and Notice of Further Decision dated 12 May 2017. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 14 July 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal. 7.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 30 January 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 8.Her application for appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal out of time was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 11 November 2019. 9.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 25 February 2021. 10.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter of 4 March 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of her claim is that if she is refouled, she will be harmed or killed by the gangsters of a drug syndicate and her ex-cohabitant, Ronnie. She was a drug pusher for the drug syndicate. But she left it and she was being hunted by the gangsters. 13.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that there was no evidence for believing that she would be harmed or killed by her enemies upon her return to the Philippines; that her allegation that the drug syndicate was very powerful was too far-fetched; that reasonable state protection was available to her and that internal relocation was an option open to her. 14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decisions. The Board also found that the government was not involved and that it would not be too harsh for her to relocate herself if necessary. 15.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.She relied upon the same facts and in addition, that her sibling was taken away by some armed men. But there is no evidence to show that this incident is related to her case. 17.The Director does not accept that there is significant change of circumstances. Such information, coupled with the original claim, would not give her subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application. She said that the Director was wrong in making his decision because he had not made proper inquiry and without careful understanding of her situation. She invited the immigration officer to tour her country to make enquiry. 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that the Director is not wrong in his decision and she only asked for more time to stay in Hong Kong. 21.To say that the Director is wrong in making his decision is only her opinion without any specific evidence. It is not necessary for the immigration officer to tour her country in order to understand the situation there. The immigration officer can rely upon the country of origin information, which he/she has done in this case. 22.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering her evidence as he did in this case. The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the facts. 23.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating her original claim in her subsequent claim application. 24.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Before me, she asked for more time in Hong Kong. 29.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts of the original claim for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 27th day of October 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment