Sukari Siti Maesaroh v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 1427/2021

[2021] HKCFI 3502

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1427 of 2021

BETWEEN

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;     or
	consideration of documents and Applicant being present in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.      Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.      A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.Pursuant to Order 20, rule 8 and Order 53, rule 3(6) of the Rules of the High Court, Form 86 is amended to the effect that the proposed respondent is the Director of Immigration.

2.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 11 August 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 611 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

3.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

The procedural history

4.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Indonesia. She raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written representation received on 26 May 2011 on the grounds of Torture risk; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance.

5.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 27 July 2016 and Notice of Further Decision dated 21 July 2017 on BOR 2 risk.

6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”).  By its Decision dated 22 September 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal.

7.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 30 April 2019 (the “Court’s Order”).

8.Her application for appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal out of time was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 9 September 2019.

9.Her notice of motion for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 21 December 2020.

10.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letters of 1 June 2021, 3 June 2021, 9 June 2021 and 28 June 2021.

11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

12.The factual basis of her claim is that if she is refouled, she will be harmed or killed by her husband in domestic violence.

13.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that the risk of her being harmed or killed by her husband was assessed to be low; that state protection was available to her and that internal relocation was an option open to her.

14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision.

15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

16.She relied upon the same facts and in addition, that her husband has become more violent and drunk. She relied on news from her neighbour that her husband was drunk and had burnt down his house and his neighbour’s house, causing death to the neighbour’s son.  The neighbour was angry and pushed the blame on her, threatening that she would be killed if she returned to Indonesia.

17.The Director does not accept the neighour’s material because it was hearsay evidence, which could not be tested.  The Director also did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances; such information, coupled with the original claim, would not give her subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application. She enclosed the Director’s Decision without setting out any specific grounds in support of her application.

19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power.  See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.  Before me, the applicant agreed that the Director was not wrong in his decision, but she asked to be allowed to stay for a few more months.  She also asked for bail.

21.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering her evidence as he did in this case.  The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision or finding of the facts.

22.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating her original claim in her subsequent claim application. 

23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision.  The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

The RPO

24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process.  The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her.  See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process.  The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her.  The applicant has been sent the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Before me, she had nothing to say.

28.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts of the original claim for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only.  I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)     The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the Court of First Instance, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)     All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)     At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)     Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same.

(5)     All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct.

(6)     If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)     Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)     Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)     No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)   This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(11)   A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

29.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 2^nd day of December2021

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1