Gurvinder Singh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1460/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 December 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 September 2021 (the “ Director’s Decision ”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 108 of 2018 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “ Ordinance ”).
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HCAL 1460/2021 [2021] HKCFI 3844 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1460 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 September 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 108 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from India. On 10 March 2014, he was arrested for overstaying in Hong Kong. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written signification dated 20 March 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 29 December 2015 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 27 October 2016. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 2 January 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 15 January 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.His application for extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the court and his application to the Court of Appeal for extension of time to appeal was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 22 October 2019. 8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 16 April 2020. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 29 June 2021. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by 2 letters dated 30 August 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by his paternal uncle due to a land dispute between his father and his uncle. 13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that the past events did not show that his uncle intended to harm or kill him; that his intention of coming to Hong Kong for asylum was in doubt as he had delayed in seeking protection after he had arrived in Hong Kong; that there was no evidence to show that the state was involved; that his treatment in the police station did not amount to torturing and it was only an isolated incident as the country of origin information demonstrated that the government did not tolerate violence. Also, state protection would be available and internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. It further found that the applicant was unable to show that he had real risk of being harmed or killed as he claimed if he returned to India. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.In support of his subsequent claim, he had submitted a statement repeating his story for his original claim. He further said that he had information from India that his enemy was still looking for him. His enemy had gone to his house and opened fire in his house in India. 17.The Director does not accept that the additional materials are significant change of circumstances as his threats arise from his original claim, which had been considered. His enemy is the same. It was a personal dispute where the state was no involved. Those grounds had been considered by the Director and the Board in his original claim. The additional information is hearsay material, which cannot be tested. Coupled with the original claim, the additional information will not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He said: ‘The Decision of the Director of Immigration is …unfair and unjustified because I was given no chance to submit any evidence in support of my claim. There was no screening interview and decision was only based on presumed facts which is collected and examined from unreliable sources…’ 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526 CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he could not say that the Director was wrong in his Decision. 21.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. His enemies are the same. 22.The applicant’s grounds in support of his application do not assist him. His comments that the Director’s Decision is only his personal opinion without any evidence to support. He had been given chance to submit statement in support of his subsequent claim application. The law provides no mechanism for screening interview because this is a subsequent claim. He has already had screening interview, in which he was legally represented by a duty lawyer, in his original claim. There is nothing amiss in the procedure. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said he had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 30th day of December 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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