Ahmed Ibrar v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1623/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 11 January 2022.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 29 October 2021 (the “ Director’s Decision ”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 898 of 2018 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “ Ordinance ”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1623/2021 [2022] HKCFI 142 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1623 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 29 October 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 898 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from India. In October 2008 he came to Hong Kong and lodged a torture claim. He then withdrew his claim and returned to India. On 14 March 2014, he was arrested for illegally remaining in Hong Kong. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written signification on 17 March 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 31 August 2017. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 16 May 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 14 June 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 September 2019. 8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 December 2019. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 8 April 2021. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 14 April 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by his friends with whom he had business dispute, friends whom he owed debt and his ex-wife’s uncle because he and his ex-wife had eloped to get married. 13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that there was no substantial ground for believing that he would face a real risk of being subjected to torture if he returned to India; that state protection would be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.In support of his subsequent claim, he said that his friend and his sister in India told him that his enemies were still looking for him. They threatened to kill him upon seeing him. Police were also looking for him. If he returned to India, he would be arrested. 17.The Director does not accept that those are significant change of circumstances as his threats arise from his original claim, which had been considered. His enemies are the same and for the reasons they looked for him are the same. Those grounds had been considered by the Director and the Board in his original claim. The additional information and the documents submitted, coupled with the original claim, would not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He said that the Director’s Decision is wrong because he had not been to India to understand the situation himself. It is still dangerous to go back to India at this time. 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526 CA §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he could not say that the Director was wrong. 21.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. His enemies are the same and they hold the same reasons for attacking him and his father. The Director is right to hold the view that those circumstances do not constitute significant changes of circumstances that will give realistic prospect of his subsequent claim. 22.The applicant’s grounds in support of his application do not assist him. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129 § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said he had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 11th day of January 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment