Mohammed Shanwaz v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 1723/2021

[2022] HKCFI 147

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1723 of 2021

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and Applicant being present in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.         Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.         A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 November 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2822 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

The procedural history

3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from India. On 9 February 2014, he was arrested for illegal remaining in Hong Kong. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written signification dated 10 February 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention.

4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 13 October 2017.

5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 30 November 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal.

6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 27 November 2019 (the “Court’s Order”).

7.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 13 May 2020.

8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 28 July 2020.

9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 30 August 2021.

10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 13 September 2021.

11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.

The subsequent claim application

12.The factual basis of his claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by his creditor Mohammed Salaudin.

13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that from the past events, the risk of him being harmed or killed upon refouled was low; that state protection would be available and that internal relocation was an option open to him.

14.He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The Board agreed with the Director’s views and further found that his evidence was contradictory and therefore incredible. It was a fabrication of a story for his claim.

15.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

16.In support of his subsequent claim, he had submitted a statement to the immigration officer saying that according to his father and friend in India, his enemies are still looking for him; that Salaudin’s subordinate Tawari had made false charges of robbery and murder against him; that the judicial system in India is corrupt and many people committed suicide because they were pressed by their creditors and finally COVID-19 is rampant in India, therefore the Hong Kong government has a duty to keep him here. Internal relocation is not feasible as his creditor may locate him quite easily.

17.The Director does not accept that the additional materials are significant change of circumstances as his threats arise from his original claim, which had been considered. His enemy is the same. Those grounds had been considered by the Director and the Board in his original claim. The additional information is hearsay material, which cannot be tested. COVID-19 is a pandemic disease worldwide, not only confined to India, which cannot be the reasons in support of his subsequent claim. The Director considers that, coupled with the original claim, the additional information will not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review

18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He stated that the Director had set the threshold too high for his application; that the immigration officer did not consider his situation carefully and is therefore biased and erred; that there was no interview for him, contrary to a fair procedure; that he was unable to obtain documentary evidence because of COVID-19; that he is now a wanted person charged with murder and the immigration officer was in error not to take that in account as new circumstances; that there was not a chance for him to appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board, which is procedurally unfair for him; that the Director was merely trying to dispose of his case as quickly as possible and he did not pay attention to his evidence carefully.

19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision.  The Court will not usurp his fact finding power.  See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526 CA §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant agreed that the Director was not wrong in making his decision.

21.The grounds given by the applicant above will not assist him. Most of his complaints are his opinions or comments without specific evidence in support of them.  The immigration officer had considered his case and his new materials.  He had also given his reasons for coming to his conclusion.  There was no interview for his subsequent claim application because this is provided by the law. He had been screened by the immigration officer in his original claim. This subsequent claim is only a continuation of the original claim because the immigration officer will consider the new materials, together with his original claim, to assess if the new materials will give him a realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim.  For the same reason, the Torture Claims Appeal Board is not necessary for the subsequently applications. There is nothing amiss in the procedures.  The fact that he is subject to a murder charge is not a reason for his claim.  The Director does not accept that he will not have a fair trial in India.  He is entitled to make such an assessment, having considered the country of origin information.  There is no objective evidence in support of his comments on the Director.

22.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision.  The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

23.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process.  The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him.  See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129 § 25.

26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process.  The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him.  The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing.

28.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said he had nothing to say.

29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only.  I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the Court of First Instance, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless this Court or the designated Judge should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of this Court or the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)   This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(11)   A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

30.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 20^th day of January 2022

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1