Kartini v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1737/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 January 2022.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 13 December 2021 (the “ Director’s Decision ”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1911 of 2018 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “ Ordinance ”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1737/2021 [2022] HKCFI 146 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1737 of 2021
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 13 December 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1911 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Indonesia. She raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written representations dated 22, 23 and 28 February 2017 on the grounds of Torture risk; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 27 February 2018. 5.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 24 August 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal. 6.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 23 May 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.Her application for appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 9 September 2019. 8.Her notice of motion for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 25 March 2020. 9.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter of 15 September 2021. 10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of her claim is that if she is refouled, she will be harmed or killed by her husband, Darminti, and her creditors. 12.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that the alleged treatment did not attain a minimum level of severity; that the past incidents did not show that her husband or her creditor would harm or kill her; that state protection was available to her and that internal relocation was an option open to her. 13.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. It further found that her evidence in relation to her guarantee of her husband’s loan or the assault by the creditor were all unacceptable. In a nutshell, there was no factual basis in support of her claim. 14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 15.In support of her subsequent claim, the applicant relied upon the same facts and in addition she said that her uncle had been keeping contacts with her and advised her that she should not return to Indonesia as her husband was still looking for her and so was her creditor. 16.The Director did not accept that there is any significant change of circumstances and such information, coupled with the original claim, would not give her subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application. She has not set out any specific ground in support of her application. 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526 CA §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant agreed that the Director was not wrong to make the decision. 20.The Director is entitled to reach his conclusion after considering her evidence as he did in this case. 21.The applicant has raised no valid challenge to the Director’s Decision. 22.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating her original claim in her subsequent claim application. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic chance of success in her intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision, I dismiss her application. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Before me, she said that she had nothing to say. 29.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts of the original claim for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 20th day of January 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment