Akter Shahana v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 33/2022

[2022] HKCFI 502

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 33 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;     or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

1.         Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.         A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 23 December 2021 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after her previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.   

2.The Applicant is a 35-year-old national of Bangladesh who arrived in Hong Kong on 12 February 2014 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her employment was prematurely terminated on 21 October 2014, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and on 4 December 2014 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if she returned to Bangladesh she would be harmed or killed by the local supporters of the political party Awami League (“AL”) as she had supported their rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”).

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim          

3.By a Notice of Decision dated 31 May 2016 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 6 July 2017 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.In his decisions the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from those local AL supporters upon her return to Bangladesh as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no reason or evidence that she had been specifically targeted by those AL people given that she had held no official position in BNP, that in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Bangladesh with a large population spread across a vast territory that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of Bangladesh away from her home district in large cities such as Dhaka where it would be difficult if not impossible for those AL people to locate her.

5.The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decisions was dismissed by the Board on 11 August 2017 after hearing her in evidence and submissions and upon finding no merits in her claim or her appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decisions.

6.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock on 11 May 2018 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for her intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in her process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in her intended application (HCAL 524/2017 [2018] HKCFI 918).

7.However, even before the Court’s decision was handed down, the Applicant on 5 February 2018 filed another Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the same decision of the Board before another court, and put forth similarly irrelevant pro-forma grounds commonly used in applications of this nature but of dissimilar facts, and which was also rejected by Deputy Judge Josiah Lam on 2 April 2019 upon finding her complaints in this second application had all been rejected by another court in her previous application and that her second such application was an abuse of process (HCAL 161/2018 [2019] HKCFI 860). 

8.The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the Deputy Judge’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23 April 2020 (CAMP 215/2019 [2020] HKCA 156).

9.The Applicant’s notice of motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 September 2020 ([2020] HKCA 757), and then by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal on 23 September 2021 under Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap 484A.

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

10.Less than 1 week later on 27 September 2021 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that her political problem as stated in her previous claim has still remained unresolved in Bangladesh in that those AL people are still looking for her and have threatened her family and damaged her home, and hence she still fears of being killed by the AL people if refouled to her home country.  

11.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

12.Accordingly, on 6 October 2021 the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of her request within 14 days, to which she subsequently replied via her lawyer from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) that she had no further information or evidence for her request and had no objection to her request being assessed on the basis of the information and materials provided in her previous claim.

13.By a Notice of Decision dated 23 December 2021 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that the basis thereof was essentially the same as that of her previous claim, and that she failed to provide any evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since her previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of her previous claim would give her subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success.

14.Two weeks later on 10 January 2022 the Applicant filed her Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, and in her supporting affirmation of the same date she put forth the following grounds for her intended challenge:

(1)  Procedural impropriety in failing to properly apply para 2 of the UN Committee Against Torture General Comment No. 2 whereby satisfaction of a National states obligations to conduct sufficient due diligence requires that reforms and means of relief introduced must be effective in any event of the Director’s decision which focused on whether such reliefs showed merely signs of positive improvement;

(2)  Procedural impropriety in failing to conduct sufficient inquiry into the relevant country of origin conditions that the Applicant would face serious risk from her enemies who will harm her because of her political and statistical view;

(3)  Procedural impropriety/irrationality in failing to conduct any screening interview for her new case that she as a victim would be killed or seriously harmed by her enemies;

(4)  Error/misdirection in law in failing to consider her new facts provided in her request for subsequent claim showing risk to her life from the money lender to her and her family members if refouled to her home country;

(5)  Procedural impropriety in failing to consider her fear from her enemies if refouled to her home country where she cannot relocate to other places as her enemies can easily trace her wherever she may hide in her country; and

(6)  No sufficient basis to consider that she and her family would not be at risk of being subjected to torture and/or CIDTP upon refoulement to her home country.      

15.These grounds however are all just some broad and vague assertions of the Applicant containing some key words and phrases but without any details or particulars or elaborations as to how they apply to her case, or how the Director had erred in his decision in refusing her request to make a subsequent claim when all she could do was to repeat her previous claim as before notwithstanding the assistance of her lawyer from DLS who as noted above in writing conceded that the Applicant was unable to provide any documentary evidence in support of her request for a subsequent claim, while any claims of any new threats from any money lender or any threats of torture or CIDTP are simply wild assertions of the Applicant unsupported by any facts or factual basis, nor was she able to do so at the hearing of her application, and as such I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for her intended challenge. 

16.In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request for subsequent claim, and given the total lack of any evidence from her of any significant change of circumstances since her previous claim was determined, I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I accordingly refuse her leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

17.Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal dated 23 September 2021, but that the Applicant is still trying to re-litigate her case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same facts and basis as before, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against her.

18.Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a)   it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b)   it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a)   may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b)   may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

19.In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.  

20.His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

21.In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate her non-refoulement claim without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and as noted above that it is not the first time that she has been found to be guilty as such, and while her written submission dated 18 January 2022 showing that she being a lowly educated person without any legal knowledge is trying to seeking protection for her life is simply no excuse for her such conduct, henceforth unless a RPO is made against her, she will likely continue to do so and thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

22.Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the Court of First Instance unless with leave obtained under paragraph (2);

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to this Court or the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with her said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless this Court or the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of this Court or the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)     This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order; and

(11)     A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition 

23.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

24.A RPO in terms of paragraph 22 be made against the Applicant.  

Dated the 16^th day of February 2022.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1