Chan Fok Yi, The Executor of the Estate of Chan Li Mui, Deceased v. Koo Loi Shing and Another
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 3158/2016 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 17 February 2022.
1. This case concerns a dispute in the interest of Lot No. 25 in D.D. 79, North, New Territories (“Lot 25”).
Cites 2 cases
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DCCJ 3158/2016 [2022] HKDC 62 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 3158 OF 2016 ________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Coram: His Honour Judge Harold Leong in Court Date of Hearing: 3, 6-7, 9 December 2021 Date of Judgment: 17 February 2022 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ 1.This case concerns a dispute in the interest of Lot No. 25 in D.D. 79, North, New Territories (“Lot 25”). Background 2.It is not disputed that Lot 25 forms part of the estate of the Deceased, who passed away in April 2007. The plaintiff was appointed the other executor of the estate of the Deceased in February 2016 and became the only executor in July 2016. 3.In June 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action to claim for, inter alia, vacant possession of Lot 25 including the area which was alleged to be occupied by the 1st defendant. 4.In December 2018, the plaintiff partitioned Lot 25 into Lot 25 Section A (referred to in the pleadings and hereinafter as “the Area”), Section B (referred to in the pleadings and hereinafter as “the Canopy”) and Remaining Portion (referred to in the pleadings and hereinafter as “the Garden”). The plaintiff sold the Canopy to a third party around the same time. 5.The 1st defendant claimed adverse possession of the Area (which he claimed to have occupied since 1966) and the Garden (which he claimed to have occupied and use since 1967). He also claimed to be told by his great grandmother before her death in 1971 that she had paid HK$30 to a male person to buy the house built on the Area and the Garden in 1968. 6.The plaintiff has erected a wire fence around the Garden in early 2017 and claims to have recovered possession to the exclusion of all others up to now. The 1st defendant is seeking damages in respect of this in his counterclaim. Preliminary issue 7.The 1st defendant, in his counsel’s Opening Submission, raised an alternative case (paragraph 28(a) of the 1st defendant’s Opening Submission) that the main issues were “whether the 1st defendant has established exclusive factual possession…for at least 20 years at the material times or 12 years before the commencement of the action…” 8.The plaintiff objected to the alternative case of the 1st defendant claiming exclusive factual possession “for 12 years before the commencement of proceedings”. 9.During the hearing, the court has ruled against allowing the 1st defendant to pursue the alternative case and has given reasons. There is no need to repeat this here. 10.As such, the 1st defendant’s case as pleaded is that he and members of his family have occupied the Area commencing from around 1966 and the Garden commencing from around 1967. This dated from prior to 1991 so the 1st defendant’s case was that he has exclusive factual possession for at least 20 years. The legal principles 11.The law on adverse possession is trite and need not be repeated in details here: in short, to established possession the 1st defendant need to show factual possession and an intention to possess for a period of at least 20 years. 12.It is also trite that once the 1st defendant established adverse possession and extinguish the owner’s title, a subsequent acknowledgement cannot revive the title (Chong Yuk Por v Chan Kam Muk DCCJ 3826/2007). The plaintiff’s evidence 13.The plaintiff’s first witness was Chan Choi Mei (“Ms. Chan”). The plaintiff is her father and, in view of his old age, Ms. Chan assisted him with his role as the executor in this matter, including dealing and liaising with the plaintiff’s solicitors, Messrs. Fu & Cheng (“Fu & Cheng”). 14.Ms. Chan confirmed that no plots of land were individually listed in the Deceased’s Will and no rental agreements were found in the Deceased’s personal belongings. However, she was aware that the Deceased had been receiving rental income for a living. The plaintiff had instructed Fu & Cheng to investigate the estate of the Deceased during which Lot 25 and also another piece of land close by, Lot 37, amongst others, were revealed. The plaintiff had then instructed Fu & Cheng to follow-up on such matters. 15.Ms. Chan never attended Lot 25, and her evidence is restricted to what she heard as reported by the handling solicitor from Fu & Cheng, Cheng Fung Yee (“Ms. Cheng”), or from others. In particular, paragraphs 8 to 20 of Ms. Chan’s witness statement (Trial Bundle B, pages 181 to 185) stated:
16.Mr. Ng, a clerk working at Fu & Cheng at the time, gave evidence next. He has accompanied Ms. Cheng to the visit to Lot 25 on 11 May 2016 (and he has also re-visited on 19 May and 12 June 2016 to serve various letters) and so he is a witness to the events on that day. 17.Mr. Ng’s evidence was that:
18.As such, the evidence of Mr. Ng is very much in line with what Ms. Chan claimed that she was told by Ms. Cheng regarding the events on 11 May 2016. 19.During the cross-examination of Mr. Ng, much time was spent on questioning a possible mix up on his part of the gates of the first and second house when he returned to Lot 25 on 19 May 2016. However, there was no convincing challenge of the rest of his evidence, especially those regarding the events on 11 May 2016. The 1st defendant’s evidence 20.The 1st defendant claimed that he come to Hong Kong in 1966 and had lived at the Area with his family including his father, mother, brothers and his great grandmother. He claimed that his great grandmother told him in around 1971 (before she passed away) that she bought the Area (or rather the house in the Area) and the Garden for HK$30 in 1968 from a person called “Ar Pin Lo” (or “the Opium Guy”). 21.The 1st defendant also conceded that he was absent from the Area and the Garden for a period of 10 years when he allegedly fled Hong Kong for the mainland in 1992 and was then arrested and jailed from 1997 to 2002. 22.The 1st defendant also produced various documents to support his occupation of the house in the Area e.g. a document that shows that his reported address to the Immigration Department from 1980 to 2017. 23.However, under cross examination, the 1st defendant changed his evidence and revealed that he had another home in the mainland. However, his evidence of when he was living there was rather inconsistent. 24.As for the incident in May 2016, the 1st defendant’s account lacked details or explanations (especially when compared to Mr. Ng’s very detailed account). 25.He simply stated that:
Analysis of the evidence on intention to possess 26.Although I think Mr. Ng might be confused about which gate belongs to the 1st defendant’s house when he returned on 19 May 2016 and might have posted the letter from Fu & Cheng dated 19 May 2016 on the gate of Lot 25 Section B and not on the 1st defendant’s gate, this should not distract from the issue of truthfulness of what he heard the 1st defendant said on 11 May 2016 including the admission that he was a tenant paying HK$700 per month. 27.Mr. Ng was a clerk at Fu & Cheng but he no longer worked there: he left in January 2019 and now worked as a security guard at the airport (Trial Bundle B page 254). There was no challenge from the defendant as to his independence as a witness. There is no evidence to suggest that he has any interest in the outcome of this case nor why he might be a dishonest witness. Furthermore, Mr. Ng has provided plenty of details supported by various photos and documents (attached to his witness statement) to support his version of events on 11 May 2016 so it would be unlikely that his memory of that day was somehow mistaken. 28.Further, it could not be disputed that the 1st defendant had provided Ms. Cheng and Mr. Ng his name, telephone number, HKID number and the numbers of occupiers of the house in the Area, which were all recorded on the Draft Tenancy Agreement. 29.The question must be why the 1st defendant would do so if he had all along believed that he (or his family) had owned the Area since 1966 (or at least since around 1971 when he heard from his great grandmother that she bought the house and Garden in 1968). 30.When asked under cross-examination on how he replied when asked to sign a tenancy agreement on 11 May 2016, the 1st defendant was very evasive. At first, he claimed that he said “nothing”. Then he claimed he asked Ms. Cheng, “Sign what tenancy agreement?” and “I would not pay a cent.” 31.If this had been the 1st defendant’s position right from the start, why would he disclose his personal details to Ms. Cheng? 32.The 1st defendant explained that he disclosed such details because “they threatened me with legal action” and “I was afraid”. 33.I do not believe this. 34.Firstly, this was the first time the 1st defendant claimed that he was “threatened”: none of such allegation ever appeared in the Defence or the 1st defendant’s witness statement. If the 1st defendant had really been threatened and was somehow forced to disclose personal details, this would have been an important issue and would not likely be omitted in the pleadings. 35.Secondly, Mr. Ng’s account of events contained details like what the 1st defendant told him as his monthly rent and how the 1st defendant “stalled” signing the Draft Tenancy Agreement by claiming that he needed to look for the old tenancy agreement. These are details that Mr. Ng would unlikely to fabricate nor be mistaken about. Mr. Ng account of events were logical and reasonable and many aspects of it was supported by various documents. 36.Thirdly, if the 1st defendant had really heard from her great grandmother as long ago as 1971 that she had purchased the house and had truly believed that he (and/or his family) was the owner since 1966 (or 1968), imagine the scenario when one day some strangers knocked on the door and asked him to sign a tenancy agreement: why would the 1st defendant, under the circumstances, either said “nothing”, or reply in the line of “I would not pay a cent”? 37.Instead, I would imagine that the 1st defendant should be very surprised and replied immediately: “What do you mean? Are you crazy? We are the owner! We bought this place many decades ago!” 38.I cannot imagine why the 1st defendant would entertain any further discussions on signing any tenancy agreement or rent to be paid, let alone agreeing to (and actually bothering to attend) another meeting a few days later. 39.Even on the 1st defendant’s own evidence (paragraph 16 of his witness statement, Trial Bundle page 306), he only told Ms. Cheng that “he and his family had lived here all along and never paid rent”. It is evident that he failed to mention that his great grandmother actually bought the Area (or the house on it) and the Garden in 1968 and therefore his family owned the place. I would reasonably expect that this would be the first thing a person would say if he truly believed himself to be the owner. 40.As such, I would think that, on balance, this story about the great grandmother was likely to be the 1st defendant’s self-serving evidence for bolstering his adverse possession claim, probably fabricated at a later stage. 41.It is also important to note that the 1st defendant agreed that he had told Ms. Cheng that he would “consider the rent” on 14 May 2016. The 1st defendant explained that he was trying to “accommodate” or “flatter” (“奉承”) Ms. Cheng. 42.This does not make sense: I cannot see how anyone who truly believes that he (and / or his family) is the owner would say that or feel the need to “accommodate” or “flatter” a lawyer asking him to sign a tenancy agreement. 43.Of course, if the 1st defendant has all along flatly refused to pay rent, it would be hard to explain why Fu & Cheng would bother to seek instructions from the plaintiff regarding bank account for rental payment or bother to write the letter dated 19 May 2016 to him with bank account details (although the 1st defendant denied receiving this letter). 44.Was the 1st defendant suggesting that Fu & Cheng would go to the extent of fabricating all these evidence as some sort of conspiracy? 45.Fourthly, the 1st defendant admitted, under cross-examination, that after disclosing his personal details, he voluntarily told Ms. Cheng that Mr. Yeung was a tenant paying rent and led them to Mr. Yeung’s house to knock on the door. 46.If the 1st defendant really was threatened and felt afraid, one wonders why he would then help Ms. Cheng further instead of simply shutting his door and calling the police? 47.Fifthly, there is no dispute that the tenancy agreement signed by Mr. Yeung on 11 May 2016 was cancelled on 14 May 2016 (Trial Bundle B, page 195 – 196). 48.If Ms. Cheng and others from Fu & Cheng were such bullies who resorted to threatening people, fabricating evidence and conspiring in order to gain an advantage for the client, why would Ms. Cheng cancel Mr. Yeung’s Tenancy Agreement immediately on request from Mr. Yeung’s son on 14 May 2016? Surely, one would expect that Ms. Cheng would simply refuse in order to bully Mr. Yeung as well? 49.As a passing comment, I would put little weight on the evidence of Mr. Tsang Siu Yeung, the 1st defendant’s second witness, who merely gave hearsay evidence from what he claimed was told by the 1st defendant and his family. This is no more than adding another layer of self-serving evidence. What first hand evidence Mr. Tsang gave were unreliable observations as a neighbour. 50.As such, I accept the plaintiff’s evidence over the 1st defendant’s evidence regarding the dealing and conversation between the 1st defendant and Ms Cheng and others in May 2016. 51.I accept that the 1st defendant did admit on 11 May 2016 that, inter alia, he was a tenant and that he was saying rent of HK$700 a month. On balance, I find that the 1st defendant must have been paying HK$700 a month as rent all along. And perhaps when he realised the landlord had passed away and that the lawyers for the executor was actually asking him for evidence for the rental agreement, he sensed an opportunity to exploit the situation and decided to stall. The 1st defendant claimed that he wanted to buy time to see what he could do, and I think he was at least truthful on that aspect. He then saw what he could do: to lay a claim on adverse possession. 52.As such, I find that the 1st defendant simply lacked the requisite intention to possess the Area nor the Garden even up to at least 11 May 2016. Analysis of the evidence on exclusive and factual possession 53.The expert’s evidence was not controversial: from the aerial photos, the Area was built upon by 1969 with fence-wall identified in 1973. Cultivation in the Garden was first seen in 1978 with fence along the western boundary and along the southern boundary first seen in 1986. 54.There is no evidence to suggest that the Garden was cultivated and fenced in in around 1966 as alleged by the 1st defendant. 55.As stated above, the 1st defendant was inconsistent as to whether he had lived in the Area and Garden as the only abode since 1966 (save the period between 1992 and 2002). Under cross-examination, he disclosed that he was married and had children in the mainland prior to 2001. At first, he claimed that he was married around 1980 and had two children shortly afterwards as a result of which he spent nights in the mainland whilst working in Hong Kong during the day for extended period until the children were 1 or 2 years old. 56.Upon return to the witness box the next day, the 1st defendant then volunteered to the court to change his evidence and pushed back the date of marriage to 1988. This date would conveniently be later than 1986 or 20 years from 1966, the date the 1st defendant claimed he first lived in the Area, and exactly 20 years from 1968, the date that the 1st defendant claimed that his great grandmother said she bought the place. It would also conveniently merge with his earlier evidence of the period that he fled Hong Kong in 1992. None of these were supported by any documents. 57.I also note that there was an inconsistency in the 1st defendant’s evidence of the number of occupants of the house in the Area. 58.I accept that even if there is no compelling evidence that the 1st defendant has continuously lived in the Area since 1966, it does not mean that the 1st defendant, or his family, has not continually and factually possessed the Area in question. There are PCCW bill issued to the 1st defendant’s mother dated 2011 and CLP electricity bill issued to his father dated 2017. However, none of the 1st defendant’s family were called to give evidence. 59.With regard to the Garden, there was dispute regarding whether there was ever complete fencing that surrounded the entire Garden, the condition of such fencing all along, and what action the 1st defendant took, if any, after the plaintiff built a new fence surrounding the Garden in early 2017. 60.At the end of the day, any discussion regarding factual possession of the Area and the Garden is not important given the court’s finding that the 1st defendant lacked the intention to possess up to at least 11 May 2016. Conclusion 61.The court therefore dismisses the 1st defendant’s claim for adverse possession for the Area and the Garden and also dismiss the counterclaim for damages regarding damages to the trees and wire netting of the Garden. 62.Since the plaintiff has already recovered possession of the Garden, the court would only order that the 1st and 2nd defendants to deliver vacant possession of the Area back to the plaintiff. 63.The court would also grant an injunction restraining the 1st and / or 2nd defendants from occupying, possessing, entering or otherwise using the Area and the Garden. 64.The calculation for mense profit has been agreed between the parties and the court orders such to be paid for the period between 29 June 2016 to 28 June 2017 be HK$1,272 per month, for the period between 29 June 2017 to 28 June 2018 be HK$1,295 per month, and the period from 29 June 2018 to date of Judgment be HK$1,330 per month. 65.Costs of this action be to the plaintiff with certificate for counsel. 66.The 1st defendant’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.
Mr Tony Chow, instructed by Messrs Fu & Cheng, for the plaintiff Mr Stanley CK Siu, instructed by Messrs Yu, Tsang & Loong, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid Department, for the 1st defendant The 2nd defendant was not represented and did not appear |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 3158/2016