Re Odtujan Derbe Cris Victoria
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 544/2021 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 25 February 2022.
1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 22 July 2020 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decisions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 11 April 2017 and 5 October 2018 (“the 1 st and 2 nd Board’s Decisions” respectively), dismissing the appeals against the decisions
Cited by 1 case · Cites 8 cases
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CAMP 544/2021 [2022] HKCA 248 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 544 OF 2021 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 2426/2018) ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Barma JA and Au JA in Court Date of Judgment: 25 February 2022 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 22 July 2020 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decisions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 11 April 2017 and 5 October 2018 (“the 1st and 2nd Board’s Decisions” respectively), dismissing the appeals against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 12 May 2015 and 10 July 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim (“the Director’s 1st and 2nd Decisions” respectively). Background 2.The applicant is a national of the Philippines. He entered Hong Kong on 17 July 2009 and was permitted to remain as a visitor. He overstayed and was arrested by the police on 26 August 2009. The applicant thereafter lodged a torture claim on 25 February 2010. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by his neighbours. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [4] and [5] of his decision (“the CALL-1 Form”)[1]. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 12 May 2015 and a Further Notice of Decision dated 10 July 2017, the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s 1st Decision covered the torture risk[2], the persecution risk[3] and the BOR 3 risk[4], while the Director’s 2nd Decision covered the BOR2 risk[5]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Board. The Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal in respect of his claim based on the BOR 3 risk, the persecution risk and the torture risk without a hearing. In reaching this decision, the Board assumed that the applicant’s version of events put forward in his non-refoulement claim form and screening interview was truthful. The Board concluded that the events described by the applicant did not disclose a real or existing risk of harm, and even if such risk existed, it could be reduced by internal relocation and state protection 6.As for the applicant’s claim based on the BOR 2 risk, after a hearing on 29 May 2018, at which the applicant was present, the Board dismissed the appeal on 5 October 2018. The Judge’s decision 7.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 1 November 2018 seeking to judicially review the Board’s Decisions. The Judge summarised the grounds relied upon by the applicant as follows (at [12] of his decision):
8.After summarising the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the Board’s and the Director’s Decisions, the Judge refused to grant leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [13] to [18] of the CALL-1 Form:
The present application for extension of time to appeal 9.The applicant’s address as stated in his Form 86 was at Aplieu Street, Sham Shui Po, Kowloon (“the Aplieu Street Address”). According to the court’s record, a copy of the CALL-1 Form and a sealed copy of the Judge’s order were sent by post to the applicant at the Aplieu Street Address on 22 July 2020. This letter was not returned undelivered. 10.The applicant took out a summons in the Court of First Instance on 7 October 2020 seeking extension of time to appeal, in which his address was stated to be at Tai Po Road, Sham Shui Po, Kowloon (“Tai Po Road Address”). In his supporting affirmation filed on the same date, he stated that he did not receive the Judge’s order and decision in time. 11.Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4), the applicant had 14 days to lodge an appeal. The applicant did not file a Notice of Appeal within 14 days of the Judge’s decision dated 22 July 2020. 12.The applicant’s application to appeal out of time was dismissed by the Judge on 2 November 2021[6]. 13.By a summons filed on 1 December 2021, the applicant renewed his application for an extension of time to appeal before this court. In the summons and his supporting affirmation, the applicant simply stated that he did not receive the decision of the court and alleged that the court’s letter had been lost in the post. 14.In his written submissions dated 15 December 2021, the applicant referred to ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[7] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514 for the trite propositions (1) that high standards of fairness are required in the adjudication of non-refoulement claims (and the rationale for such requirement); (2) that the courts will on judicial review subject such adjudication to rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny to ensure that high standards of fairness have been met; and (3) that the necessary high standards of fairness require the claimant to be given every reasonable opportunity to establish his claim. Discussion 15.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed. 16.As noted above, the Judge’s Decision was sent to the last known address of the applicant (which at that time was the Aplieu Street Address) on 22 July 2020, and was not returned undelivered. The inference to be drawn is that he has received that letter from the court, and he has had knowledge of the Judge’s decision within the period he was permitted to lodge the intended appeal. 17.The date on which the applicant had moved from the Aplieu Street Address to the Tai Po Road Address is not known. In any event, it is incumbent upon the applicant to notify the court of any change of address as soon as possible. 18.In the circumstances, we reject the applicant’s explanation or reason for his delay in lodging his intended appeal. 19.We have nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the intended appeal. 20.The applicant has not condescended to any particulars, in the Form 86 or otherwise, as to on what basis the Board’s Decisions were said to be wrong, unfair or Wednesbury unreasonable. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review was hopeless and rightly dismissed by the Judge. 21.The applicant has failed to identify any arguable error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was wrong. Nor can we discern any such matters. 22.Turning to the written submissions and the well-established legal principles cited therein, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate on how they were misapplied or contravened in the processing of his non-refoulement claim. 23.It is well-established that an appeal against a refusal to grant leave for judicial review is not a fresh application for leave, and that an applicant must point to errors on the part of the Judge. This has clearly not been done here. 24.For these reasons, we do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal. This court will not grant an extension of time for a hopeless appeal. The summons filed on 1 December 2021 is accordingly dismissed.
The applicant acting in person [2] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [3] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [7] The correct citation should be ST v Betty Kwan. |
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