Bapari Md Shahin v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 28/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 1 March 2022.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 13 September 2021 (the “ Director’s Decision ”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 363 of 2018 (the “ original claim ”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “ Ordinance ”).
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HCAL 28/2022 [2022] HKCFI 581 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 28 of 2022 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 13 September 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 363 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh. On 17 July 2014, he was arrested for illegal remaining in Hong Kong. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written signification dated 20 July 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 21 November 2016. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 23 June 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 23 February 2018. 7.His duplicated application for judicial review was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 28 June 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 8.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 24 October 2019. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 19 December 2019. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 4 March 2021. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 9 March 2021. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.The factual basis of his claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the members or supporters from Awami League (“AL”) and will face arrest by police under a warrant of arrest. 14.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that there were no substantial grounds for believing that there would be any risk of him being harmed or killed by his enemies or police in Bangladesh. The Director also found that the AL members would not be interested in him. Also, he did not mention the arrest warrant in his statement. There was no evidence to show that he would not have a fair trial even if he is arrested in Bangladesh. Relocation is an alternative option open to him. 15.He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The Board agreed with the Director’s views and further found that his oral evidence was riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions and was therefore incredible. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 17.In support of his subsequent claim, he had submitted a statement to the immigration officer saying that his enemies are still looking for him. They injured his brother and vandalized his home. He brother was taken away by police and had disappeared. He would be kidnapped and murdered by his enemies if he returns to Bangladesh. 18.The Director does not accept that the additional materials are significant change of circumstances as his evidence was only his speculation without credible proof and the information was hearsay. The Director considers that, coupled with the original claim, the additional information will not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He enclosed the Director’s Decision without specifying any ground in support of his application. But on the day before the hearing, he submitted a letter, in which he repeated that his enemies are very influential and they are still looking for him. The opposition leaders and other members had been killed by them. If he is repatriated back to Bangladesh, he would be killed too. He asked the Court not to impose the RPO on him. 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526 CA, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that if he returned to his country, he would be arrested by police and he would not have justice in his country. He did not put it in his statement for his subsequent claim by his friend who assisted him to prepare the statement. He also did not say it in his statement for his original claim. 22.The applicant is unable to show any valid reasons to challenge the Director’s Decision. His evidence had been considered by the Director and the Board in the original claim but was rejected. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretarty for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129 § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant relied upon the written submission mentioned above. However, those reasons are not valid against the RPO. He agreed that he relied upon the same story for his original claim for his subsequent claim. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 1st day of March 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment