Raja Waqar Khan v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 289/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 June 2022.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 December 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1039 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 289/2022 [2022] HKCFI 1940 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 289 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 December 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1039 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Pakistan. On 7 July 2013, he sneaked into Hong Kong illegally from China. He was arrested by police on 12 July 2013 and was referred to the Immigration Department. He lodged non-refoulement claim by way of written representation on 29 November 2014. His claim was then considered under the unified screening mechanism on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 24 November 2016. 5.He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 20 April 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 23 January 2019. 7.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 25 July 2019. 8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 October 2019. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 3 September 2021. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 5 October 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his previous claim is that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by the drug selling people and/or their subordinates who were related to Pakistan Muslim League (N) (“PML(N)”). 13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that the risk of him being harmed by his enemies in Pakistan was low as shown by the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatments from them; that his enemies did not have the intention of killing him; that state protection would be available to him; and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The Board, having considered the evidence, attached no credence at all to his claim that he entered Hong Kong in search of international protection. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.In support of his subsequent claim, he submitted to the Director that his enemies in Pakistan were still looking for him. They had harassed his brother and family for his whereabouts. They demanded payment of money for compensation of their loss in drugs as caused by the applicant. They threatened to kill him if he did not pay the compensation. Police had also received report about him being the leader of a drug dealing gang, which he alleged to be a charge fabricated by his enemies. He would be arrested upon his return to Pakistan. Relocation to another place in Pakistan will not be viable solution because the drug dealers have a widespread network across the country and they will be to locate him wherever he hides. Also, COVID-19 virus in Pakistan is serious. It is simply inhumane to send him back to Pakistan. He has submitted a copy of the police first investigation report on the drug charge against him to the Director for consideration. 17.The above allegations of threats from his enemies had been considered by the Director and the Board in his previous claim and they had been rejected. The Director further considered that his information about his brother being hurt by his enemies for his whereabouts and the harassment of his family is hearsay evidence, which cannot be tested. He has been away from Pakistan for 9 years, the risk of harm and enmity from his enemies should have been dissipated. As to the fabricated charge, the Director considered that he would have a fair trial in Pakistan. COVID-19 virus is a worldwide problem and his assertion of his life being in danger because of the virus if he returns to Pakistan is far-fetched. 18.The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the same or similar facts in support of the subsequent claim, such facts, when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. He dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He enclosed a statement of grounds as follows:
DISCUSSION 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he cannot go back to his country as his life is in danger. 22.Those grounds in paragraph 19 are not valid reasons to challenge the Board’s Decision. Grounds (a), (c) and (d) are his bare assertions without evidence in support. Ground (b) is not relevant as the Director did not believe his evidence on this issue - see paragraph 19 of the Director’s Decision. 23.The applicant is unable to show any valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 24.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 25.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 26.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 27.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 28.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 29.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 30.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said he had nothing more to say. 31.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 32.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 33.RPO in terms of paragraph 31 be made against the applicant. Dated the 27th day of June 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment