Mariana v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 478/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 July 2022.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 26 May 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1918 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
|
HCAL 478/2022 [2022] HKCFI 2189 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 478 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 26 May 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1918 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The applicant appeared before the Court. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Indonesia. She came to Hong Kong as a domestic helper. Her employment was terminated. She overstayed after her last employment in Hong Kong. On 6 August 2015, she was arrested by police for overstaying. On 11 August 2015, she lodged non-refoulement claim on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance 4.Her claim on all applicable risks was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 15 June 2017 5.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 30 August 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal on all claims. 6.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and her application was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 15 July 2020 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.Her application for appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 9 March 2021. 8.Her notice of motion for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 17 June 2021. 9.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 25 February 2022. 10.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim by letter of 12 April 2022. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if refouled, she will be harmed or killed by her step-father, Budi because of family dispute. 13.The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. He found that the ill-treatment by Budi did not attain a minimum level of severity; that risk of being harmed or killed was assessed to be low; that it was only a family dispute without the state’s involvement and state protection would be available to her and that internal relocation was a viable alternative. 14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. The Board found that Budi’s conduct to her was not acceptable and even amounted to attempted rape. But it was a one off incident. There was no evidence that he would harm or kill her. The Board further found that she would be safe if she relocated to live in Surabaya. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.In support of her subsequent claim, the lawyer of applicant submitted that her uncle had told her that her mother had given birth to two children with Budi. Budi had borrowed loan from the bank. He was unable to repay. He told the applicant’s mother to repay the loan. Her mother asked for money from her. She did not have money. The bank also threatened her mother to pay the debt or she would be put in prison. She is therefore afraid of Budi and the Bank now. 17.The Director has considered the additional information. He takes the view that there is no evidence to show that Budi or the Bank would harm or kill her. The Bank is to press her mother for repayment of the loan, not her. The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances and such information, coupled with the previous claim, would not give her subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application, in which she did not set out any ground. 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said she did not mean that the Director was wrong in making the Decision. 21.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 22.Since there is no realistic chance of success in her intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision, I dismiss her application. The RPO 23.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 24.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 25.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 26.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Before me, she said she had nothing to say. 27.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings on the same facts of the previous claim for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 28.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 29.RPO in terms of paragraph 27 be made against the applicant. Dated the 19th day of July 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
|
Cases cited in this judgment