Azharuddin Sk v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 516/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 26 July 2022.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 29 March 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1322 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 516/2022 [2022] HKCFI 2273 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 516 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 29 March 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1322 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from India. On 14 January 2015, he came to Hong Kong as a visitor and was allowed to stay as such. He overstayed and was arrested by police on 3 February 2015 and was referred to the Immigration Department. He lodged non-refoulement claim by way of written representation on 5 February 2015. His claim was then considered on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 31 October 2017. 5.He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 28 June 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 25 January 2019 for want of prosecution and was further dismissed on its merits by the Court by its Order dated 14 January 2020. 7.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 25 August 2020. 8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 28 October 2020. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 28 December 2021. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 10 January 2022. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his previous claim is that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his creditor Arjit and his followers because he failed to repay the debt. 13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that the risk of him being harmed by his enemies in India was low as shown by the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatments from them; that Arjit was not so powerful as to be able to locate him nationwide; that the state was not involved as it was a private monetary dispute; that state protection would be available to him; and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board and he was legally represented. He refused to answer questions from the Board or his legal representative. The Board, having considered the evidence, did not believe that he came to Hong Kong to avoid Arjit. It also did not believe he had borrowed money from Arit. Ultimate, the Board did not accept that, if refouled, there would be a real risk that he would have to face any of the proscribed forms of harm. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.In support of his subsequent claim, he re-affirmed his claim that Arjit is still looking for him. His mother told him that Arjit had gone to her home to look for him. His brother had argument with Arjit and was slapped by him. He has now married in Hong Kong with a son. Arjit’s business in India is hard hit by COVID-19. He would more eager to pursue him for repayment. He does not consider police in India would protect him as they are corrupt. Arjit is familiar with the ruling party and he can locate him even if he moves to live somewhere else. 17.The Director considered that the applicant relies upon the same or similar facts of his previous claim as his enemies are the same and all those issues he has raised in his subsequent claim had been considered in the previous claim. The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the same or similar facts in support of the subsequent claim, such facts, when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. He dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 18.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He has not set out any ground in support of his application. DISCUSSION 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he had a family in Hong Kong. But he considered that the Director was not wrong in his decision. 21.There is no valid reason from the applicant to challenge the Director’s Decision. 22.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 23.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 28.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said he had nothing to say. 29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 26th day of July 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment