董旺建 v. 香港特別行政區行政長官及另一人
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 392/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 July 2022.
1. By a Form 86 dated 26 May 2022, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review, seeking to challenge the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance Cap 599 and the Chinese Medicine Ordinance Cap 549.
Cites 1 case
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HCAL 392/2022 [2022] HKCFI 2300 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 392 OF 2022 ________________________
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______________ D E C I S I O N ______________ 1.By a Form 86 dated 26 May 2022, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review, seeking to challenge the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance Cap 599 and the Chinese Medicine Ordinance Cap 549. 2.This is the Applicant’s second application for leave to apply for judicial review, with regard to the Covid-19 policies of the HKSAR Government. In HCAL 182/2022, Wilson Chan J dismissed the Applicant’s first application by a Decision dated 9 June 2022 [2022] HKCFI 1745. The Decision pointed out that the Applicant had failed to identify any proper grounds of review, contrary to the mandatory requirements of RHC Order 53 rule 3(2)(a)(iii). 3.Similarly, in this application, the Applicant has failed to identify any comprehensible and/or proper grounds of review in support of his application. I agree with the submission made by Ms Liesl Lai, Government Counsel – in a letter dated 6 June 2022, copied to the Applicant – that the purported grounds of challenge set out in the Form 86 read more like an expression of the Applicant’s personal opinion, instead of specific allegations relating to any breach of identified public law duties. The mere regurgitation of certain legal terms commonly found in judicial review applications does nothing to elaborate as to how or why any one of them might be applicable in the intended application. It is no part of the Court’s role to seek to identify any ground of review for an applicant. 4.The Applicant’s failure in this regard is sufficient, on its own, to lead to the refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in these proceedings. There is, therefore, no need to deal with the potential additional questions of delay or insufficient interest/standing. 5.The present application is not reasonably arguable and does not have any realistic prospect of success. Leave to apply for judicial review is refused, with no order as to costs.
The applicant, acting in person Ms Liesl Lai, Government Counsel, of the Department of Justice, for the putative respondents |
Cases cited in this judgment