Re Shah Zahid

CAMP 107/2022

[2022] HKCA 1172

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 107 OF 2022

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 137 of 2019)

__________________________

__________________________

Before:  Hon Chu and M Poon JJA in Court

Date of Judgment: 12 August 2022

________________

JUDGMENT

________________

Hon Chu JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 20 May 2022, this Court handed down our judgment ([2022] HKCA 695) refusing to extend the time for the applicant to appeal the decision of Deputy High Court Judge P Li given on 23 November 2021 which refused to give him leave to apply for judicial review.     

2.On 15 June 2022, the applicant filed a notice of motion to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  He also put in a written submission to support the application.

3.Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.The background to this case and the applicant’s claim has been set out in our judgment. We will not repeat them.

5.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.The notice of motion stated the following as the grounds of appeal:

(1)  The decision maker just relied on country of origin information and facts that favour the rejection of the applicant’s claim.  Actual life is different.

(2)  The officer and the Court prefer to ignore the overwhelming evidence of violence towards the minorities.

(3)  The decision betrays a biased and formulaic approach. It is unlikely that there the danger to the applicant has been fairly assessed.  

7.The written submission quoted extensively from [43] to [45], and [51] of the judgment in Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 and decision on Wednesbury unreasonableness.  It also stated that the high standard of fairness should apply because the decision has the effect of finally disposing of the applicant’s claim, the Adjudicator of the Torture Claim Appeals Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner without properly assessing the credibility of the applicant. 

8.We are of the view that the matters set out in the notice of motion, affirmation and written submission do not afford any basis for granting leave to appeal.  Importantly, they all concern the applicant’s claim and personal circumstances, and do not show that the intended appeal involves any question of great general or public importance. Further, they are mere assertions unsupported by particulars and it has been shown how the legal propositions in the written submissions relate to the applicant’s case.     

9.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, we dismiss the notice of motion.

The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person.