Re Buniag Renante Lulu

CACV 556/2021

[2022] HKCA 1192

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 556 OF 2021

(ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 2162 OF 2018)

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Before:  Hon Chu JA and S T Poon J in Court

Date of Judgment:  17 August 2022

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Chu JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 13 June 2022, this court handed down a judgment ([2022] HKCA 836)  dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Lung given on 3 December 2021 refusing to grant him leave to apply for judicial review.

2.On 30 June 2022, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal this court’s judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. He has also put in a written submission to support his application.

3.Having considered the Notice of Motion and the written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them.

5.Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.The Notice of Motion states that: (i)  there are some errors of law in the decision; (ii)  the decision maker relied on country of origin information (“COI”)  and facts that favour the rejection of the applicant’s claim. Actual life situation is different from what was stated in the COI; (iii)  the decision makers ignored overwhelming evidence of violence committed towards the minorities; and (iv)  the decision betrays a biased and formulaic approach indicating that there has been any fair assessment of the danger to the applicant’s life. 

7.The written submission quotes extensively from cases on the high standard of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness.  It submits that the Torture Claim Appeals Board (“the Board”)  acted in a procedurally unfair manner without properly assessing the applicant’s credibility.  It further makes reference to section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 dealing with late filing of notice of appeal to the Board.  This is clearly irrelevant as there was no delay in in the applicant’s appeal to the Board.  

8.All the matters put forward by the applicant relate solely to his claim.  No question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the Ordinance, had been identified.  Nor do we see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). 

9.As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are therefore not met, we dismiss the Notice of Motion.

The applicant, unrepresented, acting in person.