The Incorporated Owners of Hung Wai Building v. Sunny Elegant Ltd and Others
Read the full judgment text of LDBM 76/2019 on BabelCite. This Lands Tribunal judgment was delivered on 1 September 2022.
1. The 4 Respondents applied by summons filed on 15 June 2022 for leave to adduce expert evidence on liability on 5 issues set out in paragraph 1 of the said summons ( the Leave Application ). The names of the two experts nominated by the 4 Respondents are set out at paragraph 2 of the said summons.
Cites 6 cases
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LDBM 76/2019 [2022] HKLdT 42 IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 76 OF 2019 ________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Before: Deputy District Judge S. H. Lee, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal (Paper Disposal) Dates of Written Submissions: 8 August 2022 (1st to 4th Respondents) 15 August 2022 (Applicant) Date of Decision: 1 September 2022 _________________ D E C I S I O N _________________ A. Introduction 1.The 4 Respondents applied by summons filed on 15 June 2022 for leave to adduce expert evidence on liability on 5 issues set out in paragraph 1 of the said summons (the Leave Application). The names of the two experts nominated by the 4 Respondents are set out at paragraph 2 of the said summons. 2.Among the said 5 issues set out in the Leave Application, issues (2), (4) and (5) are as follows:-
3.Solicitors for the 4 Respondents, Mr Wong Kam Mun (Mr Wong), had prepared his 3rd Affirmation dated 14 June 2022 (the 3rd Affirmation) in support of the Leave Application. 4.On 6July 2022, the Leave Application was heard by this Tribunal. Ms Vivian Li (Ms Li), counsel for the 4 Respondents, withdrew the Leave Application in respect of issue (3) and proceeded with the remaining issues. Counsel for the Applicant, Ms Becky Wong (Ms Wong), objected to the rest of the Leave Application. 5.After hearing submissions from Ms Li and Ms Wong, I dismissed the Leave Application in respect of issues (2), (4) and (5) but gave leave to parties to instruct a single joint expert (SJE) to give opinion on issue (1) reformulated as follow (the Order): -
6.On 20 July 2022, the 4 Respondents filed their summons and the 4th Affirmation of Mr Wong (the 4th Affirmation) applying for leave to appeal from the Order to the Court of Appeal on the grounds set out in the 4th Affirmation and the questions of the law to be determined by the Court of Appeal are said to be set out therein (the Leave to Appeal Application). 7.As the Leave to Appeal Application was considered suitable to be disposed of on papers, this Tribunal gave direction to that effect to the parties, including giving directions for them to lodge and serve written submissions and authorities. 8.Mr K. M. Chong (Mr Chong) and Ms Li appear for the 4 Respondents on the Leave to Appeal Application while the Applicant remains represented by Ms Wong. On 8 August 2022, Mr Chong and Ms Li lodged written submissions and draft Notice of Appeal (Draft Notice) on behalf of the 4 Respondents. On 15 August 2022, Ms Wong lodged written submissions on behalf of the Applicant. The 4 Respondents did not lodge any reply submissions thereafter. B. Applicable laws on leave to appeal 9.Any party to the proceedings before the Tribunal may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a judgment, order or decision of the Tribunal on the ground that such judgment, order or decision is erroneous in point of law: s.11(2) of Lands Tribunal Ordinance, Cap.17 (LTO). 10.A party wishing to lodge an appeal must apply to the Tribunal for leave to appeal first: s.11AA(1) of LTO and r.30B(1) of Lands Tribunal Rules, Cap.17A. 11.Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard: s.11AA(6) of LTO. C. Applicable principles on expert evidence directions 12.The Court of Appeal had recently summarized and set out the principles which guide the Court in determining if expert evidence should be admitted[2]. The pertinent ones are reproduced in this section below. 13.Substantive conditions to be met for expert evidence to be admissible are: -
14.Evidence meeting condition (a) can still be excluded by the Court if the Court takes the view that calling it will not be helpful to the Court in resolving any issue in the case justly. Such evidence will not be helpful where the issue to be decided is one on which the Court is able to come to a fully informed decision without hearing such evidence. 15.After implementation of Civil Justice Reform, in addition to the substantive conditions identified above, the use of expert evidence is subject to procedural requirements contained in the rules to guard against misuse or mismanagement of expert evidence. Our courts can take account of the probative value of an expert report in exercising case management power. 16.The giving of expert directions is very much a matter of case management. Lack of proper preparation of expert evidence could result in unnecessary costs and time spent on evidence which is of no help to the resolution of the dispute. Such wastage is not consistent with the underlying objectives of the Rules of High Court, Cap.4A (RHC). 17.The party who seeks expert directions (who also bears the burden of persuading the court that expert evidence is helpful and appropriate) should consider the materials to be presented to support the application more carefully. In some cases, it may be useful to have the intended expert report at hand to explain to the court the nature of such evidence and to demonstrate the necessity for having such evidence. 18.The court will not give directions for expert evidence to be adduced (carrying with it the incidence of substantial costs being incurred on its preparation and court time spent on the same) simply on the basis that the court cannot rule out a possibility of such evidence being relevant and helpful in the sense as discussed above. If the applicant for expert directions fails to persuade the court on relevance and necessity of such evidence, the application should be dismissed[3]. 19.Whether expert directions should be given or not and, if so, on what terms is ultimately a case management decision of the court. Like other case management decisions, the Court of Appeal will be circumspect in interfering with such decisions and would not do so unless the decisions were not made in accordance with established principles or were otherwise plainly wrong. D. Issues joined by parties on the application 20.The Applicant is the incorporated owners of the subject building (the Building) which comprises shops on G/F, office units on 1/F and two residential blocks. The 1st Respondent is owner of one G/F shop and many 1/F office units. The 2nd Respondent is the principal tenant of the said shop and office units. The 3rd and 4th Respondents are the sub=tenants/licensees and occupiers of the said shop and office units. 21.The parties are in dispute over 2 major areas of the Building. The first area is the external wall of the Building and concerns some chimney. That, however, does not feature in the Leave Application and is irrelevant for the Leave to Appeal Application. 22.The second area in dispute concerns certain areas on G/F and 1/F of the Building. They include a) G/F entrance, staircases, staircase landing leading to 1/F; and b) corridor and toilets on 1/F (the Disputed Areas). 23.The Disputed Areas do not, however, include “the 1/F electrical room” referred to in issues (1), (2) & (4) in respect of the Leave Application. 24.The Applicant says that the Disputed Areas are common parts. But the 4 Respondents contend that they are area of exclusive use privately owned by the Respondent(s). 25.The Disputed Areas, said the Applicant, had been licensed to the Respondent(s) for their use. But the Respondents claimed that the 1st Respondent had entered into that licence under misrepresentation of former chairman of the Applicant. Induced by such misrepresentation, the Respondents, they claimed, had invested substantially in their G/F and 1/F premises to their detriment. They put forward proprietary estoppel and/or estoppel by convention to prevent the Applicant from denying their continued use of the Disputed Areas. 26.The Applicant claimed that the said licence had expired and/or had been terminated by notice in 2017 and/or 2018 and, notwithstanding notice given by Applicant’s solicitors, the Respondents had continued to occupy the Disputed Areas to Applicant’s exclusion by using the 1/F premises as a Chinese restaurant and a café, blocking the entrances, staircase and corridor, and thus converting the Disputed Areas to their own use. 27.Moreover, in breach of s.34I(2) of Building Management Ordinance, Cap.344 (BMO), the Respondents, the Applicant claimed, had used or permitted the Disputed Areas to be used in such a way to cause a nuisance or hazard to other persons lawfully in the Building i.e. by obstructing Applicant’s access to the 1/F electrical room by way of occupying the Disputed Areas as a café and by making decorations and erecting objects on the former 1/F corridors leading to the said room. 28.According to the Applicant, there were installed inside the said room electrical facilities essential to the power supply or related to the power supply of the Building and that the said room is common part and that the facilities inside were common facility to be used and enjoyed by all owners of the Building. The Respondents had obstructed all the owners of the Building having unrestricted and free access to this common part and the common facilities inside. The Applicant had to ask for permission of the Respondent(s) before being allowed entry to the said room during business hours and entry was further not available after business hours such that the Applicant could not respond in the event of any emergency after business hours. 29.The Respondents, according to Ms Li’s oral submissions and clarifications at the hearing of the Leave Application, disagreed with the 1/F electrical room being common parts and suggested that it was private property owned by the 1st Respondent. The Respondents denied that the Applicant is entitled to have access to the said room or that they are obliged to provide access of the said room (allegedly private property) to the Applicant. 30.Installed inside the said room, said the Respondents, are not essential power supply facilities but mere meters for billing purpose that do not supply energy to the units of the Building. Proper inspection to be conducted inside the said room could, they say, be carried out by Applicant’s qualified technicians alone. Through its technicians, the Applicant, they say, had already been able to conduct proper inspection of the facilities inside the said room and that the general safety of all owners and occupiers of the Building had not been jeopardized at all. 31.The pertinent pleas for parties’ respective cases on s.34I(2) of BMO could be found at: -
E. Ground of appeal re issue (5) 32.At paragraph 7 of the 4th Affirmation, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Draft Notice, and paragraph 4 of Respondents’ submissions, it was complained that this Tribunal had erred in law in ruling that: -
33.Mr Chong and Ms Li made the following submissions.
34.For reasons below, I do not find the above ground of appeal (and submissions) having any reasonable prospect of success.
F. Grounds of appeal re issues (2) & (4) 35.At paragraph 12 of the 4th Affirmation, paragraphs 11 and 12 of Respondents’ submissions, and paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Draft Notice, it was further complained that this Tribunal had erred in law in ruling that:-
36.Mr Chong and Ms Li made the following submissions.
37.Again, I think this ground of appeal is (and the submissions above are) completely devoid of merits.
38.The Respondents separately complained at paragraph 22 of the Draft Notice, and paragraphs 16 and 17 of their submissions, that this Tribunal had failed to take into account that no real prejudice would be caused to the Applicant should the expert directions sought by them be granted (this ground of appeal, or question of law, was not raised in the 4th Affirmation at all). 39.Mr Chong and Ms Li submitted that: -
40.With respect, the above submission is, I think, wholly misconceived and unmeritorious.
F. Ground of appeal re SJE 41.Finally, the Respondents complained at paragraph 24 of their submissions and at paragraph 24 of the Draft Notice that this Tribunal had erred in deciding that a SJE be instructed by the parties (this ground of appeal, if a question of law at all, was also not raised by the Respondents in the 4th Affirmation). 42.Mr Chong and Ms Li submitted that: -
43.I do not find the above ground of appeal (and submissions) having any prospect of success either.
H. Conclusion 44.I therefore conclude that none of the grounds of appeal raised by the Respondents enjoy any reasonable prospect of success on appeal. There is also no reason in the interests of justice why their intended appeal should be heard. I. Disposition 45.Accordingly, I dismiss the Leave to Appeal Application brought by the 4 Respondents. J. Costs 46.I make an order nisi that the 1st to 4th Respondents do forthwith pay the Applicant on District Court scale the costs of the Leave to Appeal Application together with counsel certificate, to be summarily assessed by this Tribunal on paper without hearing. The Applicant do lodge and serve on the 4 Respondents its statement of costs for summary assessment within 7 days after this order becomes absolute and the 4 Respondents be at liberty to lodge and serve their written grounds of objections within 7 days thereafter.
Ms Becky Wong, instructed by Lam & Partners, for the Applicant Mr K. M. Chong and Ms Vivian Li, instructed by Christine F. L. Ip & Young, for the 1st to 4th Respondents [1] Ms Li clarified in her oral submissions made at the Leave Application that the usage for issue (5) is “access” or “ingress and egress”. [2] Shenzhen Futaihong Precision Industry Co Ltd & Others v BYD Co Ltd & Others [2018] HKCA 408, 18 July 2018,CA, at paragraphs 3 to 13 [3] With respects, the earlier and different approach adopted at 511J-512A of the case of Wong Hoi Fung v AIA & Another [2002] 3 HKLRD 507 relied upon by the 4 Respondents should, I think, no longer be followed. [4] In any event, the expert to be called by the Respondents is not the designer of the Building. [5] Wong Hoi Fung v AIA & Another, supra, at 512G; Lord Energy Ltd v Paul Chen [1998] 2 HKLRD 751, 758I, per Rogers JA (as he then was) [6] Similarly, expert assistance from surveyor is not called for in examining aerial photos unless there are specific areas or features which are not readily observable by a layman: Grand Wayfair Investment Co Ltd v Chan Yung Kan & Others, unreported, CACV 238/2013, 26 September 2014, CA, at para 38 & 40. [7] Jumbo King Ltd v Faithful Properties Ltd & Others (1999) 2 HKCFAR 279, 296D-E, per Lord Hoffmann NPJ [8] Lord Energy Ltd v Paul Chen, supra, 758I-J, per Rogers JA (as he then was) [9] Lord Energy Ltd v Paul Chen, supra, 760D-G, per Rogers JA (as he then was), agreed by Mortimer V-P at 760I [10] Grand Wayfair Investment Co Ltd v Chan Yung Kan & Others, supra, at para 39 [11] Even among issues (2), (4) and (5) themselves, while issue (5) may be highly contentious, it may well not be the case for issues (2) and (4) involving the 1/F electrical room, a relatively minor area in dispute, and not the two major battlegrounds (i.e. the Disputed Areas and the external wall), among the parties. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under LDBM 76/2019