Giyarsih v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1059/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 September 2022.
1. The applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision dated 29 March 2019 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board’s Decision”).
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HCAL 1059/2019 [2022] HKCFI 2877 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1059 OF 2019
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung: Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused. Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.The applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision dated 29 March 2019 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The applicant did not request an oral hearing. Pursuant to Order 53, rule 3(3) of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), the Court will deal with her application on paper. 3.Pursuant to Order 20, rule 8 and Order 53, rule 3(6) of the RHC, Form 86 is amended to the effect that the Board is the proposed respondent and the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) is the interested party. The applicant 4.The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She entered Hong Kong on 1 June 2012 as a foreign domestic helper and was permitted to stay until 29 June 2013. On 8 August 2012, her employment contract was terminated prematurely after her criminal conviction. On 15 September 2012, she was referred to the Immigration Department. On 26 October 2012, she raised a torture claim, which was later rejected on 27 May 2013 and the subsequent petition was also dismissed on 24 September 2013. On 25 July 2013, she lodged a non-refoulement claim. Her claim was made on the basis that, if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her creditor Mohammad Saleh (“Saleh”). 5.According to the applicant, she borrowed the loan for her chicken farm business in around 1994 or 1995. Saleh was well connected with the gang groups and the loan was of high interest rate. In 1999, her business failed due to pandemic. She thus defaulted the loan. To chase the payments, Saleh visited her house and also took valuable objects to settle the loan. After the applicant was employed, she also remitted her salary to settle the loan until 2009 when she stopped due to the financial difficulties of her family. Through her family, Saleh threatened to torture or even kill her if she returned. Out of fear, she stayed in Hong Kong for protection. Details of her claim are set out at paragraph 7 of the Notice of Decision dated 9 July 2018 by the Director (the “Director’s Decision”). The Director’s Decision 6.The Director considered the applicant’s claim in relation to the following risks:
7.By way of the Director’s Decision, the Director dismissed the applicant’s claim on the basis that she would not face any real or substantial risk of harm upon refoulement. In elaboration, the Director found that (i) the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatments indicated an unlikelihood of future risk of harm [15]-[17]; (ii) Saleh’s influence was localized [18]; (iii) state protection would be available to her [19]-[22]; and (iv) internal relocation was a viable alternative [23]-[24]. The Board’s Decision 8.The applicant appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. On 15 January 2019, the Board conducted an oral hearing for her appeal, during which she gave evidence. 9.Having considered the evidence, the Board identified several inconsistencies in the material aspects of her claim. For example, when did she stop repaying the loan? what was Saleh’s reaction to her inability to repay? and what threats did Saleh pose against her? [26]. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim lacked credibility. On this basis, the Board rejected the applicant’s claim and dismissed her appeal. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision 10.The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 18 April 2019for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. 11.In her affirmation in support of her application, the applicant stated:
DISCUSSION 12.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to its Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 13.The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 14.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
15.Those grounds under paragraph 11 above are bare assertions or her personal opinions without any evidence in support of them. It is clear the adjudicator had put a lot of questions to the applicant and she did answer them. The issue of psychological strain was not raised before the Board. 16.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Board’s Decision. The findings of the Board are not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 17.The applicant fails to show that she has any realistic prospect of success in her proposed judicial review. CONCLUSION 18.I refuse to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Accordingly, I dismiss her application. Dated the 20th day of September 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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