Ups Parcel Delivery Service Ltd v. Huaqi Import & Export Co., Ltd and Others

HCA 424/2020

[2022] HKCFI 2910

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 424 OF 2020

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Before:  Deputy High Court Judge H. Au-Yeung in Court

Dates of Hearing:  10 August & 2 September 2022

Date of Judgment: 22 September 2022

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JUDGMENT

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INTRODUCTION

1.This is an email fraud case in which the plaintiff alleged that the 1^st defendant was the first layer recipient of a sum of US$1,575,000 whereas the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th defendants were the second layer recipients of the sums of US$500,000, US$750,000 and US$250,000 respectively. 

2.Final Judgment has already been granted by the Court against the 1^st defendant.

3.The 2^nd and 3^rd defendants have not entered appearance in these proceedings at all.  However, no default judgment has been applied for as far as they are concerned.  The plaintiff seeks to prove its case against them at this trial, in which they are absent. 

4.The 4^th defendant admitted that it had received two sums of US$125,000 each on around 31 March 2020 and 1 April 2020 respectively (in the total sum of US$250,000 (“the D4 Sum”)) as alleged by the plaintiff.  However, the 4^th defendant, which allegedly was in the business of sourcing and selling frozen meat and seafood throughout South East Asia, resisted the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that the D4 Sum was part payment made by a client for frozen pork which the 4^th defendant had, subsequent to such payment, delivered partially.  On such a basis, the 4^th defendant submitted that it has a bona fide right to the D4 Sum and that it is entitled to retain the D4 Sum given its change of position in reliance on the receipt of the D4 Sum. 

THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE 2^ND AND 3^RD DEFENDANTS

5.To prove its case against the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants, the plaintiff has adduced the evidence of:

(1)  Mr Tan Boon Tiam, Vice President of the Finance and Accounting in the Asia Pacific Region of UPS[1] (“UPS”), who was responsible for the overall management and supervision of all finance and accounting related matters of UPS in the Asia Pacific Region.   He set out, among other things, the following matters in his witness statement[2]:

(a)  the particulars of an Aircraft Charter Agreement which was entered into between UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. (“UPS Worldwide”) and Western Global Airlines (“WGA”) dated 18 March 2020, pursuant to which UPS Worldwide was obliged to pay WGA the sum of US$1,575,000;

(b)  the background of the circumstances under which the plaintiff paid the 1^st defendant the said sum of US$1,575,000, pursuant to the request made in a number of emails in which the sender impersonated Ms Libby Millar (a staff member of “Top Line Admin” which is a service company used by WGA to handle its invoicing matter), believing by mistake that the payment request was issued for and on behalf of WGA;

(c)  the material events leading up to the discovery of the fraud in early April 2020;

(2)  Leung Wai Ling, the Hong Kong Country Security Assistant Manager of UPS, who was responsible for the overall management of security-related issues for UPS in Hong Kong.  She has explained, among other things:

(a)  the material events leading up to and following the plaintiff’s discovery of the identity of the second layer recipients of the said sum of US$1,575,000, namely, the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th defendants;

(b)  that neither UPS nor the plaintiff had any previous dealings or knowledge of the 2^nd, 3^rd or 4^th defendant or any shareholder or director of these companies.

6.Furthermore, the plaintiff has placed before this Court documentary evidence in support of its case including the relevant emails which led to its payment to the 1^st defendant and the proof of payments by the 1^st defendant to the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th defendants respectively.

7.In Investment Trust Companies v. Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2018] AC 275, it was recognized that there may be situations in which, whilst the parties have not dealt directly with one another, or with one another’s property, the defendant has nevertheless received a benefit from the claimant, and the claimant has incurred a loss through the provision of that benefit.  It was held by Lord Reed JSC that:

“46. Situations in which the defendant has received a benefit from the claimant, and the claimant has incurred a loss through the provision of that benefit, usually arise where the parties have dealt directly with one another, or with one another’s property […]

47. There are, however, situations in which the parties have not dealt directly with one another, or with one another’s property, but in which the defendant has nevertheless received a benefit from the claimant, and the claimant as incurred a loss through the provision of that benefit. These are general situations in which the difference from the direct provision of a benefit by the claimant to the defendant is more apparent than real.

48. One such situation is where the agent of one of the parties is interposed between them.  In that situation, the agent is the proxy of his principal, by virtue of the law of agency.  The series of transactions between the claimant and the agent, and between the agent and the defendant, is therefore legally equivalent to a transaction directly between the claimant and the defendant.[…] Another situation is where […] an intervening transaction is found to be a sham […] Since the sham is created precisely in order to conceal the connection between the claimant and the defendant, it is disregarded when deciding whether the latter was enriched at the former’s expense. […] There have also been cases, discussed below, in which a set of co-ordinated transactions has been treated as forming a single scheme or transaction for the purpose of the ‘at the expense of’ inquiry, on the basis that to consider each individual transaction separately would be unrealistic.  There are also situations where the defendant receives property from a third party into which the claimant can trace an interest.  Since the property is, in law, the equivalent of the claimant’s property, the defendant is therefore treated as if he had received the claimant’s property.”

8.In the present case, the plaintiff transferred US$1,575,000 to the 1^st defendant on 25 March 2020.  US$1.5 million out of this sum was thereafter further transferred to the 2^nd and 3^rd and 4^th defendants.  The timing and amounts thereof are shown by the following table which Ms Wong for the plaintiff has helpfully prepared:

No.	Date	Time	Second Layer Recipients			Transfer Amount
1	26.3.2020 (Thur)	10:31	D2			US$125,000
2		14:24		D3		US$125,000
3	27.3.2020 (Fri)	09:32		D3		US$125,000
4		10:07	D2			US$125,000
5	30.3.2020 (Mon)	09:37		D3		US$125,000
6		09:50	D2			US$125,000
7	31.3.3020 (Tues)	09:04		D3		US$125,000
8		09:08			D4	US$125,000
9	1.4.2020 (Wed)	08:44			D4	US$125,000
10		08:46		D3		US$125,000
11	2.4.2020 (Thur)	08:48		D3		US$125,000
12		08:52	D2			US$125,000
Total						US$1,500,000

9.Given the fact that the transfer between the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant on one hand and the transfers between the 1^st defendant and the 2^nd defendant (and the 3^rd defendant, as the case may be) are closely related in time and that the pattern and coordination in the subsequent transfers clearly demonstrate that there was a systematic and orchestrated attempt to dissipate the money received by the 1^st defendant, I am of the view that the situation is equivalent to a direct payment. 

10.In these circumstances, I hold that:

(1)  the 2^nd defendant had been unjustly enriched in the amount of US$500,000 at the expense of the plaintiff, in that the plaintiff had paid the sum of US$1,575,000 to the 1^st defendant by mistake;

(2)  the 3^rd defendant had been unjustly enriched in the amount of US$750,000 at the expense of the plaintiff, in that the plaintiff had paid the sum of US$1,575,000 to the 1^st defendant by mistake.

11.I therefore order that:

(1)  The 2^nd defendant shall pay the sum of US$500,000 (or the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent at the time of payment) to the plaintiff with interest;

(2)  The 3^rd defendant shall pay the sum of US$750,000 (or the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent at the time of payment) to the plaintiff with interest.

THE CLAIM AGAINST THE 4^TH DEFENDANT

The 4^th defendant’s case

12.The 4^th defendant does not dispute that it did receive two sums of US$125,000 each from the 1^st defendant on 31 March 2020 and 1 April 2020 respectively and that those sums of money actually came from the plaintiff.

13.Even though the 4^th defendant did not receive the monies from the plaintiff directly, given the systematic dissipation of monies from the 1^st defendant’s account and the close proximity in time, I consider that the whole series of transactions should be treated as a single scheme or transaction for the purpose of the “at the expense” inquiry.  Ms Choy for the 4^th defendant did not seek to argue otherwise.

14.The 4^th defendant alleged that it is entitled to retain the monies received nonetheless.  Its pleaded case is that:

(1)  On 20 March 2020, it entered into a sale and purchase agreement (“the Polenectar Agreement”) with a Polenectar (Cambodia) Hotel Co. Ltd. (“Polenectar”) whereby the 4^th defendant agreed to supply to Polenectar 536,000kg of frozen pork at the total price of US$832,500 (“the Total Price”), and the pork shall be delivered to a place in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam;

(2)  Pursuant to the Polenectar Agreement, Polenectar shall arrange for 30% of the Total Price to be remitted into the 4^th defendant’s account within 3 working days after the execution of the Polenectar Agreement;

(3)  For the purpose of the Polenectar Agreement, the 4^th defendant purchased some meat from a wholesaler in Vietnam;

(4)  Polenectar did cause two sums of US$125,000 to be transferred from the 1^st defendant’s account into the 4^th defendant’s account with Standard Chartered Bank (“D4’s Account”) as deposit, the total of which represented about 30% of the Total Price;

(5)  The 4^th defendant’s sole shareholder and director, Zheng Min (“Zheng”), had been informed by Polenectar that payment made pursuant to the Polenectar Agreement had been effected through a local moneychanger or remittance company in Cambodia;

(6)  Upon Polenectar’s instructions, the 4^th defendant did deliver the first batch of the meat to its warehouse in Vietnam in early April 2020, followed by two further batches in around mid-April 2020, which together worth about 40% of the Total Price.  No further delivery had been made thereafter;

(7)  The 4^th defendant had incurred shipping/delivery costs in the transaction;

(8)  Neither the 4^th defendant nor Zheng Min had any knowledge or means to know about the alleged fraud nor did they had any previous dealings/business relationship with the plaintiff or any of the other defendants.

The issue

15.While the 4^th defendant has pleaded two lines of defence, namely, that the 4^th defendant has a bona fide right to the D4 Sum and that it had had a change of position upon the receipt of the D4 Sum, Ms Choy for the 4^th defendant accepted that the main factual issue here is whether the two payments of USD125,000 were related to the alleged transaction with Polenectar.  She agreed that the 4^th defendant’s defence would fail if the Court finds against the 4^th defendant on this factual issue.

Evidence of Cheung Kim Hung called by the 4^th defendant

16.For the purpose of proving its defence, the defendant has only called Cheung Kim Hung (“Cheung”) as its witness.

17.Cheung joined the 4^th defendant as its manager in around July/August 2019.  His main responsibilities include assisting Zheng to oversee the 4^th defendant’s operation and its employees and to communicate with the 4^th defendant’s business partners, etc[3].

18.During his cross-examination, Cheung told the Court, among other things, that:

(1)  Although he and the 4^th defendant’s solicitors had asked Zheng to give evidence in this action, Zheng assigned him to give evidence instead because (i) Cheung is stationed in Hong Kong; and (ii) Cheung had a good understanding of the 4^th defendant’s business by way of reading the company’s WeChat group messages;

(2)  All sale and purchase contracts were signed by Zheng on behalf of the 4^th defendant;

(3)  In all transactions which involved the sale of frozen meat/seafood by the 4^th defendant, once the buyer had paid, the buyer would inform the 4^th defendant by WeChat message or by phone;

(4)  The 4^th defendant has several bank accounts.  It was Zheng who would decide which bank account to use for the purpose of receiving the sale proceeds of a particular transaction;

(5)  The first time Cheung saw the Polenectar Agreement was in around June 2020 (i.e. around the time when the 4^th defendant was served with the Injunction Order granted herein);

(6)  Cheung did not participate in the negotiation in relation to the Polenectar Agreement, which was, according to what Zheng told him, entered into by Zheng on behalf of the 4^th defendant;

(7)  Cheung had no idea whether this was the first time that the 4^th defendant did business with Polenectar;

(8)  While it was provided in the Polenectar Agreement that the time of delivery was “to be advised”, Cheung did not know when Polenectar informed the 4^th defendant about such time because Zheng had not given instructions to him to follow up this matter;

(9)  While it was only provided in the Polenectar Agreement that the place of delivery was “Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam”, Cheung guessed that Zheng should know the exact address of delivery because Polenectar was Zheng’s client, and Zheng was the person who was responsible for arranging delivery of the purchased meat to Polenectar;

(10)  Zheng told Cheung orally that Zheng had indeed made such arrangement for delivery;

(11)  Zheng had never shown Cheung any record of communication between Zheng and Polenectar;

(12)  Cheung assumed that after Polenectar had made 30% deposit payment, it must have informed Zheng accordingly, and Zheng must have checked the 4^th defendant’s bank account (through the assistance of the 4^th defendant’s accounting staff member) and confirmed receipt of the same;

(13)  After the payments which the 4^th defendant received on 31 March 2020 and 1 April 2020 in the total sum of US$250,000 (which represented the payment of 30% deposit for Polenectar Agreement), the 4^th defendant did not receive any further payment from Polenectar even though approximately 40% of the total quantity of meat ordered under the Polenectar Agreement had been delivered.  Zheng told Cheung and other staff that he (Zheng) did follow up the matter but Polenectar did not give any constructive reply.  However, Cheung could not tell when Zheng followed that matter up;

(14)  Zheng told Cheung that Zheng had made enquiries with Polenectar which confirmed that the D4 Sum was indeed payment from Polenectar for the purchase of the frozen meat under the Polenectar Agreement;

(15)  Zheng told Cheung that the 4^th defendant did not have any business relationship with the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd defendants.

19.It can be seen immediately that quite a lot of crucial evidence of Cheung (for example, that the two payments of US$125,000 were made by Polenectar and were related to the Polenectar Agreement) were hearsay evidence.

20.Hearsay evidence is admissible.  Section 47(1)(a) and (b) of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap.8, Laws of Hong Kong) provide that:

“47(1) In civil proceedings evidence shall not be excluded on the ground that it is hearsay unless—

(a) a party against whom the evidence is to be adduced objects to the admission of the evidence; and

(b) the court is satisfied, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that the exclusion of the evidence is not prejudicial to the interests of justice.”

21.Having said that, the Court has to consider the weight to be attached to hearsay evidence.  Section 49 of the Evidence Ordinance stipulates that:

“49. Considerations relevant to weighing of hearsay evidence

(1) In estimating the weight, if any, to be given to hearsay evidence in civil proceedings the court shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), regard may be had, in particular, to the following—

(a) whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a witness;

(b) whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated;

(c) whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay;

(d) whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters;

(e) whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with another or for a particular purpose;

(f) whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight;

(g) whether or not the evidence adduced by the party is consistent with any evidence previously adduced by the party.”

22.In the present case:

(1)  It would have been reasonable and practicable for the 4^th defendant to call Zheng as a witness. The only reasons which Cheung gave as to why Zheng did not come forward to give evidence were (i) Cheung is stationed in Hong Kong; and (ii) Cheung had a good understanding of the 4^th defendant’s business.  I do not think these are good reasons at all.  Since Zheng was the person responsible for the alleged transaction with Polenectar and he was allegedly the one who confirmed with Polenectar at the material time about the two payments of US$125,000, it was reasonable to expect that he would explain these matters in Court.  I should also add that Ms Choy for the 4^th defendant is not entitled to argue that it was reasonable for Zheng (who has been in the Mainland since February 2020) not to be a witness herein because of the pandemic situation, because this was not the reason given by Cheung in his evidence.  Ms Choy cannot give evidence from the Bar table;

(2)  Some of the important evidence involved multiple hearsay, for example, the fact that Polenectar had paid the 4^th defendant twice in the sums of US$125,000 for the purpose of the Polenectar Agreement;

(3)  Cheung has been assigned by his boss, Zheng, to give evidence in support of the 4^th defendant’s defence.  I find that he has the motive to conceal or misrepresent matters.

23.I am of the view that, in the light of the above circumstances, no weight should be attached to Cheung’s evidence.

Adverse inferences to be drawn

24.The frequent references to Zheng in Cheung’s evidence has highlighted the importance of Zheng as a witness.  Indeed, since Zheng is the sole director and sole shareholder of the 4^th defendant, and given his role in the Polenectar Agreement, there is really no reason why Zheng should instruct Cheung to give evidence in this action rather than doing it himself.  I do not accept Cheung’s explanations as to why he (Cheung) should give evidence in the present case.

25.In Tullett & Tokyo International Securities Ltd v APC Securities Co. Ltd. [2001] 2 HKLRD 356, Le Pichon JA followed the principle explained by Fuad JA in Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v Chan Yiu-wah and Another [1988] 1 HKLR 457 at 467 C – H:

“In relation to the fourth point above, Mr Huggins SC prayed in aid the maxim omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem ("the maxim") sometimes referred to as the principle in Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Str 505. Excerpts expounding that principle from Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn Revision) (1979) Vol. 2, at paras. 285 and 291 were quoted in the judgment of Fuad JA in Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v Chan Yiu-wah and Another [1988] 1 HKLR 457 at 467 C - H :

‘285. Failure to produce evidence, as indicating unfavorable tenor of evidence: (1) In general. ... The failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstance, document, or witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate, as the most natural inference, that the party fears to do so; and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavorable to the party. These inferences, to be sure, cannot fairly be made except upon certain conditions; and they are also open always to explanation by circumstances which make some other hypothesis a more natural one than the party's fear of exposure. But the propriety of such an inference in general is not doubted.

The non-production of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party's cause. Ever since the case of the Chimney Sweeper's Jewel [Armory v. Delamirie] this has been a recognised principle.

291. (3) Documents or chattels destroyed or not produced. The applicability of the general principle to an opponent's non-production or suppression of documents or chattels has always been assumed. In England from the beginning of the recognition of the principle, some sort of inference has been acknowledged to be legitimate. In this country, similarly, the tradition has been continued and steadily enforced, in numerous instances, where the opponent has destroyed, suppressed, or refused or failed to produce a document or chattel whose contents or quality came into issue or became relevant under the issues.’ ”[4] (emphasis added)

26.I accept Ms Wong’s submissions that the Court should draw an adverse inference against the 4^th defendant by reason of its failure to produce Zheng as a witness.

27.The same applies to the accounting staff member of the 4^th defendant who, according to Cheung, had confirmed with Zheng the receipt of the two sums of US$125,000 upon Polenectar’s notifications about such payments.  The evidence of such a staff member would be important in connecting the two sums of US$125,000 with the Polenectar Agreement.  However, such a staff member was not asked by the 4^th defendant to give evidence herein.

28.These are not the only adverse inferences which can be drawn against the 4^th defendant.

29.It may be recalled that Cheung alleged that after Polenectar had paid the 4^th defendant, Polenectar did inform Zheng, who had then confirmed the receipt of the same with the 4^th defendant’s accounting staff member.  Cheung also alleged that Zheng and the staff of the 4^th defendant (including Cheung) all along had discussions in their WeChat group chat as to the follow-up work required after Polenectar’s payment of the 30% deposit.  Zheng had also allegedly asked Cheung to follow up on the following batch of delivery from Polenectar.  However, the 4^th defendant did not disclose any internal WeChat group chat communication records to show what the staff had discussed about the follow-up work in relation to the Polenectar Agreement after the alleged payments made by Polenectar or about any other discussion in relation to the Polenectar Agreement. This is extremely suspicious.  The 4^th defendant is all along legally represented, and therefore the 4^th defendant must have been properly advised as to what documents should be disclosed for the purpose of this action (there is no evidence suggesting otherwise). 

30.I therefore draw an adverse inference against the 4^th defendant in that such evidence of communication records, if produced, would be unfavourable to the 4^th defendant’s case.

Was the D4 Sum related to the Polenectar Agreement?

31.There are other features in the facts which make me seriously doubt whether the D4 Sum was indeed paid as deposit for the Polenectar Agreement.

32.Firstly, it was stipulated in the Polenectar Agreement that the 30% deposit had to be paid “within 3 days from the date of the contract”.  However, at the end of the day, the D4 Sum was only transferred to the 4^th defendant on 31 March 2020 and 1 April 2020 respectively.  In other words, there was a delay of more than one week (the Polenectar Agreement was dated 20 March 2020). 

33.Secondly, while the deposit was stated in the Polenectar Agreement to be US$249,750, the actual amount received by the 4^th defendant was US$250,000.  Cheung explained that, in many cases, buyers would pay more than the required amount of deposit, and that buyers would round up the figure. 

34.I do not think this evidence would assist the defence case because:

(1)  What Cheung stated was in relation to what many other buyers had done in the past as opposed to what Polenectar had done in the past.  What other buyers had done is irrelevant for our purpose;

(2)  Cheung had not given any evidence to the effect that Polenectar had deliberately paid more than it was required as deposit for the Polenectar Agreement;

(3)  Given the deposit payment was allegedly made by transfer rather than by cash, it is more difficult to accept that buyers would round up the figures.

35.Thirdly, the total value of goods delivered was US$348,312.5.  Having taken into the account the sum of US$250,000, that means the balance of the purchase price was US$98,312.50.  Pursuant to the Polenectar Agreement, the balance of the purchase price of the goods delivered should be paid within 7 days after delivery.  There were allegedly three batches of delivery, and the last batch was delivered on 15 April 2020.  However, Polenectar had admittedly not made any such payment.  Although Cheung alleged that Zheng had chased Polenectar for further payment and further delivery instruction, no evidence in writing had been produced in support.  Insofar as the demand for payment is concerned, it is inherently improbable that the 4^th defendant would not issue any demand in writing at all, even after such a long time.  This raises a great doubt as to whether the alleged deliveries were made in relation to the Polenectar Agreement at all, and whether the D4 Sum was paid towards the Polenectar Agreement as alleged.

36.Fourthly, if Polenectar had allegedly only received goods for the value of US$348,312.50 (that is, around 41.8% of the goods ordered), and did not place any further order for delivery of the remainder of the goods ordered under the Polenectar Agreement, Polenectar was in breach of the Polenectar Agreement, and the 4^th defendant would be entitled to sue Polenectar for loss of profit for the remainder of the order.  However, surprisingly, there is no evidence that the 4^th defendant had issued any demand letter to Polenectar for such loss of profit or for further delivery instructions.  This also raises a great doubt as to whether the alleged deliveries were made in relation to the Polenectar Agreement at all, and whether the D4 Sum was paid towards the Polenectar Agreement as alleged.

37.Having considered all the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied that the 4^th defendant had proved on the balance of probabilities that the total sum of US$250,000 received from the 1^st defendant was for payment of deposit for the Polenectar Agreement. 

Conclusion

38.I am satisfied that the 4^th defendant had been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff by its receipt of the D4 Sum.

39.I therefore make an order that the 4^th defendant shall pay the sum of US$250,000 (or the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent at the time of payment) to the plaintiff with interest.

ORDER

40.To conclude, I make the following orders:

(1)  The 2^nd defendant shall pay the sum of US$500,000 (or the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent at the time of payment) to the plaintiff.

(2)  The 3^rd defendant shall pay the sum of US$750,000 (or the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent at the time of payment) to the plaintiff.

(3)  The 4^th defendant shall pay the sum of US$250,000 (or the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent at the time of payment) to the plaintiff.

(4)  Interest on the said sums shall be payable at the rate of 1% above prime rate as from time to time quoted by HSBC from the respective dates on which the above sums were received by the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th defendants respectively until the date hereof, and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment.

(5)  The Mareva Injunction granted by Wilson Chan J on 5 June 2020 against the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants and continued by K Yeung J on 12 June 2020 shall be continued for 6 months from the date hereof.

COSTS

41.I make a costs order nisi that the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th defendants shall bear the plaintiff’s costs of the action (including all costs reserved), to be taxed if not agreed.

42.The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, shall be made by letter, and will be disposed of on paper) within 14 days hereof.

Ms Sheena Wong, instructed by Morrison & Foerster, for the plaintiff

The 2^nd and 3^rd defendants were not represented and did not appear

Ms Alison Choy, instructed by Ivan Tang & Co, for the 4^th defendant