Tam Yuk Ching and Others v. Hoosenally & Neo (A Firm) and Another

HCA 1511/2020

[2022] HKCFI 3825

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1511 OF 2020

________________

________________

Before:  Mr Recorder Eugene Fung SC in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:  6 December 2022

Date of Decision:  30 December 2022

_______________

DECISION

________________

1.On 20 September 2022, the entirety of the 1^st plaintiff’s claim against the 1^st defendant was struck out by a Master on the ground that the 1^st plaintiff’s claim is only for reflective losses suffered by the 2^nd and 3^rd plaintiffs. This is the 1^st plaintiff’s appeal against the Master’s striking out order.

A.  THE RELEVANT BACKGROUND

2.As accepted by the 1^st defendant from the pleadings, the 1^st plaintiff (“P1”) is a lay person who carried out property investments through her corporate vehicles, including the 2^nd plaintiff (“P2”) and the 3^rd plaintiff (“P3”).

3.According to the plaintiffs, (1) P2 was formed for the purpose of acquiring Shop No. C68, 1/F Commercial Development of Locwood Court, Kingswood Villas, No 1 Tin Wu Road, Tin Shui Wai, Yuen Long (“KV Property”), and (2) P3 was formed for the purpose of acquiring Flat A and Flat B on 9/F, Ka Ming Court, Nos. 688-690 Castle Peak Road, Kowloon (“KM Properties”).

4.In the course of the acquisition of the KV Property and the KM Properties, fraud had been perpetrated on the plaintiffs. Legal proceedings were brought by, amongst others, the plaintiffs in HCA 1289/2015 and HCA 2759/2015 against the wrongdoers. On 31 July 2020, Coleman J granted final judgment in favour of the plaintiffs and found, amongst other things, that the estate agent (Mr Ngai Lok Kei (“Mr Ngai”)) and his estate agency (Wealth Trustful Property Agency Limited) had made fraudulent representations in relation to the properties and that all the defendants therein had participated in a conspiracy to defraud the plaintiffs with respect to their misconduct associated with the properties.

5.The 1^st defendant (“D1”) is a firm of solicitors in Hong Kong. At the material times, there is no dispute that:

(1)  in the acquisition of the KV Property (“the KV Property Transaction”), D1 acted for Cheerful Joy Investments Limited (“Cheerful Joy”) in the latter’s purchase of the KV Property from the original owners and in its sub-sale to P2;

(2)  in the acquisition of the KM Properties (“the KM Properties Transaction”), D1 acted for Hailey Ventures Limited (“Hailey”) in the latter’s purchase of the shares of and the loans in the original owners of the KM Properties and in its sub-sale to P3.

6.The plaintiffs failed to recover any damages pursuant to the final judgment in HCA 1289/2015 and HCA 2759/2015. On 7 September 2020, the plaintiffs issued the Writ herein against two firms of solicitors in Hong Kong (one of which is D1) for their alleged failure to discharge their duties to properly advise, and disclose materially detrimental information to, the plaintiffs in the KV Property Transaction and the KM Properties Transaction.

7.In their Statement of Claim herein, the plaintiffs allege, amongst other things, that they have suffered loss and damage. Two specific sums of purported loss are pleaded, namely (1) HK$5,712,000 which allegedly would not have been paid if D1 had disclosed certain material information to P1 (§66.1) and (2) HK$5,508,000 which allegedly was the secret profit earned by Hailey which P3 would not have paid had D1 disclosed certain material information to P1 (§66.2).

8.In the prayer of their Statement of Claim, the plaintiffs claim against D1 (1) damages, (2) alternatively equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duties and duties owed to the plaintiffs, (3) interest, (4) further or other relief and (5) costs.

9.After the pleadings were closed, the parties exchanged witness statements in March 2022.

10.By an inter-partes summons filed on 10 May 2022, D1 applied to strike out P1’s claim against it on the grounds that (1) P1’s claim discloses no reasonable cause of action against the 1^st defendant, (2) P1’s claim is frivolous or vexatious, or (3) the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the same. As mentioned earlier, D1’s striking out application was successful before the Master and P1 filed her notice of appeal on 30 September 2022.

11.By an inter-partes summons dated 9 November 2022, the plaintiffs applied for leave to amend their Statement of Claim and has attached to the summons a draft Amended Statement of Claim (“Draft ASOC”) setting out the proposed amendments. By an inter-parties summons dated 10 November 2022, the plaintiffs applied for leave to adduce an additional affirmation of P1 for the purpose of the present appeal. I understand that both summonses were adjourned by a Master to be heard on a date after the substantive hearing of the present appeal. However, counsel for the D1 accepted at the hearing that this Court is entitled to consider the proposed amendments in the Draft ASOC as to whether P1’s claims against D1 should be struck out.

B.  D1’S GROUND AND SUBMISSIONS FOR STRIKING OUT

12.D1 submits that any claim by P1 against it can only be for a diminution in the value of her shares in P2/P3 (i.e. for reflective loss) and P1 therefore has no reasonable cause of action against D1.

13.D1 is content to assume all the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim to be true. Despite this, D1 submits that (1) with respect to the KV Property Transaction, P1 and P2 are claiming the same HK$5,712,000 against D1 and D2 jointly, (2) with respect to the KM Properties Transaction, P1 and P3 are claiming the same HK$5,508,000 against D1, (3) if P2 and P3 succeed on their respective claims for HK$5,712,000 and HK$5,508,000, P1’s losses would be made good.

C.  P1’S CLAIM FOR HK$5,712,000 AGAINST D1

C1.  Whether P1’s claim discloses any reasonable cause of action

14.In considering whether P1’s claims against D1 disclose any reasonable cause of action, no evidence shall be admissible on an application for a strike out: RHC Order 18, rule 19(2). It is therefore only necessary to consider the allegations pleaded in the Statement of Claim to ascertain if P1’s pleaded claims against D1 disclose any reasonable cause of action. In doing so, I also bear in mind that the present appeal is by way of a rehearing and it is only in plain and obvious cases that the court should exercise its striking out powers.

15.P1’s claim for HK$5,712,000 is based on what happened in the KV Property Transaction. P1’s pleaded case in her Statement of Claim is as follows.

(1)  D1 acted for Cheerful Joy in the latter’s purchase of the KV Property from the original owners and in its sub-sale to P2 (§2.1).

(2)  Pursuant to a provisional agreement for sale and purchase dated 29 October 2014, Cheerful Joy agreed to sell and P2 agreed to purchase the KV Property for HK$28,560,000 (§15.1). Under this agreement, P2 had already paid to D1 (for payment to Cheerful Joy) an initial deposit of HK$1 million (§15.5).

(3)  In around early November 2014, the 2^nd defendant (“D2”) represented P1 to handle P2’s purchase of the KV Property from Cheerful Joy (§17.1). A clerk of D2 informed P1 to transfer further deposits of HK$4,712,000 to D1 for payment to Cheerful Joy, which she did so on 11 November 2014 (§18).

(4)  The total deposit paid by P1 to D1 (for payment to Cheerful Joy) for P2’s purchase of the KV Property was HK$5,712,000 (§18).

(5)  On or about 21 November 2014, Cheerful Joy and P2 entered into a formal sub-sale agreement (§20).

(6)  D1 and D2 were P1’s legal representatives in the “Tam Transactions”[1] and as such owed several duties to P1 (and also to P2 and P3) (§59).

(7)  D1 and D2 owed an implied contractual duty of reasonable care and skill towards the plaintiffs in respect of their provision of services as solicitors (§62).

(8)  In the KV Property Transaction and during the period when D1 represented P3, D1 came across various information which was materially relevant to P1’s interests (§63).

(9)  D1 was in breach of the duties owed to P1 as pleaded earlier in the Statement of Claim (§65).

(10)  As a result of D1 and D2’s breaches as pleaded, the plaintiffs have suffered loss and damage, including but not limited to HK$5,712,000 (§66.1).

(11)  As a result of the matters pleaded, the plaintiffs have suffered loss and damage for HK$5,712,000 which P1 (as P2’s representative) would not have paid to D1 (for payment to Cheerful Joy) had D1 discharged and/or complied with its duties and conducted the requisite investigation into the principal sale and purchase transaction (§70).

(12)  In the circumstances, the plaintiffs hold the defendants jointly and severally liable for HK$5,712,000 given their breaches of duties pertaining to the KV Property Transaction (§71).

16.There is no plea in the Statement of Claim to the effect that D1 was acting as P1’s solicitors in the KV Property Transaction. This is to be contrasted with the positive pleas in the Statement of Claim that D1 was at the material times acting (1) for Cheerful Joy in its purchase of the KV Property and its sub-sale to P2 (§2.1), (2) for Hailey in its purchase of the shares and loans (“Shares and Loans”) of and in the registered owners of the KM Properties in the KM Properties Transaction (§§1.3.2 & 2.2) and (3) “simultaneously” for P1 in her purchase of the Shares and Loans from Hailey in the KM Properties Transaction (§2.3).

17.As noted above, P1 has pleaded that “[D1] and [D2] were [P1’s] legal representatives in the Tam Transactions” in her Statement of Claim (§59). However, on the face of such a rolled-up plea, it may be taken to refer to the plaintiffs’ earlier pleas that (1) D1 was acting for P1 in her purchase of the Shares and Loans from Hailey in the KM Properties Transaction (§2.3) and/or (2) D2 represented P1 to handle P2’s purchase of the KV Property from Cheerful Joy (§17.1). There is nothing in the Statement of Claim prior to §59 to suggest that D1 was acting as solicitors for P1 in the KV Property Transaction, and the beginning phrase of §59 therefore cannot in my view be read as pleading an allegation to that effect.

18.It is further noted that the alleged duties in §§59, 60, 61 and 62 of the Statement of Claim are pleaded on the basis that D1 (and D2) were at the material times acting for P1, P2 and/or P3. However, given that no factual basis has been pleaded in the Statement of Claim to suggest that D1 was P1’s solicitors in the KV Property Transaction, I am unable to see how any of the pleaded duties is applicable to P1’s claim against D1 in the KV Property Transaction. Furthermore, P1 has not in the Statement of Claim (1) made any allegation that there was at any material times a contract between P1 and D1 for the purpose of the KV Property Transaction, or (2) put forward any factual basis upon which D1 can be said to have owed any duty to P1 in the context of the KV Property Transaction. These matters form part of the factual situation the existence of which would entitle P1 to obtain damages (or equitable compensation) for HK$5,712,000 against D1: cf Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 at 242. Insofar as the P1 contends that D1 owed to her a duty to take care in the KV Property Transaction, it is well-established that P1 should in her pleading set out the facts upon which the supposed duty is founded: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023 vol 1 §18/12/27. As mentioned earlier, no such facts are set out.

19.In her skeleton submissions, P1 has asserted that she is “claiming professional negligence against D1 qua client” (§7). However, there is in fact nothing in the Statement of Claim to suggest how she became D1’s client in the context of the KV Property Transaction. Although P1 has made elaborate submissions in her skeleton submissions (§§20-33) to contend that there was an implied retainer between P1 and D1, it is apparent that most of the matters relied upon arose in the context of the KM Properties Transaction, and none of them can be relied upon to suggest a retainer between P1 and D1 in the context of the KV Property Transaction. In any event, it is significant to note that P1 has not pleaded an implied retainer between herself and D1 for the purpose of the KV Property Transaction in the Statement of Claim.

20.In these circumstances, I am unable to identify any cause of action (whether in tort, for breach of contract, or for breach of fiduciary duty) from the Statement of Claim that P1 relies upon to support her claim against D1 for HK$5,712,000. I have also considered the proposed amendments in the Draft ASOC but do not believe that any of them would assist in curing the above-mentioned defects in the original Statement of Claim in relation to P1’s claim for HK$5,712,000 against D1.

21.It is in my view plain and obvious that P1’s claim for HK$5,712,000 against D1 should be struck out for want of any reasonable cause of action.

22.In the light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the application of the no reflective loss principle in relation to P1’s claim for HK$5,712,000 against D1. The no reflective loss principle is an exclusionary rule denying a plaintiff what otherwise would be his right to sue: Wah Nam Group Ltd v Roderick John Sutton [2018] HKCA 687 at §20.1 (Yuen JA); Topping Chance Development Ltd v CCIF CPA Ltd [2020] HKCA 478 at §23 (Kwan VP). If a plaintiff cannot establish a right to sue in the first place, it would appear to follow that the no reflective loss principle is not engaged to provide a basis to bar the plaintiff’s claim.

C2.  Whether P1’s claim is frivolous and/or vexatious

23.I note that D1’s application to strike out has also been made on the basis that P1’s claim is frivolous or vexatious. However, in the light of (1) my conclusion that P1’s claim against D1 for HK$5,712,000 should be struck out for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and (2) D1 has not advanced any submissions in this appeal on whether P1’s claims should be struck out for being frivolous or vexatious, it is unnecessary for the court to express any view on whether the P1’s claims (whether for HK$5,712,000 or HK$5,508,000) against D1 are frivolous or vexatious.

D.  P1’S CLAIM FOR HK$5,508,000 AGAINST D1

24.P1’s claim for HK$5,508,000 is based on what happened in the KM Properties Transaction. P1’s pleaded case in her Statement of Claim is as follows.

(1)  P1 intended to acquire the KM Properties via P3 (§1.3.2).

(2)  D1 acted for Hailey in its purchase of the Shares and Loans and its sub-sale to P3 (§2.2).

(3)  D1 simultaneously acted for P1 in her purchase of the Shares and Loans from Hailey through P3 (§2.3). P3 was also a client of D1 (§2.3.2).

(4)  D1 was aware that P1 was the decision maker, the person in charge of signing/executing legal documents, the funder of purchase price and the person responsible for settling other monies to discharge D1’s legal costs and disbursements (§2.4).

(5)  D1 was aware that P1 was a lay client who carried the property investments through her corporate vehicles (§2.5).

(6)  On or about 19 December 2014, Mr Ngai secretly procured Hailey to purchase the KM Properties by entering into two provisional sale and purchase agreements to purchase the Shares and Loans (§22).

(7)  On or about 23 December 2014, Hailey and Mr Ngai (on behalf of P3) entered into 2 provisional sale and purchase agreements by which Hailey agreed to sell to P3 the Shares and Loans (§23).

(8)  Hailey had made a substantial profit of HK$5,508,000 by sub-selling the Shares and Loans to P3 (§23.1).

(9)  D1 were the legal representatives of both Hailey and P3 in the latter’s acquisition of the Shares and Loans from Hailey (§23.3).

(10)  Mr Lee Shu Wing was D1’s legal representative who had assisted and advised P1 in the transaction to acquire the Shares and Loans (§23.4).

(11)  On or about 17 March 2015, P3 paid to D1 (for payment to Hailey) the balance of the purchase price in the total sum of HK$21,999,600 (§30).

(12)  On 17 March 2015, P1 became P3’s sole director and shareholder in order to complete P3’s purchase of the Shares and Loans from Hailey (§44.6).

(13)  After the transaction for the Shares and Loans was completed, P1 learned that Hailey had purchased the KM Properties for HK$25,920,000 and then immediately sold them to P3 for a total of HK$31,428,000, leading to a significant secret profit of HK$5,508,000 (§54.3).

(14)  D1 and D2 were P1’s legal representatives in the “Tam Transactions” and as such owed several duties to P1 (and also to P2 and P3), including duties to advise and a duty to disclose information of relevance and concern to the client (§59).

(15)  In the context of property transactions involving confirmors and sub-purchasers, solicitors are under a duty to advise clients of the problems and risks associated with such transactions (§61).

(16)  D1 and D2 owed an implied contractual duty of reasonable care and skill towards the plaintiffs in respect of their provision of services as solicitors (§62).

(17)  In the Shares and Loans transaction and during the period when D1 represented P1 and P3 in that transaction, D1 came across and/or ought to have had access to various information which was materially relevant to P1’s interests (§64).

(18)  D1 was in breach of the duties owed to P1 as pleaded earlier in the Statement of Claim (§65).

(19)  As a result of D1 and D2’s breaches as pleaded, the plaintiffs have suffered loss and damage, including but not limited to HK$5,508,000 which P3 would not have paid had D1 disclosed the various material information to P1 (§66.2).

(20)  In the circumstances, D1 is solely liable for the HK$5,508,000 secret profit under the Shares and Loans transaction (§71)

25.From the above-mentioned matters pleaded in the Statement of Claim, it appears that P1 has sufficiently set out the material facts which allegedly give rise to the duties that she claims were owed by D1 in respect of her claim for HK$5,508,000. Given that P1 has prima facie established a right to sue D1 for HK$5,508,000, it becomes necessary to consider D1’s submissions that such a claim is barred by the no reflective loss principle.

26.D1 submits that since P1 and P3 are both claiming for HK$5,508,000 against D1, P1’s loss would be made good if P3 succeeds on its claim and the no reflective loss principle would bar P1’s claim for the same. In advancing this submission, D1 relies on, inter alia, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Landune International Ltd v Cheung Chung Leung [2006] 1 HKLRD 39. In that case, Yuen JA at §24 said that “the focus of the rule against reflective loss is not on whether a wrong had been done to the plaintiff … personally, but on the loss he is seeking to recover – if the loss can be made good if the company … enforces its rights against the defendant, the plaintiff’s loss is a reflective loss and to prevent double recovery, its claim should be struck out”. Having considered some English decisions (including Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (No 1) [2002] 2 AC 1 and Gardner v Parker [2004] 2 BCLC 554), her Ladyship concluded at §35 that the plaintiff’s loss was a reflective loss because “it would be made good if the [company] succeeds in recovering the money from the defendants”. In Basab Inc v Superb Glory Holdings Ltd (2017) 20 HKCFAR 384, Tang PJ at §8 cited with approval the above-quoted passage from §24 of Yuen JA’s decision in Landune.

27.In response to D1’s submissions on the no reflective loss principle, P1 has heavily relied on the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Marex Financial Ltd v Sevilleja [2021] AC 39. In particular, P1 submits that this English decision resulted in the disapproval and overruling of Lord Millett’s dicta in Johnson v Gore Wood (above), Giles v Rhind [2003] Ch 618, Perry v Day [2005] 2 BCLC 405 and Gardner v Parker (above), and that any authorities in Hong Kong which rely on the principles set out in such overruled cases are unhelpful for the purpose of this appeal.

28.I find such a sweeping submission unhelpful and surprising. As a matter of principle under the doctrine of precedent, it seems clear that this Court is bound by the ratio decidendi in the authorities of the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal. There are clear authorities from the appellate courts in Hong Kong on the operation of the no reflective loss principle, including (but not limited to) the Court of Appeal’s decision in Landune (above) and the decision of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal in Basab (above). Any decisions from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom are of course to be treated with great respect (cf Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117 at §17 (Li CJ)). However, insofar as one cannot reconcile between what the Supreme Court has decided in Marex and the ratio decidendi in the relevant decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong, this Court is clearly bound to follow the courts in the higher judicial hierarchy in Hong Kong.

29.In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (above), Lord Bingham at p 36B-E said:

“These principles do not resolve the crucial decision which a court must make on a strike-out application, whether on the facts pleaded a shareholder’s claim is sustainable in principle, nor the decision which the trial court must make, whether on the facts proved the shareholder’s claim should be upheld. On the one hand the court must respect the principle of company autonomy, ensure that the company’s creditors are not prejudiced by the action of individual shareholders and ensure that a party does not recover compensation for a loss which another party has suffered. On the other, the court must be astute to ensure that the party who has in fact suffered loss is not arbitrarily denied fair compensation. The problem can be resolved only by close scrutiny of the pleadings at the strike-out stage and all the proven facts at the trial stage: the object is to ascertain whether the loss claimed appears to be or is one which would be made good if the company had enforced its full rights against the party responsible, and whether (to use the language of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No.2) [1982] Ch 204, 223) the loss claimed is ‘merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company’. In some cases the answer will be clear, as where the shareholder claims the loss of dividend or a diminution of the company’s assets, or a loss unrelated to the business of the company. In other cases, inevitably, a finer judgment will be called for. At the strike-out stage any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the claimant.”

30.These observations of Lord Bingham were adopted with approval by Tang Ag CJHC in Hotung v Ho Yuen Ki (No 4) [2011] 2 HKC 149 at §20 and Fok JA (sitting as an additional Judge of the Court of First Instance) in Pico North Asia Holdings Ltd v Cheung Yuk Ting Linda (unreported, HCA 1371/2009, 8 February 2011) at §8. I also note that part of above-quoted passage from Lord Bingham’s speech was mentioned without disapproval in Marex (above) at §48 by Lord Reed PSC (with whom Lord Hodge DPSC, Lady Black and Lord Lloyd-Jones JJSC agreed).

31.The important point to note from Lord Bingham’s observations in Johnson v Gore Wood is that when the question of whether the no reflective loss principle is engaged is considered on a strike-out application, the court can only have regard to the pleadings and determine whether the loss appears to be one which would be made good if the company enforced its rights.

32.P1 submits that (1) P3 was at all material times P1’s nominee; (2) it was P1 who made all the relevant payments to D1 (including those pursuant to the KM Properties Transaction and D1’s legal costs), (3) it is possible for the trial judge to find after hearing all the evidence at the end of the trial that the person who suffered the loss was P1 (instead of P3). Despite the somewhat convoluted way in which the claim for HK$5,508,000 is advanced in the Statement of Claim, it seems to me that all the background facts have been pleaded in P1’s pleading and that the conclusion that P1 has suggested is one that appears to be open to the trial judge to reach on the existing pleading. If such a conclusion is reached by the trial judge, P3 (the company) would not be able to enforce any right to recover HK$5,508,000 and the no reflective loss principle would not operate to bar P1 from recovering the same.

33.For these reasons, and particularly given the way in which the material facts have been pleaded by the plaintiffs in their Statement of Claim, it is not in my view plain and obvious that P1’s claim for HK$5,508,000 against D1 is necessarily barred by the no reflective loss principle. As Lord Bingham said in Johnson v Gore Wood (above) in the context of the no reflective loss principle (see §29 above), any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff at the strike-out stage. I decline to strike out P1’s claim for HK$5,508,000 against D1.

34.It follows from what I have said so far that I have come to a different view to that of the Master and that the entirety of P1’s claim against D1 should not be struck out.

35.In the proposed amendments in the Draft ASOC, P1 seeks to advance a number of additional claims against D1 in respect of her legal fees and expenses incurred in relation to the KM Properties Transactions. Given that such losses were allegedly suffered by P1 alone (and not P3), the no reflective loss principle is arguably not applicable to bar such claims. At the hearing, it was submitted on behalf of D1 that P1’s proposed new claims are bound to fail but no detailed reasons were provided. Accordingly, it seems to me that P1’s proposed amendments regarding her alleged losses incurred in relation to the KM Properties Transaction may provide an additional basis for concluding that the entirety of P1’s claim against D1 should not be struck out. Be that as it may, I am conscious that the plaintiffs’ application for leave to amend their Statement of Claim is not before me and will be determined by a Master in due course. Therefore, nothing in this Decision should be taken as representing my views on whether or not leave should be granted on any of the proposed amendments in the Draft ASOC.

E.  DISPOSITION

36.For the reasons given above, I strike out P1’s claim for HK$5,712,000 against D1 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, but decline to strike out her claim for HK$5,508,000 against D1. P1’s appeal is therefore partially allowed. I set aside the Master’s order to strike out the entirety of P1’s claim against D1, and the Master’s costs order.

37.As far as the results are concerned, D1 and P1 have respectively achieved some success before the Master and in this appeal. Although it might be said that D1 has had to bring a strike-out application in order to get P1’s claim for HK$5,712,000 struck out, the application was made on the basis of the no reflective loss principle which I have found not to be engaged in relation to the claim struck out. Looking at the matters in the round, it seems to me that a fair order for costs should be that there be no order as to costs both in D1’s striking out application before the Master and in P1’s appeal before this Court. I make an order nisi to this effect.

Mr Edward Chan SC & Mr Jacky Lam, instructed by Messrs Kok & Ha for the 1^st to 3^rd Plaintiffs

Mr Ryan Chan, instructed by Messrs SSW & Associates for the 1^st Defendant