Lakhwinder Singh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1091/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 January 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 September 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1897 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 1091/2022 [2023] HKCFI 73 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1091 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 September 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1897 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 16 November 2022. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of India. He entered Hong Kong on 20 August 2015 illegally and was arrested by the police on the same day. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 22 August 2015. 5.By a Notice of Decision dated 13 March 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the BOR 2 risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2], the persecution risk[3] and the torture risk[4]. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After a hearing on 16 July 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal on 20 August 2018 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection. At [95] and [99] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found that the applicant’s case was not credible and that he would not face any proscribed risks of harm upon his return. The Board was also satisfied at [98] that internal relocation would be viable.[5] 7.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and his application was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 4 December 2020 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.His appeal to the Court of Appeal against the Court’s Order. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal on 13 July 2021. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23 December 2021. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 19 July 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 25 July 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.The applicant’s claim was based on threats from members of an opposing political party 14.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. 15.He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The Board considered the evidence. At [95] and [99] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found that the applicant’s case was not credible and that he would not face any proscribed risks of harm upon his return. The Board was also satisfied at [98] that internal relocation would be viable. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 17.In support of his subsequent claim, he submitted to the immigration officer a statement, in which he stated that after he had submitted his NCF on 25 January 2018 for his previous claim, he received information from his wife in India that the owners of the adjacent land of her home, namely Balkar Singh and Baljinder Singh and their three sons (the “new enemies”) started to created trouble to the family for the purpose of obtaining the family’s land. As a result of their harassment, his wife and his children moved to live with her parents. The new enemies threatened that if he returns to India to claim the land, they will kill him. His wife had reported to police, but the police did not take action, probably having taken bribe from his enemies. 18.The Director considered the evidence and found that the new facts are not credible as he did not raise them in his interview with the immigration officer in March 2018. Nor had he raised it with the Board in July 2018. There is no evidence to show that state protection will not be available to him if he returns home. 19.The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the facts which should have been raised in his previous claim to support his subsequent claim and such facts, which bear no credibility, when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 20.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application, in which he said that the Director failed to differentiate between his previous claim and subsequent claim as his previous claim is on politics and the subsequent claim on land dispute. His new enemies are trying to kill his wife. He has no proof, but it is true. His wife had left home with the children to live with her mother. DISCUSSION 21.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 22.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 23.Before me, the applicant, upon being asked why he did not raise the land dispute in his previous claim, said that he was under stress, therefore he did not tell the immigration officer. However, he was represented by duty lawyer at the time. He then admitted that he had relied upon the old story in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim and the Director was not wrong in making his decision. 24.There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments on the intended RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 29.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 6th day of January 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
[1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [5] Extracts from [2021] HKCA 911 §§2-6 |
Cases cited in this judgment