Nirmal Singh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1176/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 2 February 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 1 August 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2895 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1176/2022 [2023] HKCFI 288 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1176 of 2020
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 1 August 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2895 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 28 November 2022. The procedural history 4.The applicant is an Indian national. He came to Hong Kong on 30 March 2014 illegally and was arrested by police on 28 April 2014. He was transferred to the Immigration Department. He lodged his non-refoulement claim by means of a written representation on 30 April 2014 on the applicable grounds of the BOR 2 risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2], the persecution risk[3] and the torture risk[4] on the basis that he is in fear of being harmed by Surinder and Vicky of the Indian National Congress Party and also affiliated with the Shiv Sena Party, because he is a supporter of the Shiromani Akali Dal Party and refused to join the Congress Party. 5.By Notice of Decision dated 6 March 2018, the Director refused his claim on all applicable risks. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. Having considered the applicant’s reasons, the Board dismissed his appeal by the Board’s Decision dated 6 December 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”). 7.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance by its Order dated 7 August 2020 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.His application for extension of time to appeal against the Court’s Order was first dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 23 December 2020, and on appeal, dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23 June 2021. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 20 August 2021. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 21 April 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 23 May 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.In the applicant’s previous claim, the applicant claimed that , if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by people of the Congress and Shiv Sena Party because of political disputes. 14.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. 15.He appealed to the Board. The Board dismissed this appeal for the reasons that his evidence was not reliable as it was based upon hearsay information and was implausible; that there was no risk of persecution if he returned to India and there was no evidence that the government of its agents were involved in the incidents; that there was no evidence of torture within the statutory context; that state protection was available to him and that internal relocation was a viable alternative. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 17.In support of his subsequent claim, he submitted to the immigration officer additional information and internet news articles. 18.The Director considered the evidence and found that his fear of being harmed or killed by Surinder and Vicky in his previous claim is the same one as in his subsequent claim, which had been considered by the Board and was rejected. The news articles do not assist him as they are not evidence show his personal risk if he returns to India. 19.The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the facts, which when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 20.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application, in which he said that the Director had not considered his case properly. DISCUSSION 21.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 22.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 23.Before me, the applicant said that his situation is not very good in his country. He has kidney problem and the doctor said that he needs medical care. The medical care in India is not as good as in Hong Kong. 24.I find that there is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 25.There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 26.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 27.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 28.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 29.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he repeated what he said in paragraph 23, supra. 30.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 2nd day of February 2023.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
[1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. |
Cases cited in this judgment