Vu Van Binh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 1323/2022

[2023] HKCFI 460

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1323 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by (counsel for) the Applicant in open court / the Applicant being absent in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

1.  extension of time for the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 19 November 2021 be refused; and

2.  the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.The Applicant is a 48-year-old national of Vietnam who entered Hong Kong illegally on 21 January 2020 and some 2 months later on 30 March 2020 surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Vietnam he would be harmed or killed by his creditor over his outstanding debts. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.

2.The Applicant was born and raised in Pha Le, Thuy Nguyen, Hai Phong, Vietnam. After leaving school he worked as a fisherman to make his living, got married and raised a family with 2 children in his home district.

3.In August 2018 for the purpose of expending his fishing activities, the Applicant borrowed a loan from a local money-lender with monthly interest payments, of which he was initially able to manage until July 2019 when his fishing vessel was sunk by a storm, and when he was without income and was unable to make his loan repayments, his creditor started to send his followers to make threats against him.

4.As he became fearful for his safety, the Applicant therefore fled to other towns to hide form his creditor, but when he later heard that his creditor had sent men looking for him everywhere, he felt it was no longer safe to remain in Vietnam, and so on 14 January 2020 he departed for China, and from there he later sneaked into Hong Kong and subsequently raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 22 October 2020 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

5.By a Notice of Decision dated 5 January 2021 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

6.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his creditor and followers upon his return to Vietnam as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there was no evidence of any real intention of them to seriously harm or kill him other than to put pressure on him to repay his debts, that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between them without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Vietnam with a large population of 98 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 331,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Ho Chi Minh City where it would be difficult if not impossible for his creditor to locate him.

7.On 19 January 2021 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 20 April 2021 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 19 November 2021 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the decision of the Director.

8.In its decision the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from his creditor over their debts dispute but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of his creditor to seriously harm or kill him, and that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between them without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Vietnam to negate any such risk that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.

9.On 23 November 2022 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form, and in his supporting affirmation of the same date he just repeated his claim as before that he cannot return to his home country where he will face the risk of being harmed or killed by his creditor but without putting forward any proper ground for his intended challenge, nor did he request any oral hearing for his application.

10.By then the Applicant was however seriously out of time with his application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made.

11.As the last day of the three-month period for him to file his Form 86 fell on 19 February 2022, the Applicant was therefore more than 9 months late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.

12.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 9 months must be considered as very substantial and inordinate, for which he did not provide any explanation in his Form or affirmation, and as the record shows that the decision was sent on the same day to his last reported address without being returned through undelivered post, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for the Applicant’s serious delay.

13.As for the merits of his intended application, as noted above the Applicant has also failed to put forth any proper ground for his intended challenge, and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any merits in his intended application either.

14.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

15.In the Applicant’s case, the Board rejected his claim essentially on its correct findings that it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor without any official involvement that state and police protection would be available to him upon his return to his home country to negate any risk which might arise from his claim with the benefits of hearing the Applicant in his evidence and his answers to questions raised on his claim as well as the relevant COI available before the Board, and in the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the findings of the Board.

16.Furthermore, the fact is that it has also been correctly established by the Director in his decision that the risk of harm in the Applicant’s claim is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Vietnam, a decision also confirmed by the Board, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.

17.In the premises and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

18.For these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for his serious delay, I refuse to extend time and accordingly dismiss his leave application.

Dated the 17^th day of February 2023.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1