Diantan Teresita Gracia v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1425/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 March 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 27 June 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 309 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1425/2022 [2023] HKCFI 633 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1425 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 27 June 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 309 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The application was adjourned for the applicant to process her legal aid application in accordance with regulation 7A of the Legal Aid Ordinance, Cap.91. 4.The applicant appeared before the Court on 6 February 2023 and said that she had not obtained the result of her legal aid application. The Court considered that there is no merit in her application, which should not be further delayed. The Court therefore decided to proceed to hear her application. The procedural history 5.The applicant is a national of the Philippines. She came to Hong Kong and stayed as a domestic helper, but then as a visitor after she had finished her employment contract and she was permitted to stay until 22 January 2003. She overstayed and was arrested by police on 15 May 2009. On 19 May 2009, she raised her torture claim under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Her torture claim was rejected by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”). She did not appeal against this decision. Then, she lodged her non-refoulement claim dated 27 September 2013 and received by the Immigration Department on 4 October 2013 on the grounds of BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 6.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 15 February 2016 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 19 June 2017. 7.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 22 February 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board rejected her appeal on BOR 2 risk, BOR 3 risk and Persecution risk. 8.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 12 August 2020 (the “Court’s Order”). 9.Her appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal on 10 February 2021. 10.Her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 13 July 2021. 11.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 8 March 2022. 12.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 25 April 2022. 13.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 14.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if she is refouled, she would be harmed by her creditors and their subordinates because her family failed to pay off the loan and she was the loan guarantor. She also feared that she would be killed by the new valley chief who intended to take away her land. 15.The Director found that her previous claim was not substantiated. She appealed to the Board. 16.The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and it did not accept her evidence on the facts of her claim. 17.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 18.In support of her application, the applicant has submitted additional materials in support of her claim. In gist, she is currently still in fear that she will be harmed or even killed by the same enemies, the loan sharks because of the loan dispute. This issue has been considered by the Board in the previous claim. Her fear of the loan sharks and their connection with the government officials has also been considered by the Board in the previous claim. Likewise, the issue of internal relocation has also been considered by the Board in the previous. All of the reasons were rejected by the Board. 19.The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the previous claim, will give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Thus, he refused her application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 20.The applicant has filed an affidavit in support of her application. However, she did not raise any specific ground. 21.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 22.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said she understands the Director’s reasons for his decision. She said that her problem in the Philippines still remains unsolved and she will be harmed or killed if she returns to the Philippines. These issues had been considered and rejected in her previous claim. 23.There is no valid ground from the applicant to challenge the Director’s Decision. 24.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 25.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 26.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 27.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 28.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 29.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 30.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 31.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 32.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 33.RPO in terms of paragraph 31 be made against the applicant. Dated the 9th day of March 2023.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment