Chen Yung Ngai Kenneth and Another v. Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCB 3819/2011 on BabelCite. This HCB judgment was delivered on 20 March 2023.
1. This is an application by the Trustees of the estate of the Discharged Bankrupt, David Ho , for discovery against 6 banks (“ the Banks ”) under section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap 6 (“ BO ”). The Trustees apply for production of bank account opening documents and transaction records concerning various entities and persons who are suspected to be the nominees of David Ho (“ the Production Application ”).
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 14 cases
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HCB 3819/2011 [2023] HKCFI 826 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 3819 OF 2011 ____________ Re: HO YUK WAH DAVID (the “Discharged Bankrupt”) ____________
____________ Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers Date of Hearing: 17 November and 20 December 2022 Closing Date for Further Affirmations: 13 and 15 March 2023 Date of Decision: 20 March 2023 _______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ A. BACKGROUND 1.This is an application by the Trustees of the estate of the Discharged Bankrupt, David Ho, for discovery against 6 banks (“the Banks”) under section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap 6 (“BO”). The Trustees apply for production of bank account opening documents and transaction records concerning various entities and persons who are suspected to be the nominees of David Ho (“the Production Application”). 2.David Ho was formerly a partner in a law firm and a businessman involved in substantial projects in the Mainland. He founded Asia-Pac Infrastructure Development Limited (“APIDL”) in 1996. 3.On 2 August 2011, a bankruptcy order was made on David Ho’s own petition. David Ho had debts of over HK$160 million but declared negligible assets. After investigation, he was found to be operating a complex scheme using offshore companies and nominees to conceal his assets, carry on his business ventures and litigation, and pay his personal and family expenses. Through his nominees, David Ho has diverted significant amount of funds out of reach of his creditors. 4.Many legal actions were brought by or against his nominees. Among them, 2 are of importance for the present purpose, namely HCA 971/2012 (“the 971 Action”) and HCA 806/2006 (“the 806 Action”). 5.The judgment in the 971 Action was summarised in Chen Yung Ngai Kenneth v Hugill & Ip (a firm) [2023] HKCFI 151 at §§16-28. In gist:
6.There was no appeal from the judgment, but the liquidators of APIDL resisted the Trustees’ investigation despite the finding that APIDL was held beneficially by David Ho. 7.The 806 Action is an ongoing action. In gist, APIDL and 3 other companies in the Asia-Pac Group (controlled by David Ho) sue their former legal advisers for negligence and breach of duty. 8.On 10 April 2013, APIDL was put into creditors’ voluntary liquidation. Mr Alan Tang and Ms Anita Hou were appointed as liquidators (“the Liquidators”). The Liquidators decided to continue the 806 Action. 9.On 2 August 2019, David Ho was discharged from bankruptcy. 10.The Trustees have always suspected that David Ho was involved in funding arrangements for various actions (eg the 806 Action), which may result in funds available for David Ho’s estate if the litigation was successful. 11.In Re Ho Yuk Wah David (No. 5) [2022] HKCA 110 (“the 83 Judgment”), the Court of Appeal allowed a section 29 BO application in respect of the 806 Action. At §17.2, the Court of Appeal commented that:
12.The Liquidators claim that the 806 Action received funding from alleged third parties upon APIDL’s liquidation, who were not connected to David Ho. They further claim that there was no litigation funding arrangement for the 971 Action. However, since David Ho was found to have beneficially owned APIDL all along, the Trustees suspect that David Ho has been substantively involved in the funding arrangements for the 806 Action. The Trustees also suspect that David Ho has funded other proceedings in which Mr Alan Tang was involved as liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy, including: HCA 4188/2002 (“the CWT Case”); and HCA 345/2001 (“the LSF Case”) which are not relevant for present purposes. 13.In the 971 Action, Yu Yang produced a witness statement stating that there was an agreement between David Ho and him about the proceeds obtained from the 806 Action. After covering the investment capital, the proceeds were to be distributed in a 60/40 split between Yu Yang/his sister and David Ho’s family members. Yu Yang stated that huge amount of assets were invested into APIDL for litigation. All returns went to David Ho or his family, or “reinvested” into ongoing actions such as the CWT Case and the LSF Case. 14.As beneficial owner of APIDL, David Ho would be entitled to surplus funds of APIDL. If APIDL succeeds in the 806 Action, any surplus funds would go to the shareholder. David Ho would have even more incentive to fund the 806 Action. 15.The Production Application before me now is a sequel to the production order made against the Liquidators under the 83 Judgment. The aim is to further investigate and identify the entities or individuals who purportedly funded APIDL in the 806 Action. 16.Two issues arise:
B. THE PRODUCTION ISSUE B1. Legal Principles 17.Section 29 BO provides (where material) that:
18.The applicable principles have been set out in Re Ho Yuk Wah David (No. 5) [2020] 2 HKLRD 608, §§22 and 31, Au-Yeung J; confirmed in the 83 Judgment, §12. In gist, the Trustees must satisfy the court that the information or documents “relate to the bankrupt, his dealings or property”; the provision of information or documents is reasonably required for them to carry out the Trustees’ functions; and the respondents are able to provide such information or documents. The standard of proof is reasonable suspicion: the 83 Judgment, §14. 19.Confidentiality is no bar to an order for disclosure in a section 29 application: The Joint and Several Trustees in Bankruptcy of Nanik Dayaram (also known as Nanik Dayaram Hathiramani) v Lee Pei Yin, HCB 7651/2011, 6 November 2015, §62, Ng J. 20.The same principles apply even when a bankrupt is discharged, because the property vested in the Official Receiver and Trustees does not re-vest in the bankrupt upon discharge: Re Lee Siu Fung Siegfried [2017] 1 HKLRD 1155, §§25-27, G Lam J (as he then was). B2. Application of the legal principles 21.The bank accounts of the following entities or individuals are in issue:
22.Regarding APIDL (Account 1), the production order sought by the Trustees should plainly be granted in light of the 83 Judgment and the 971 Action. See §11 and 5(a) above. 23.Regarding the bank accounts of the other entities and individuals, the starting point for analyses is the documents disclosed by the Liquidators as a result of the 83 Judgment. They reveal that, amongst others, two BVI companies had funded the 806 Action by injecting funds into APIDL:
24.For the following reasons, the Trustees reasonably suspect that True Treasure and Aim Best are merely corporate vehicles for David Ho to fund the 806 Action or to aid him in the transfer and concealment of his assets post-bankruptcy. B3. True Treasure (Accounts 2-3, 5-8) 25.In relation to True Treasure, the Trustees submit, and I accept, the following points:
26.In addition, the Trustees’ suspicion that Sun Li Hua, Guan Qiao Ling and Ma Yun Ru were the nominees of David Ho is buttressed by the following evidence:
27.There are thus reasonable grounds to suspect that the account holders of Accounts 2-3, 5-8 were nominees of David Ho. B3. Aim Best (Accounts 4 & 9) 28.In relation to Aim Best, the Trustees submit, and I accept the following points:
29.There are thus reasonable grounds to suspect that Aim Best, Shinewing Specialist Advisory Services Limited and Bryne & Co. are merely channelling funds from David Ho to fund the 806 Action or that they are nominees David Ho. 30.Aim Best paid far more than the fixed counsel fees, because the UIFA states that Aim Best should cover all costs of ONC Lawyers without specifying an amount. No reasonable funder would subject itself to such “unlimited liability”. 31.Lastly, the Trustees’ suspicion is also supported by the following conduct of the Liquidators:
32.In view of §§25-31 above, I am satisfied that the Trustees have demonstrated reasonable grounds for suspecting that the litigation funding originated from David Ho, channelled through the bank accounts of his nominees, and was eventually injected into APIDL. It is entirely appropriate for the Trustees to seek information from the nominees or suspected nominees’ Banks in order for them to consider what actions may be taken for the benefit of the creditors. I give great weight to the views of the Trustees. C. THE NOTICE ISSUE 33.The Trustees submit that it is unnecessary to give notice to or to join the relevant entities or individuals holding the bank accounts for 3 reasons.
34.With respect, I disagree. The analogy between section 21 EO and section 29 BO is inapt. Whilst both sections do not expressly require notice to the account holder, under section 21 EO, the test is one of relevance: See Chan Wai Sun v Law Kai Andrew [2003] 3 HKLRD 954, §10, Chu J (as she then was). Since relevance is established, the applicant deserves a more robust approach of the court as set out in Tiger Resort Asia Ltd v Kazuo Okada & Ors [2018] HKCFI 472, DHCJ K Yeung SC (as he then was). Any insistence that service or notice should be a prerequisite for an application under section 21 EO would impose unjustified fetters upon the court’s discretion that can be exercised (§22). In contrast, under section 29 BO, the test is reasonable suspicion. The two sections are by nature different, with section 29 BO having a far lower standard of proof. 35.In principle, the court’s power under section 29 BO is to be exercised in the same way as an application under the repealed section 221 of the Companies Ordinance and the now equivalent section 286B of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, Cap 32: Joint and Several Trustees of the Property of So Ching Wan v Assen Ltd (In Liquidation) [2020] HKCA 1081, §8.4. The English corresponding provisions (similar but not identical) are sections 236 and 366 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The issue on notice has been reviewed by the English courts. 36.In, Marcel v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1992] Ch. 225, the police had seized documents, under Part II of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which might be relevant to a criminal investigation. All the members of the Court of Appeal expressed the view that where a subpoena duces tecum was served on the police calling for seized documents the police should inform the owner of the documents about the subpoena, in order to give him the opportunity of raising an objection. 37.Then came Morris v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1993] Ch. 372, in which the liquidators of B.C.C.I. sought under section 236 to obtain documents which its auditors had delivered to the Serious Fraud Office (“the SFO”) under section 2(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987. Sir Donald Nicholls V.-C. held that the SFO had no express or implied power to make voluntary disclosure of the documents to the liquidators. Sir Donald Nicholls V.-C. then turned to section 236 and held at pp. 382-383:
38.Sir Donald Nicholls V.-C. referred to Marcel as a “compelling analogy”, and summed up the position at p. 385:
39.These principles were applied by Lightman J in In re Murjani [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1498, pp 1510H-1511E. There the trustee in bankruptcy applied for a production order against two solicitors believed to be acting for the bankrupt’s wife and two alleged nominee companies (“the Clients”) under section 366 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The trustee had no other information concerning the Clients. Lightman J held that non-joinder of the Clients as respondents could be justified. The solicitors and Clients had taken all steps to render the clients untraceable, and it was obvious that the Clients would learn of the orders from the solicitors in ample time to challenge them before the solicitors would be compelled to comply with them. 40.In Soden & Anor v Burns [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1512, A and B were public limited companies but went into administration. Inspectors appointed under section 432 of the Companies Act 1985 to investigate A’s collapse took evidence from 112 witnesses, including directors and witnesses from the merchant bank, the strategy consultants and both auditors. The administrators of B applied for an order under section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 for disclosure of the transcripts of evidence of 53 of those witnesses. The Secretary of State refused to disclose that evidence because the witnesses were not given prior notification and an opportunity to object. 41.Robert Walker J (as he then was) firstly held that there was a qualified (not absolute) duty of confidence attaching to information obtained under compulsory powers, although the transcripts of evidence were owned by the Secretary of State. The duty of confidence was owed to the witness who gave evidence to the inspectors (at p. 1525 D-E). 42.Secondly, citing Morris, Walker J held that such witness should be given the opportunity to raise objections to disclosure. He explicitly rejected the argument that those individual witnesses had no standing. At pp. 1528H-1529B:
43.In Hong Kong, the same principles apply. In The Joint and Several Liquidators of Kong Wah Holdings Limited and Akai Holdings Limited v Herbert Tsoi & Partners & Anor (unreported, HCCW 49/2000, 19 November 2004), the liquidators sought documents under the repealed section 221 of the Companies Ordinance from a law firm in respect of its professional services rendered for 3 former subsidiaries of the Company. At §36, Kwan J, as she then was, held that the proper way to proceed was to join the subsidiaries as respondents, because no exceptional circumstances had been made out as to why the application should proceed in their absence. 44.In Ip Pui Lam Authur v Hang Seng Bank Ltd & others, unreported, HCB 3819/2011, 30 June 2015, Lok J similarly held that “under ordinary circumstances it would be better that the person whose account is to be looked at should be served” (§38). 45.It can be distilled from the above authorities that notice should be given to the bank account holders where an application is made under section 29 BO for disclosure of information of their bank accounts, unless the trustee can make out exceptional circumstances like urgency, serious prejudice to the trustee or that the trustee has made reasonable efforts to trace the account holders but to no avail. 46.The Trustees make 2 further points:
47.Here, the documents sought are of a historical nature. The application is not urgent. §45 should apply, save where otherwise specified in respect of a particular account. D. DISPOSITION 48.The documents sought are those in connection with:
49.Those documents are reasonably necessary for the Trustees to carry out their functions in investigating the assets of the bankrupt. Those documents are plainly within the possession of the relevant Bank. The scope of disclosure sought is not unreasonable. 50.In respect of the 1st Respondent, Chong Hing Bank, notice of the application to APIDL is not required as it has already been found to be the nominee of David Ho in the 971 Action. The disclosure sought related to only one bank account, 258-1x-1xxx8x-4. The period covered is from opening of the account to the date of this order. The terms of the order are reasonable. Chong Hing Bank can produce within 14 days. I grant the order sought. 51.In respect of the 2nd Respondent, HSBC, the Trustees do not have the addresses of 2 account holders, Guan Qiao Ling and Zhao Jian Hong. 52.To insist on service, (including substituted service) would prejudice the Trustees’ investigation. As the disclosure would cover account opening documents and identity of beneficial owner and authorized signatory, this would assist the Trustees in tracking down Guan and Zhao. 53.The disclosure sought is in relation to all bank accounts in HSBC:
54.The terms of the order are reasonable. HSBC can produce the documents within 28 days. I grant the order sought. 55.In respect of Shinewing, it is a Hong Kong company. The summons ought to be served on Shinewing before this Court would consider making the order sought. 56.In respect of the 3rd Respondent, China Merchants Bank Co Ltd, the Bank has confirmed that it does not have an account holder in the name of Sun Li Hua and no record of the relevant transaction on or around 28 May 2013. No order will thus be made with regard to her. 57.Han Liang has not been served. The Bank also stated in its letter dated 10 November 2022 that it was not in a position to provide the information sought in the place of the remitting banks. I make no order with regard to the China Merchants Bank Co Ltd. 58.In respect of the 4th Respondent, CMB Wing Lung Bank Ltd, the Trustees initially sought a “provisional order” such that “upon the provision of further or other identification information and/or bank account number of Alison Sun Lihua (and/or Sun Li Hua/Sunlihua, Chinese name 孙立花)”, CMB Wing Lung Bank do produce the documents sought. 59.With respect, this is putting the cart before the horse. An applicant should first satisfy the Court as to the identity of the account holder before the Court would even consider making an order. 60.Subsequent to the hearing, the Trustees obtained more information pursuant to a discovery order in Ho Yuk Wa David (No. 5) [2020] 2 HKLRD 608, Au-Yeung J; and filed the 2nd affirmation of Tam Cheuk Hin Joey on 13 March 2023. It shows Sun Li Hua’s Chinese passport number, 2 addresses in Beijing and an email address. That affirmation gives further information, which I accept, showing Sun Li Hua to likely be David Ho’s nominee giving detailed and thorough instructions on behalf of the 971 Defendants in the 971 Action when she was neither a director nor shareholder of any of the 971 Defendants. The draft order provided by the Trustees even provided the Chinese citizenship identification number of Sun Li Hua. Such particulars of Sun Li Hua can be provided to the Bank to search for the account of Sun when an order is made. 61.Notice of the summons ought to be given to Sun Li Hua before the Court will consider making an order. Given that her address is out of jurisdiction, the application is adjourned with liberty to restore within 2 months for the Trustees to serve her. 62.In respect of the 5th Respondent, Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited, Chungs Lawyers acting on its behalf stated in their letters dated 26 October, 31 October, 9 November and 13 December 2022 that, based on the only information currently available, ie name of the account holder Ma Yun Ru (or Ma Yun Ru, China), Ma does not maintain any bank account with the 5th Respondent. I therefore make no order with regards to Bank of China. 63.In respect of the 6th respondent, Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd, the account holder, Byrne & Co, is a registered partnership in Hong Kong. The summons ought to be served on Byrne & Co before this Court would consider making the order sought. 64.The orders granting disclosure strike a balance between the Trustees’ reasonable requirements and the need to avoid making an order which is wholly unreasonable, unnecessary or oppressive to the Banks or the account holders concerned. 65.For the reasons given,
66.I thank Ms Kong for her assistance.
Ms Charlotte Kong, instructed by Lee, Wong & Lam, for the Applicants The 1st Respondent was unrepresented and did not appear The 2nd Respondent was unrepresented and did not appear The 3rd Respondent was unrepresented and did not appear The attendance of the 4th Respondent represented by Myra Li & Co. was excused The attendance of the 5th Respondent represented by Chungs Lawyers was excused The 6th Respondent was unrepresented and did not appear | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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