Dinh Thi Quyen v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 89/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 March 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 October 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2879 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). This decision is written in English despite the Director’s Decision being written in Chinese because the applicant submitted her affirmation in support of this application in
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HCAL 89/2023 [2023] HKCFI 749 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 89 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 October 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2879 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). This decision is written in English despite the Director’s Decision being written in Chinese because the applicant submitted her affirmation in support of this application in English. 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 20 February 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a Vietnamese national. She came to Hong Kong illegally on 30 August 2015. She surrendered to the Immigration Department. On 31 August 2015, she submitted a written representation to lodge a non-refoulement claim on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 28 March 2017. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 13 December 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board rejected her appeal on all applicable grounds. 7.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court of First Instance by its Order dated 6 August 2020 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.Her application to the Court of Appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 15 November 2021. 9.Her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 13 January 2022. 10.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 31 August 2022. 11.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 7 September 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 13.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if she is refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her creditor and her creditor’s people because she was unable to pay off her loans. 14.The Director found that her previous claim was not substantiated. She appealed to the Board. 15.The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and found that (1) her evidence that she had borrowed loans from the loan-sharked for her business was not accepted; (2) even if her evidence were accepted, the creditor did not have the real and genuine risk of being harmed or killed if she returned to Vietnam in view of her alertness in Vietnam; (3) state protection was available to her; and (4) internal relocation was an option open to her. 16.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 17.In support of her application, the applicant has submitted additional materials in support of her claim. In gist, she is currently in fear that if she returns to Vietnam, she will be harmed or even killed by her creditor or her creditor’s people, which had been considered in her previous claim. The Director considered that she claimed that she and her family were attacked by the creditor and his people was never mentioned in her previous claim and is therefore not believable; that her allegation of lack of state protection and internal relocation would not avoid the creditor is only her speculation and is contrary to the country of origin information. 18.The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the previous claim, will give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Thus, he refused her application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application. However, she only enclosed the Director’s Decision without specifying any ground. 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said she understands the Director’s reasons for his decision. She further said that she wanted further time to stay in Hong Kong. She said her life will be in danger if she returns to Vietnam. 22.The above do not form any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 23rd day of March 2023.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment