Tumbaga Emelita Basco v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 117/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 March 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21 December 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2797 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 117/2023 [2023] HKCFI 752 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 117 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21 December 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2797 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 27 February 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a Filipino national. She had come to Hong Kong as domestic helper and was permitted to remain until 31 July 2017 or 2 weeks after termination of her contract, whichever was earlier. On 6 December 2016, her contract was prematurely terminated. She departed, but last arrived in Hong Kong on 1 January 2017 as a visitor and was permitted to remain until 15 January 2017. She did not depart as required and had overstayed in Hong Kong since 16 January 2017. On 18 January 2017, she surrendered to the Immigration Department. By written significations dated 12 April 2017 and 12 May 2017, she lodged her non-refoulement claim on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 29 November 2017. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 19 November 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board rejected her appeal on all applicable grounds. 7.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and her application was rejected by the Court of First Instance on 12 May 2021 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.Her application to the Court of Appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 October 2021. 9.Her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23 December 2021. 10.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 26 July 2022. 11.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 25 August 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 13.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if she is refouled, she will be tortured or even killed by her creditors as she could not repay the loan to them. 14.The Director found that her previous claim was not substantiated. She appealed to the Board. 15.The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and, for the reasons set out in the Board’s Decision, came to the conclusion that her evidence was incredible and she was not subjected to any real risk of being harm or killed if she returned to the Philippines and it therefore dismissed her appeal. 16.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 17.In support of her application, the applicant has submitted additional materials for the immigration officer’s consideration. Having considered the evidence, the immigration officer concluded that she repeated the same fear that she had raised in her previous claim. 18.The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the previous claim, will give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Thus, he refused her application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 19.The applicant has filed an affidavit in support of her application. However, she only enclosed the Director’s Decision without specifying any ground. 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that she understands the Director’s Decision; that she still wants to stay in Hong Kong and she will respect the Court’s decision. 22.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 23.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 28.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 23rd day of March 2023.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment