Cao Thi Sinh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 129/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 March 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 4 January 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1845 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 129/2023 [2023] HKCFI 829 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 129 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 4 January 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1845 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 6 March 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a Vietnamese national. She came to Hong Kong on 20 May 2015 illegally and was arrested by police on 10 June 2015. She lodged her non-refoulement claim on 15 June 2015 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 27 January 2017. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claim Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 3 September 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board rejected her appeal on all applicable grounds. 7.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 14 July 2020 (the “Court’s Order”). 8.Her appeal against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal on 22 April 2021. 9.Her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 28 July 2021. 10.Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 9 March 2022. 11.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 17 October 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 13.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if she is refouled, she feared that she would be harmed or killed by a loan shark named Tran Van Yen. 14.The Director found that her previous claim was not substantiated. She appealed to the Board. 15.The Board, having considered the evidence, did not accept that the applicant had borrowed money from Tran and it was a fabrication and that her story of ill treatment and harm from the moneylender were also fabrications and untrue; that state protection was available to her and that internal relocation was an option open to her. 16.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 17.In support of her application, the applicant has submitted a letter with additional information. The immigration officer considered that her subsequent claim related to the same loan for which she was unable to repay. The immigration officer considered that the above issues had been raised by the applicant and considered by the Director and the Board and they had been rejected. 18.The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the previous claim, will give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success of her subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of her application. Attached to her affirmation is a statement, in which she set out her grounds of procedural impropriety or irrationality, error or misdirection in law in general terms, which are not relevant as the applicant admitted before me that she had relied upon the same facts in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that she understood the Director’s reasons for his decision. She admitted that she had relied upon the same facts in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. 22.There is no valid ground from the applicant to challenge the Director’s Decision. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she understood and there was no question on the RPO. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 23rd day of March 2023.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment