Au Cheung Woot v. Choi Wai Leung
Read the full judgment text of HCA 909/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 3 April 2023.
1. This is an action brought by Au Cheung Woot (“ P ”) against Choi Wai Leung (“ D ”). By Writ of Summons dated 24 May 2019, P seeks an account for money received by D in respect of profit distributions by Cheung Lap Engineering Limited (“ the Company ”) after 2018, and rescission of the transfer of a 50% shareholding in the Company from P to D dated 1 April 2010.
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HCA 909/2019 [2023] HKCFI 931 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 909 OF 2019 ____________________
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____________________ JUDGMENT ____________________ Introduction 1.This is an action brought by Au Cheung Woot (“P”) against Choi Wai Leung (“D”). By Writ of Summons dated 24 May 2019, P seeks an account for money received by D in respect of profit distributions by Cheung Lap Engineering Limited (“the Company”) after 2018, and rescission of the transfer of a 50% shareholding in the Company from P to D dated 1 April 2010. 2.The trial was set down for 6 days. P’s evidence was heard on 20 to 21 March 2023. P’s evidence summons as described below was then heard. Evidence from D and Mr Ng Ching Yee (“Mr Ng”) was heard on 21 and 22 March 2023. Closing submissions were made on 24 March 2023. The material facts 3.P is 75 years old and became a welder apprentice at 13 years old after attaining Primary 2 level education. 4.In around 1985, P and a fellow construction worker Lo Lap Chi (“Mr Lo”) teamed up to take on contracts in respect of metalwork and engineering. In around 1994, P and Mr Lo founded a firm called Cheung Lap Engineering Company ("the Firm") to operate this business. In around 2000, P and Mr Lo set up the Company which replaced the Firm in operating the business. P and Mr Lo were the only registered shareholders of the Company and held 1 share each therein. P and Mr Lo were also the 2 directors of the Company. 5.It is undisputed that in May 2009, P suggested to D that when P retired, D should take over his role in the Company, and that D (whether immediately or later) agreed (“the Oral Agreement”). The terms of the Oral Agreement are disputed, as will be discussed below. 6.P ceased working in the Company from June 2009. 7.It is undisputed that on 1 April 2010, P and D signed a raft of documents which included share transfer documents (in English) in respect of 1 share of the Company by which 50% of the Company’s issued shareholding was transferred by P to D, and documents to effect the resignation of P as director and the appointment of D as director (“the 1 April 2010 Documents”). The circumstances in which P signed the documents is a matter of dispute, as discussed further below. 8.Thereafter, it is undisputed that:
9.The two main issues are:
10.P’s pleaded case as to the Oral Agreement:
11.By way of defence, D pleads at paragraph 9 of the Re-Amended Defence (“RAD”):
12.As to April 2010, P’s pleaded case at paragraphs 14 to 19 of the SOC is that he was defrauded by D as follows:
13.As to 1 April 2010, D’s case as pleaded at paragraphs 12 and 13(9) of the RAD is that pursuant to the Oral Agreement:
Evidence Summons 14.On Friday 17 March 2023, P issued a summons returnable on Monday 20 March 2023, the first day of trial, seeking leave to adduce the witness statement of Mr Lo dated 8 January 2021 as hearsay evidence. 15.The evidence in support of the summons was as follows:
16.Mr Chung submitted on behalf of D that D wished to know what evidence was presented against D before presenting D’s case. I accepted that submission. I heard the application after P had presented all his evidence bar that of Mr Lo. I refused P’s application on 21 March 2023. I give my reasons now. 17.S.47 (1) of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap. 8) provides:
18.Mr Chung on behalf of D opposed the summons. Mr Chung referred to Ko Nga Chun v Companhia de Desenvol Vimento Wui San Limitada [2018] HKCFI 1134, para 15, and Lily Cheung v Cheung Wai Kwok [2014] 6 HKC 155, paras 56-64. 19.The normal rule is that evidence may not be relied upon if the party seeking to adduce the evidence does not call the witness or ensure that they could be called at trial; nor where the witness does not or refuses to testify for personal reasons. This is reflected in O.38 r.2A(6) as explained in Lily Cheung at paras 55-56. 20.There was a PTR in December 2022. As submitted by D and accepted by P, the availability of witnesses ought ideally to have been checked at that time so that any issues with witness attendance could be addressed. P did not inform D of the problem in obtaining Mr Lo’s attendance between 6 and 17 March 2023 (the date of the summons). The attempts at service in Hong Kong in that time period seem to have been pointless given P’s evidence that Mr Lo was not in Hong Kong. P has not acted reasonably in ensuring that Mr Lo was available at trial or taking steps to adduce his evidence without ambushing D on the eve of trial. 21.This seems to be a case of both P failing to ensure that Mr Lo could be called at trial, and Mr Lo being unwilling to attend. 22.It is common ground that Mr Lo’s evidence serves to corroborate the evidence of P, and does not materially add to the evidence. Whilst Mr Lo’s evidence addresses whether or not a document, called a share withdrawal agreement purporting to be between Mr Lo and D, was provided by D to Mr Lo, Mr Chan on behalf of P accepted that this was a minor point, and it was an issue which he would be able to address by cross-examination of D. (As it transpired, this was not an issue raised in the cross-examination of D). 23.I was therefore not satisfied that there would be any prejudice caused to the interests of justice if Mr Lo’s evidence is excluded. 24.For the reasons above, I dismissed P’s evidence summons with costs thereof to D in any event. Applicable Legal Principles 25.In this case, where the parties differ as to what was agreed and there is a dearth of contemporaneous documentation, it is important to bear in mind the appropriate approach to the evaluation of evidence. The general principles set out in relevant authorities are helpfully set out in Luen Ming Supreme Fabricator Company Limited v Ng Chi Wah [2021] HKCFI 1501, paras 82-86. 26.For present purposes, I extract the following principles from that summary.
The Evidence 27.I heard oral evidence from P, D and Mr Ng. 28.It is undisputed that there are no contemporaneous documents recording the Oral Agreement. 29.However, there are contemporaneous documents relating to the transfer of the Share. As contemporaneous documents provide the most reliable evidence as to what happened at a point in time, I start by considering what happened in April 2010 as that may inform my decision as to what happened in May 2009. (i) Documentary evidence relating to the execution of the share transfer documents 30.The contemporaneous documents are as follows:
31.I agree with Mr Chung’s submission that it is consistent with the transfer of ownership of P’s 50% share of the Company to D that, at the same time, P resigned as director and D became director. It seems more likely that the replacement of P with D as director would go hand-in-hand with the transfer of ownership of the Share; if the only intention was that D could have better authority to act then that could be achieved simply by appointing D as an additional director. 32.Mr Chung on behalf of D sought to rely on the Company’s audited accounts for the year ended 31 March 2011 as compared to the audited accounts for the year ended 31 March 2010. The Company’s accounts for the year ended 31 March 2010 contained a note in respect of current liabilities that there was an amount due to a related company, namely a Cheung Lap Iron Works Company of which (it was suggested by Mr Chung) both P and Mr Lo were partners. The Company’s accounts for the year ended 31 March 2011 contained a note in respect of current liabilities that there was an amount due to a director. It was put to P that this “conversion” or alternative treatment was consistent with the fact that P ceased to be a shareholder and director of the Company in 2010 so there was only a reason to make a note in relation to Mr Lo. It was also put to P that a reasonable auditor would have checked this treatment with P as well as Mr Lo. P denied knowledge of the transfer of shares or any familiarity with the financial statements and disagreed that the auditor had confirmed this change in treatment with P as well as Mr Lo. It is notable that the Company’s accounts were not signed until 2012, and they were signed by Mr Lo and D, not P. I have no information as to what the auditor established when auditing the accounts, and I am not prepared to make any assumptions. Further, this forensic point was only made in submissions and is not addressed by any of the witness evidence, with P simply having said in cross-examination he did not know about the accounts entry. There has been no examination of what if any other arrangements might have been made between Mr Lo and P that might have caused the change in treatment of amounts owed to related parties. Accordingly, I do not obtain any assistance from this item of evidence. 33.Mr Chung relied on all of the annual returns and accounts of the Company after 2010, signed by Mr Lo, which identified D as the holder of the Share. I agree that this tends to evidence Mr Lo’s recognition of D as the holder of the Share. 34.Mr Chung also sought to rely on an “agreement” dated 1 February 2019 between Mr Lo and D as demonstrating that Mr Lo acknowledged D as the beneficial shareholder of the Share. There is in evidence a document dated 1 February 2019. It is in Chinese on Company-headed paper. It has been translated as being entitled “Share Withdrawal Agreement” but in submissions I was told by Mr Chung (and Mr Chan for P did not dispute this) that it could also be translated as “Surrender Agreement”.
35.P’s witness statement, adopted as evidence in chief, stated (unchallenged by D) that Mr Lo provided this document to P on 28 March 2019. Mr Chung relies on a letter dated 1 November 2019 from Mr Lo’s solicitors to D’s solicitors referring to the Surrender Agreement of 1 February 2019. Mr Chung states that this is evidence that Mr Lo at least regarded that document as effective, and thereby Mr Lo was recognizing D as owner of the Share. However, Mr Chan points out that later in the same letter, Mr Lo’s solicitors refer to correspondence with P’s solicitors and P’s claim “that he is all along the shareholder of the Company (to which our client acknowledges)”. As Mr Chan says, that letter is internally inconsistent. Mr Chan further points to P’s witness statement evidence at paragraph 10 to the effect that Mr Lo had told P in 2009 that he would not interfere with whatever agreement was made between P and D but would deal with D, and Mr Chan submits that this is one possible explanation for the apparent inconsistency of Mr Lo’s position. On that basis, I am unable to regard the Share Withdrawal Agreement as evidence of Mr Lo’s recognition of D as the beneficial shareholder. Further, I am reluctant to rely on Mr Lo’s inconsistent statements as good evidence of the beneficial ownership of the Share. (ii) Oral evidence in respect of the Share Transfer 36.I note that it was accepted that P had no English ability. D stated that he had some English but it was not at a level where he could read legal documents or witness statements in English. Mr Ng clearly works in English and Chinese but stated that he was more comfortable giving evidence in Cantonese, and that he had not read his witness statement in English. On that basis, all three witnesses gave evidence in Cantonese. 37.As is normal in a trial conducted in English, where witnesses give evidence in Cantonese, counsel’s questions in English were translated for the witness, and the witness’ answers were translated into English. This has consequences: at least, (1) there is potential for discrepancies in what has been said and what is translated (however good the quality of translation) (2) there is certainly potential for missing the witness’ tone (3) it is harder to judge the witness’ demeanour as there is a lack of direct communication between witness and the court. I have regard to these points in addition to the general principles set out above as to the proper approach to take to the evaluation of evidence at a trial. 38.I also note that in this case both parties and all witnesses were giving evidence in Cantonese, the (limited) documents are in both Chinese and English, and the parties were unable to fully follow the trial conducted in English. It is most regrettable that the action was set down for trial in English. That is now water under the bridge for this trial, but must be a situation to be avoided in an ideal world. 39.P’s oral evidence as to 1 April 2010 was that:
40.D’s oral evidence as to 1 April 2010 was as follows:
41.Mr Ng gave oral evidence:
42.Mr Ng is the only independent witness. There has been no suggestion made of any reason for him to lie about the circumstances surrounding the signing of the 1 April 2010 Documents. Indeed, his relationship before 2010 had been with P and Mr Lo, and he did not know D. His mishandling of the share transfer documents after they were signed must be embarrassing but he was plain about the fact that he had lost them. I found him a frank and direct witness. 43.I see no reason to find that what happened on 1 April 2010 is anything other than what is recorded in the 1 April 2010 Documents i.e. that they were signed at the Company’s office with all four of P, D, Mr Lo, and Mr Ng present. I see no reason to disbelieve that Mr Ng explained that the 1 April 2010 Documents were being signed to effect the share transfer and change of director. I accept Mr Ng’s evidence in this regard. This corroborates D’s evidence in this regard. 44.P’s case is that on 1 April 2010, he signed the 1 April 2010 documents (1) at a restaurant (2) with only D present (3) on the basis of D’s representation that the documents were to effect a change in director but would not effect a change of share ownership. I am unable to accept that version of events in light of Mr Ng’s evidence. Critically, on the evidence, I cannot accept that P was misled by D into signing the documents to transfer his share to D in April 2010. 45.On the basis of the evidence, P’s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation by D must fail. (iii) The evidence relating to the May 2009 Oral Agreement 46.It was common ground that:
47.What is in issue:
48.There are no contemporaneous documents recording the Oral Agreement in May 2009. 49.Counsel for both P and D sought to point to accounting documents, namely Company ledgers for May to June 2009 and audited accounts for the years ending 31 March 2009 and 31 March 2010, with a view to trying to identify cash at bank figures for about May 2009 so as to try to support either P’s HK$1.1 million figure or D’s HK$730,000 figure. Both counsel accepted that there was nothing conclusive on this and it was really only speculation in circumstances where none of the witnesses had assisted with the source of the figures they had used or the documents identified by counsel. 50.However, the 1 April 2010 Documents are documents which came into existence before the problems in question emerged. I have found that they demonstrate an intention on the part of P and D to execute both a share transfer and a change in directorship. It therefore seems inherently likely that the Oral Agreement was, as D says, that D should replace P as shareholder and director. It seems most implausible (if not nonsensical) that D would agree to act as P’s agent on a 50:50 profit-share basis despite P’s complete extrication from the business of the Company and the transfer of P’s share to D. 51.On the basis of the documents available and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, I am unable to accept P’s Pleaded Version of the Oral Agreement. 52.On that basis, the oral evidence given by P and D was of relatively little value. I will just make a few observations. 53.Both P and D are men who have spent their careers in site work and site supervision on construction projects, and who are not familiar with dealing with formal or legal documents. Both men have had serious debilitating health issues recently. They were giving evidence in respect of matters which occurred some 13-14 years ago. 54.Both P and D when giving oral evidence departed from the facts asserted in their pleadings. For instance, P disavowed D having made the Second Representation. D’s oral evidence as to when the value of the Share was finally agreed with P varied from his pleaded case. I do not regard this as evidence of dishonesty by either of them but of the real risk in litigation of a mismatch between what a party of witness means and what their lawyers understand them to mean when preparing their witness statement; or what a witness’ memory is at one point in time, and what it is at another point of time after looking at documents and discussion. 55.P’s evidence was premised upon the fundamental assertion that there was no agreement for a share transfer. I have been unable to accept that in the light of the contemporaneous documents and Mr Ng’s evidence. 56.P is 75, he has been unwell and needed regular comfort breaks so that attending the trial would have had more than the usual discomfort for him; he wore a mask; and his evidence was subject to translation. I note all of those factors. Nevertheless, I found him to be somewhat “difficult” when giving evidence. He disagreed with matters with which he could not reasonably disagree e.g. whether Mr Ng provided corporate services to the Company at the material time. I did not however form the view that he was lying, but that he may have at some point forgotten what had happened back in 2009-2010 and persuaded himself as to a new version of history. There were certainly instances when P was being questioned where he seemed to be confused or unable to grasp what he was being asked. For instance, he was asked about the Share Withdrawal Agreement which P himself stated in his witness statement was a document provided by Mr Lo to P in respect of Mr Lo’s dealings with D. When being asked about what he knew about such an agreement between Mr Lo and D, P stated several times that he had not withdrawn a share and that he had never seen the document and then he contradicted his own witness statement in respect of how he came to receive the document. For these reasons, I would not be able to treat P’s oral evidence as wholly reliable. 57.D appeared to be a straightforward witness. That is not to say that all of his oral evidence was reliable or even comprehensible. For instance:
58.In any event, I feel able to decide what happened in May 2009 by reference to more reliable documentary evidence. As stated above, I am unable to accept P’s Pleaded Version of the Oral Agreement. Conclusion 59.I therefore dismiss P’s claims against D. 60.I further make an order nisi that D’s costs in this action, including any costs reserved, be paid by P, to be taxed if not agreed. In the absence of any order to vary, the order will become absolute after 14 days.
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Cases cited in this judgment