Palao Ronald De Jesus v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 1367/2022

[2023] HKCFI 619

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1367 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

1.   Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.   A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 11 November 2022 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.

2.The Applicant is a 43-year-old national of the Philippines who arrived in Hong Kong on 9 February 2010 as a visitor with permission to remain up to 23 February 2010 when he did not depart and instead overstayed, and on 9 March 2010 he surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a torture claim later taken as a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to the Philippines he would be harmed or killed by the family of a murder victim who believed him to be responsible for the crime.

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim

3.By a Notice of Decision dated 24 September 2015 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 10 May 2017 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.In his decisions the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from the victim’s family upon his return to the Philippines as low due to the absence of any past ill-treatment from them, that the Applicant had subsequently been acquitted by the court of the alleged crime that there was no reason for the victim’s family to have any further adverse interest in him, that in any event in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in the Philippines with a large population of 101 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 300,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Davao where it would be difficult if not impossible for the victim’s family to locate him.

5.The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decisions was dismissed by the Board on 15 March 2017 upon accepting the factual basis of his case but found no merits in his claim or his appeal given the availability of both state protection and reasonable internal relocation for him to move safely to other part of the country without any risk of being located that his claim failed on all applicable grounds, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decisions.

6.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by this Court on 6 November 2019 upon finding that there was no good reason for his serious delay of more than 12 months with his application, that none of the proposed grounds for his intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no merits or prospect of success in his intended application (HCAL 1027/2018 [2019] HKCFI 2353).

7.The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the Court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 March 2021 (CAMP 66/2020 [2021] HKCA 350).

8.The Applicant’s notice of motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 5 July 2021 ([2021] HKCA 903), and then by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal on 15 February 2022 under Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap 484A.

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

9.Some 6 months later on 30 August 2022 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that the family of the murder victim is still looking for him and has also made threats against his family members in the Philippines including to take away his property as compensation for their loss that he still fears of being harmed or killed if refouled to his home country.

10.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

11.Accordingly, on 15 September 2022 the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently did by a letter dated 10 October 2022 with supporting documents.

12.By a Notice of Decision dated 11 November 2022 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that the basis thereof was essentially the same as that of his previous claim, and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success.

13.On 30 November 2022 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, and in his supporting affirmation filed on the same day and written submissions dated 4 January 2023 he put forward various grounds for his intended challenge as follows:

(1)  That the Director failed to materialize the basic fact stated for his subsequent claim that the Maoists in his home country are still hunting him and that his government would not be able to protect him from their threats;

(2)  That the Director failed to show why he would not face any risk upon his refoulement to his home country where his family has also been threatened and persecuted;

(3)  That there is procedural impropriety in the Director’s failure to apply para 2 of the UN Committee Against Torture General Comment No. 2 whereby satisfaction of a national state obligations to conduct sufficient due diligence requires that reforms and means of relief introduced must be effective in any event whereby the Director’s decision focused on whether such reliefs showed merely signs of positive improvement;

(4)  That there is procedural impropriety in the Director’s failure to conduct sufficient inquiry into the relevant COI that the Applicant would face serious risk from his enemies who will harm him because of his situation and statistical view which consider a serious matter for which he would be harmed upon refoulement;

(5)  That there is procedural impropriety/irrationality in the Director’s failure to conduct any screening interview for his subsequent claim that the Director failed to provide sufficient opportunity or proper fairness for assessing the Applicant’s subsequent claim;

(6)  That there is procedural impropriety in the Director’s failure to consider the Applicant’s genuine fear of his enemies that he cannot relocate to other part of the country as his enemies could easily trace him wherever he hides in his country;

(7)  That there is error or misdirection in law in the Director’s failure to realize the difference between his previous claim and his new claim which is a religious problem that it would be dangerous for him to survive in the Philippines;

(8)  That the Director failed to consider the Applicant’s supporting documents or the relevant COI showing that the situation in his home country is deteriorating and dangerous that internal relocation will not protect him;

(9)  That there is no sufficient basis to conclude that the Applicant and his family will not be at risk from his enemies.

14.Most of these grounds are however just vague and bare assertions of the Applicant with a few key words or phrases but without any details or particulars or elaboration as to how they would apply to his case or what are their relevancy to his case, or how did the Director actually err in the decision, or how did the Director fail to consider the relevant COI when his claim on the factual basis of even his own case was a private dispute without any official involvement and given the unchallenged findings by both the Director and the Board in his previous claim that any risk arising therefrom could be avoided or negated by state protection and internal relocation being available to the Applicant upon his return to his home country and which equally apply to his subsequent claim that I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.

15.As for his complaint of not being given any screening interview for his request to make a subsequent claim, it is well established that there is no absolute right to an oral hearing, or for that matter a screening interview as in the present case, as the ultimate question is one of fairness, and while an opportunity to make worthwhile or effective representations is an important requirement of fairness in most but not all situations, it does not follow that there must be an oral hearing or screening interview being held before a decision is to be made: ST v Betty Kwan [2014] 4 HKLRD 277.

16.Given that it is for the Applicant in his request to make a subsequent claim to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer of those requirements under Section 37ZO (2) of the Ordinance as noted above, and that on the basis of such evidence and information as provided that the immigration officer was entitled take into account of the findings of credibility and facts made by the Director or the Board in relation to his previous claim, it is in my judgment that the immigration officer in the exercise of his discretion was not at fault in not holding any further screening interview for the Applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim given the correct findings that the basis thereof is essentially the same as the previous claim and the absence of any significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was finally determined, I do not find this ground of the Applicant reasonably arguable either.

17.In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request for subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I accordingly refuse his leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

18.Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal dated 15 February 2022, but that the Applicant is still trying to re-litigate his case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same facts and basis as before, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against him.

19.Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a) may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

20.Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:

“(1) Leave for the institution or continuance of any legal proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under section 2791) shall not be given unless the Court of First Instance is satisfied that –

(a) the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(2) No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting or refusing leave required under this section, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance.”

21.In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.

22.His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

23.In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] –[40]).

24.In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate his non-refoulement claim without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against him, to which he was unable to raise any valid objection at the hearing, I am convinced that the Applicant will likely continue to do so and/or to make vexatious appeals, thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

25.Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to or touching upon or leading to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, or any appeal, including this Order, without the leave of a Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with his said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave under this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge;

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition

26.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

27.A RPO in terms of paragraph 25 be made against the Applicant.

Dated the 6^th day of April 2023

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1