Li Sau Mui v. Man Wai Cheong
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 4322/2018 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 17 May 2023.
1. This action was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant for libel arising out of the contents of a letter dated 8 July 2017 (“the 8 July Letter”) as will be referred to below.
Cites 12 cases
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DCCJ 4322/2018 [2023] HKDC 620 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 4322 OF 2018 ------------------------
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------------------------ JUDGMENT ------------------------ Background 1.This action was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant for libel arising out of the contents of a letter dated 8 July 2017 (“the 8 July Letter”) as will be referred to below. 2.The plaintiff was at the material times the Indigenous Inhabitant Representative of Sha Lo Wan Village (“the Village”) in Tai O, Lantau Island, and was one of the two representatives of the Village. Her tenure was from 1 April 2015 to 31 March 2019. The defendant was at the material times a resident and former Resident Representative of the Village. His tenure lasted up to 10 March 2015. There are 2 village representatives for each tenure, including an indigenous Inhabitant Representative and a Resident Representative. 3.In around June 2014, the Airport Authority (“the Authority”) informed the representatives of the Village of the intended construction of the third runway of the Hong Kong International Airport. As the Village was expected to be affected by the construction of the third runway, the Authority started to discuss with the representatives of the Village on granting a rural environment improvement allowance (“the Allowance”) to the villagers. However, despite continued negotiations over a few years, the Authority had not increased the amount of the Allowance offered to each applicant at HK$65,000 since the beginning of the discussions in 2014. It also appeared that the members of the Village would not be given an additional noise reduction allowance (“Noise Reduction Allowance”) that was apparently offered to some other villages. 4.In April 2015, the plaintiff was elected as the Indigenous Inhabitant Representative of the Village in place of her father. One Chan Chi Kuen (陳志權) was also subsequently elected as the Resident Representative in place of the defendant. Since then, the plaintiff and Chan Chi Kuen had continued to negotiate with the Authority on behalf of the villagers and the defendant had ceased to participate in such negotiations in which he was previously involved. 5.It is the plaintiff’s case that she had worked to improve the general welfare of the Village since she was elected as the Indigenous Inhabitant Representative. She was re-elected after her first tenure ended on 31 March 2019. 6.On about 8 March 2017, the Authority sent letters enclosed with a document entitled “鄉郊環境改善津貼申請” (i.e. applications for allowance for the improvement of the village environment) to the villagers being land owners or licence holders (“Application Form(s)”). For successors of deceased land owners or holders of approved licences for their units, it appears that the Authority had requested them to execute another document entitled “承繼及執行証明” (“Certification Form(s)”) for the certification of their relevant rights of succession. In both documents, the Authority required the same to be witnessed and signed. In the Certification Form, the Authority also required the witness to certify the truth of the contents (“茲証明上述屋契/牌照持有人及其家人均為確實無訛，特此証明”). However, as is highlighted by the plaintiff, it was not stated in the letter from the Authority or in the relevant documents as to who was qualified to be a witness, and the duties or obligations or legal liability of such witnesses. 7.There is no dispute that since around April 2017, the plaintiff did not agree to witness and sign the Application Forms when the villagers approached her. She had also demanded the Authority through her solicitors to clarify the legal liability of the witnesses. 8.The plaintiff convened a village assembly on 4 April 2017 in which the villagers deliberated on the impact of the third runway and the problems associated with the documents, including the potential legal liability of the applicants and the witnesses. It was decided that another village assembly would be held on 30 April 2017 wherein the villagers would vote on a decision whether to accept the Allowance. 9.Meanwhile, since the plaintiff had refused to witness and sign the Application Forms, some of the villagers who wanted to accept the offer of the Allowance and receive the same sooner had requested the Chairman of the Tai O Rural Committee (“the Committee”), Mr Lou Cheuk Wing (劉焯榮) to assist them. The Committee is a statutory body established under the Rural Representative Election Ordinance, Cap.576 to oversee the affairs of the Tai O rural areas. The requests were in turn diverted to the Vice-Chairman of the Committee, Mr Ho Siu Kei (何紹基), who did witness and sign some of those documents. It is not disputed that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman were not members of the Village, but they were interested in such capacities in the local affairs of the Tai O area, of which the Village formed part. As the Indigenous Inhabitant Representative of the Village, the plaintiff also acted as a member of the Committee. 10.The plaintiff was of the view that the witnessing of the Application Forms by Mr Ho Siu Kei had led to the result that some villagers had already signed the application documents before a collective vote could be casted in the village assembly to be convened on 30 April 2017. As a result, the plaintiff thought that any further attempts to negotiate for a better deal with the Authority had been rendered futile. The 8 July Letter 11.It was against this backdrop that the matter further developed, culminating in the present dispute. 12.Since 29 May 2017, some banners and posters were posted in the Tai O area, complaining about the acts by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee in interfering with the internal affairs of the Village. Later on 29 June 2017, the plaintiff sent a letter to the members of the Committee entitled “有關：沙螺灣村內部事務被大澳鄉事委員會主席、副主席嚴重侵犯”, also complaining that there had been serious interference in the internal affairs of the Village by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman (“the 29 June Letter”). 13.It is not disputed that subsequently on 8 July 2017, the defendant published the 8 July Letter which was entitled “關於大澳沙螺灣村內務事” and addressed to the members of the Committee[1]. The letter was signed by the defendant together with 38 other villagers. The full Chinese text of the 8 July Letter is set out below[2]:
14.According to the pleaded case of the plaintiff, the following words contained in the 8 July Letter (“the Words”) are alleged to be defamatory[3]:
The plaintiff’s evidence 15.In short, the plaintiff complains that the “sting” of the Words attacks the plaintiff’s integrity, and her ability in serving as the Indigenous Inhabitant Representative of the Village. She complains that the Words as contained in the 8 July Letter were without factual foundation and had seriously damaged her reputation. She further complains that the 8 July Letter was published with malice to bring her reputation down. 16.In her evidence at trial, the plaintiff gave an account of the background of the dispute in line with what has been set out above. She was adamant that the Committee is only an advisory body, and the substantive decisions of the Village ought to be made by the villagers themselves in the village assembly. However, she accepted that the decision whether to accept the Allowance, although being “strictly speaking” a matter for the villagers to be considered on the whole, could be made by villagers individually. She could not prevent individual villages from agreeing to accept the Allowance. 17.However, she stressed that the Village is one that would be affected the most by the construction of the third runway. Apart from the question of seeking allowances, there would also be traffic problems created by the construction of the third runway that would need to be solved. She also said that there are a number of villagers, including elderly ones, who took the view that the Village ought to continue to fight for a better deal with the Authority. 18.In cross-examination, she maintained that if an applicant wishes to seek assistance from the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman of the Committee concerning the Allowance, he or she must seek her permission first. Otherwise, this would constitute an interference by the Committee in the internal affairs of the Village. 19.She also stressed that over the years, she has contributed a great deal towards the welfare of the Village, not only in respect of the negotiations with the Authority concerning the Allowance, but also various matters of welfare of the villagers including the laying of anti-slipping agent at the public pier of the Village, the re-construction of public toilets, and facilitating the improvement works on the drainage systems in the Village, etc. She disagreed with the plaintiff’s stance that at the material time she already had a bad reputation in the management of the affairs of the Village. On the contrary, she maintained that she had contributed her best efforts and significant time towards the affairs of the Village, and that the 8 July Letter had done nothing but to damage her reputation, negating her contribution towards the welfare of the Village over the years, and causing her damage. The plaintiff’s other witnesses 20.The plaintiff also called Mr Kung Hok Sing (龔學成) (“Mr Kung”) and Wu Ka Ping (胡家屏) (“Mr Wu”), the former being an Indigenous Inhabitant Representative of another village called Yi O Village in Tai O, and the latter being a former Village Representative of yet another village called Shek Tsai Po West Village in Tai O. 21.Mr Kung is also married to the plaintiff’s elder sister and has been the Indigenous Inhabitant Representative of Yi O Village since April 1995. He has known the plaintiff as well as the defendant for a number of years. He gave evidence confirming that the Authority had sent out notices to various villages in the Tai O area informing them of the intended construction of the third airport runway, and offering certain allowances including the Allowance in the sum of HK$65,000, and for some other villages (not including the Village), an additional allowance in the amount of HK$96,000 being the Noise Reduction Allowance. He said the plaintiff thought this was not fair to the Village as the impact of the construction of the third runway on the Village was the most serious compared with other villages. In this respect, he had been assisting the Village in the capacity of a consultant and had been attending various meetings held with representatives of the Authority in seeking a better deal for the Village. 22.He agreed with the stance taken by the plaintiff that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee ought not to have witnessed the Application Forms for individual villagers without seeking the consent of the village representative and a better understanding of the situation of the Village and the views of the villagers. 23.As for the evidence of Mr Wu, he was the Village Representative of Shek Tsai Po West Village in Tai O from April 2007 until the end of September 2018, and has known the plaintiff since around 2014. He confirmed that the Village had been negotiating with the Authority for a better deal in respect of the Allowance, and that at some stage, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee, Mr Ho Siu Kei, had been asked to witness the Application Forms for some of the villagers. He also confirmed his receipt of a copy of the 8 July Letter in late September 2017 which was distributed by the Committee. 24.The evidence of Mr Kung and Mr Wu is not substantially disputed. As the defendant submitted, the analysis of the plaintiff’s case is focused mainly on the interpretation of the undisputed facts and documents produced. The defendant’s evidence 25.The defendant gave evidence confirming that he had known the plaintiff’s father, Mr Li Chi Fung (李志峰) since 1996 when he started to assist him with the affairs of the Village. Mr Li has been the Chairman of the Committee for a number of tenures, as well as the Indigenous Inhabitant Representative of the Village. The defendant had ceased to be a Village Representative of the Village since 11 March 2011 but he had continued to be concerned about the affairs of the Village. 26.He said that the Authority had in fact sent out notices to the land owners and licence holders of the Village about the intended construction of the third runway of the airport as early as in 2014, proposing to give the Allowance to the villagers with a view to improving the condition of their living environment. As for the version of the Application Forms sent out in March 2017 by the Authority, he himself was not certain as to who could or could not act as witnesses. However, he did not see any restraint on the identity of the witnesses. For land owners, according to the Application Forms, they simply needed to provide copies of their identity cards and of the relevant land search records. As for licence holders, they were simply required to produce copies of their identity cards and licences issued by the government in support of their applications. 27.According to him, the plaintiff in fact has not been residing in the Village and had only been liaising with those villagers with whom she had been more closely acquainted whenever she visited the Village. She had not been liaising with the defendant directly on the matter of the Allowance. He further said that whilst the members of a number of other villages have already obtained the Allowance, the members of the Village were still in the course of negotiations, and this led to the feeling of discontent or frustration held by some of the villagers. However, a village assembly was eventually held on 16 September 2016 in which the plaintiff was able to persuade the villagers to consent to the further negotiations by the plaintiff with the Authority on getting a better deal. The defendant testified that at the village assembly held on 16 September 2016, the villagers had reached a consensus to wait until 31 March 2017 in order to give further time for the plaintiff to negotiate for a better offer from the Authority. 28.According to the defendant, by April 2017, since there had not been any further progress achieved in respect of the negotiations with the Authority, some of the villagers had started to ask the plaintiff to witness their applications for the Allowance, but the plaintiff had refused to do so. The defendant said he had been told that the reason for the refusal was that the plaintiff did not want to risk having legal liability as a result of acting as a witness for the villagers. The defendant thought that the reason behind the refusal was rather that the plaintiff felt she did not have “face” if she agreed to assist the villagers as witness in their applications for the Allowance, since she had not eventually been able to secure a better deal for them. 29.As to the reaction of the plaintiff towards the witnessing of the Application Forms for the villagers by Mr Ho Siu Kei, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee, the defendant said that the plaintiff had complained by a letter dated 31 May 2017 to the Home Affairs Department about the interference by Mr Ho in the internal affairs of the Village by witnessing the Application Forms for the villagers. 30.Notwithstanding so, the defendant said that about 45 applications for the Allowance had in fact been successful by the end of June, with the assistance proffered by Mr Ho. 31.On 29 June 2017, the plaintiff issued the 29 June Letter to the members of the Committee, again complaining about the interference by Mr Ho in the affairs of the Village. The 29 June Letter contained the following allegations or assertions by the plaintiff[4], described in the defendant’s pleading as “crude and foul-mouthed” descriptions to disparage other people, including Mr Lou and Mr Ho without justification:
32.The defendant also stated that since the end of May 2017, there had been banners and posters appearing in the Tai O area similarly accusing Mr Lou and Mr Ho of interfering with the affairs of the Village. 33.As such, the defendant says that the plaintiff had through her conduct demonstrated herself to be lacking the ability to properly conduct herself as a Village Representative or Indigenous Inhabitant Representative. 34.It is the defendant’s evidence that the 8 July Letter was subsequently issued in response to the 29 June Letter from the plaintiff. He maintained that the 8 July Letter was justified. The defendant’s other witnesses 35.At the trial, the defendant also called Mr Chan Lai Bun (陳禮賓) and Mr Ho Siu Kei to testify on his behalf. 36.Mr Chan has been a resident of the Village since he was born in 1956. He stated that he had attended the village assembly held on 16 September 2016, and that at the assembly a consensus had been reached amongst the villagers present that they would wait until 31 March 2017 to see if any better deal could be reached with the Authority, failing which the villagers would be free to apply for the Allowance individually. He also stated that he himself and the defendant had gone to the Authority to collect the cheques issued for the Allowance on 29 June 2017, and had been told that since September 2016, the plaintiff had no longer been negotiating with the Authority. 37.As for Mr Ho’s evidence, he stated that he was the Vice-Chairman of the Committee from 1 April 2015 to 31 March 2019, after which he has become the Chairman of the Committee since 1 April 2019. He recounted the circumstances under which the villagers had to resort to him to assist in witnessing the Application Forms to be submitted by them, including the plaintiff’s refusal to witness their applications. He also referred to the reaction of the plaintiff in relation to his attesting the applications for the villagers, including the letters dated 31 May 2017 issued by the plaintiff to the Home Affairs Department, and the 29 June Letter. He also stated that the 8 July Letter was issued in response to the 29 June Letter from the plaintiff. 38.In cross-examination, he agreed with the records obtained from the Authority that from April to June 2017, he had assisted 56 villagers involving a total of 107 applications for the Allowance, out of which 26 villagers had eventually received a total of 45 cheques from the Authority. 39.He also agreed in cross-examination that the 8 July Letter had been drafted at his request after collecting the views of the villagers. It was then presented to the villagers for their signatures. The signed letter was eventually taken to the Home Affairs Department by his secretary, Ms Chan Kit Wah (陳潔華). He also agreed that he did not personally verify with each of the signatories whether the plaintiff had refused their requests for witnessing their Application Forms to be submitted to the Authority. Limited Factual Disputes 40.The material facts of this case are largely undisputed. As the defendant has submitted, this case actually turns on the interpretation of the undisputed facts and the documents issued by the respective parties, and not so much on the performance of the witnesses. Originally, as set out in the defendant’s opening submissions, there were various factual issues that might need to be resolved, for example, on the village assembly held on 16 September 2016, the reason for the plaintiff’s not witnessing and signing the Application Forms in around April 2017, and the extent of publication or circulation of the 8 July Letter. The defendant submitted, however, that after hearing the evidence, it seems these factual issues are no longer hotly disputed or even significant:
Extent of Publication 41.The plaintiff submitted that a defendant is liable for the republication of the defamatory statement if “there is an adequate causative link between the tort and damage, but subject to that, the defendant will be liable if he is actually aware that what he says or does is likely to be reported or if a reasonable person in his position should have appreciate that there was a significant risk that what he said would be repeated in whole or in part and that that would increase the damage caused by what he said.” (Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th Ed., at §6.52). 42.There is no dispute over the publication of the 8 July Letter. The plaintiff says that originally, the defendant has sought to argue that the extent of circulation was limited to executive members of the Committee. This, the plaintiff submitted, is has been defeated by the following factors:
43.On the other hand, the defendant contended that on the evidence, both the plaintiff and Mr Kung, who were members of the Committee, had confirmed in evidence that they did not directly receive the 8 July Letter from the secretariat of the Committee or Ms Chan Kit Wah. Thus, the defendant submitted that the reasonable inference to be drawn is that the 8 July Letter was intended for only the executive members but not all members of the Committee. On the other hand, Mr Wu, who was also not an executive member of the Committee, had received the 8 July Letter from the post box at his shop in Tai O around 2 or 3 weeks before the “general meeting” (“同人大會”) was held in October 2017. The defendant says this evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the above inference. It is submitted by the defendant that it was likely that the 8 July Letter was first circulated to the executive members when it was signed, and was later circulated to other non-executive members. 44.In any event, the defendant submitted that it does not really matter if the 8 July Letter had been circulated to not just executive members but all members of the Committee. In any event, the common interest in sending and receiving the same would still have been made out. It is said that the 8 July Letter only came to wider circulation and was brought to the attention of the plaintiff through the text message from Mr Wu and Mr Kung in September 2017. Accordingly, the defendant says there is no evidence that when the defendant signed on the letter in July 2017, it was reasonably foreseeable by him that there would be a circulation wider than his expectation. The defendant contended that the wider circulation to members of the public must have been the result of the choice of individual Committee members to further enlarge the circulation 2 months later in September 2017. 45.Subject to my decision on liability, I would think that on the face of the 8 July Letter, it appears that it was addressed to the members of the Committee without limiting its circulation to executive members only. By signing on the letter, the signatories must have reasonably expected that it was to be circulated to the addressees, namely the Committee members at large. 46.On the basis of the above general observations or findings, I will proceed to examine the main issues to be decided upon in this case. Whether the Words were defamatory The meaning of words 47.I have been referred to the recent case of Independent Commentators Association Limited v Joint Publishing (HK) Co Ltd [2021] HKCFI 743, at §§21-22 where the legal principles for determining the meaning of defamatory words have been summarised by DHCJ Richard Khaw SC, relying on Bawang International (Group) Holding Ltd and Another v Next Magazine Publishing Ltd, HCA 1109 of 2010, 23 May 2016, Lok J at §§26-34:
Whether the words used are defamatory 48.A defamatory importation is one to the plaintiff’s discredit, or which tends to lower him in the estimation of others, or causes him to be shunned or avoided, or exposes him to hatred or ridicule (Gatley, at §2.1). It is also not disputed as a matter of legal principle that a statement to the effect that a person is dishonest or untruthful (Gatley, at §2.28) or that a person is unfit in office (Gatley, at §§2.35, 2.37) is defamatory. 49.I am also referred by Mr Szeto for the plaintiff to Mok Kam Kwai v Lam Mo Fat, HCA 1868 of 2010, 6 March 2014, a libel case said to be comparable to the present one. In that case, the plaintiff was the chairman of a rural committee. The defendant put up banners in conspicuous spots in a village, suggesting that the plaintiff did not act in the interest of the village and he was incompetent and unfit to hold his office. The court found the offending banners to be defamatory and awarded general damages in the sum of HK$400,000. 50.In this regard, it is important to note at the outset that from the defendant’s submissions and his pleaded case, it is already accepted that insofar as the meaning of the Words as pleaded in paragraph 5(b) of the Statement of Claim is concerned (namely, that the plaintiff had failed to perform her duty as the Indigenous Inhabitant Representative of the Village diligently and wholeheartedly in serving the members of the Village), that must have the effect of lowering her reputation. Needless to say, I will bear this in mind when considering this issue. 51.It is submitted by the defendant, however, that such comment would not usually attract liability because of justification, honest comment and/or privilege. The plaintiff’s contentions 52.The plaintiff submitted that the Words are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning. 53.In relation to the 1st Sentence, it is submitted that the only natural and ordinary meaning of the words as emphasised is that the plaintiff had knowingly suggested a false contrary, and plainly asserts that the plaintiff was lying to the villagers and was deceitful, and thus, this sentence was undoubtedly defamatory. 54.The plaintiff further submitted that the context of the 1st Sentence presupposes the assertion that the witnessing of the Application Forms by Mr Ho (“何副主席逐一為我們簽署見證”) was a good cause and was true. The 1st Sentence then goes on to assert the plaintiff has lied, twisted the objective state of fact and falsely accused Mr Ho of interfering with or jeopardising the internal affairs of the Village (“嚴重侵害村內事務”). It was only when the plaintiff was twisting the objective state of fact that her assertions would be said to be “puzzling” (“實在令人費解”). The way how the 1st Sentence was actually structured and worded admits of only one interpretation as aforesaid, and this plainly accused the plaintiff of lying when she expressed her view that Mr Ho had interfered with the internal affairs of the Village. The plaintiff submitted that 1st Sentence accused the plaintiff of twisting the objective state of fact for which she would be questioned or doubted by a reasonable reader. 55.In this regard, I beg to differ. The question whether the witnessing of the Application Forms by Mr Ho was a good cause or not would appear to me to be one of opinion more than truth or falsity. It seems to me that whether Mr Ho was doing a commendable act by witnessing for the villagers, or whether such act constituted interference with the internal affairs of the Village could well be a question of opinion rather than outright truth or falsity as I mentioned. Thus, it cannot be said that the only natural and ordinary meaning of the 1st Sentence is that the plaintiff was lying and was deceitful, as opposed to carrying an opinion that was difficult to understand, as was suggested in the last words of the 1st Sentence. 56.In relation to the 2nd Sentence, the plaintiff submitted this is a direct attack on, inter alia, the plaintiff’s office and duties. It is submitted that “盡心盡力” (referring to doing her best to serve) involves a mental element (“心”) (“i.e. heart”) and an element of conduct or effort (“力”). The 2nd Sentence suggests that the plaintiff had failed to discharge with her best endeavour with regard to both elements. Mr Szeto suggested that the mental element (i.e. “未能盡心”) can only mean the plaintiff had some kind of unidentified hidden self-interest when serving the Village, amounting to an accusation of a conflict of interest. He further submitted that “未能盡力” (i.e. not doing her best) can only mean the plaintiff had chosen to be lazy. It is submitted that the 2nd Sentence was thus defamatory. The plaintiff further submitted that the defendant would be entitled to say that he was regretful of the performance of the plaintiff (“對於本村原居民代表李秀梅女士服務本村的表現我深感遺憾”). However, with the presently worded accusation, the defendant was not just expressing his view but is also defaming the plaintiff with the specific averments above. In this regard, subject to the validity of any of the defences raised, and by reason of the acceptance by the defendant of the meaning pleaded in paragraph 5(b) of the Statement of Claim, I am satisfied that the 2nd Sentence has the effect of lowering the reputation of the plaintiff. 57.As for the 3rd Sentence, the plaintiff submitted that this is the most obvious defamatory statement. Again, it is said that the defendant was attacking the plaintiff as a liar who had given false accounts of facts, and attacking her on how she handled the matter. The plaintiff submitted that in the present context, “black” plainly means “bad”, and “white” is “good”. Henceforth, when one accused the other of “顛倒黑白” (“calling black as white”), the accuser obviously is suggesting the other as knowingly stating the good to be bad or vice versa. The plaintiff says that the defendant accepted in his evidence that if he said something coloured black is white, he would be lying. Accordingly, the defendant admitted to the plain meaning that accusing the plaintiff of “顛倒黑白” is to say she had lied. Likewise, it is also submitted that “本末倒置” (“putting the cart before the horse”) presupposes a proper order or course of things. An accusation that somebody has “本末倒置” is to suggest that the person has reversed or overturned the proper order or course of things. Hence, accusing the plaintiff of being “本末倒置” means nothing short of accusing her of lying about obvious facts. With the additional comments of disappointment and anger, the 3rd Sentence is described by the plaintiff’s counsel as ‘stingy’ and defamatory. The defendant’s contentions (i) Meaning of “未能盡心” 58.It was suggested to the defendant in cross-examination that “未能盡心” (i.e. failure to do her best wholeheartedly) connotes the meaning of the plaintiff having a conflict of interest over the handling of the affairs of Village. First and foremost, the defendant submitted that this suggested meaning has not been pleaded. Owing to the remoteness between this phrase and this suggested meaning, there must be some extrinsic fact or understanding to establish the connection by way of innuendo, but none has been set out in the plaintiff’s pleadings. The defendant thus contends that this suggested meaning must be rejected. 59.Further, it is submitted that the natural and ordinary meaning of the phrase “未能盡心盡力” simply means the plaintiff has not diligently and wholeheartedly served members of the Village. It is submitted that her refusal to witness or sign the Application Forms shows she did not spare enough effort to help those Villagers who wished to accept the Allowance (“未能盡力”), and did not care enough for their need and eagerness to receive the Allowance earlier (“未能盡心”). In this respect, the plaintiff had in April 2017 still prioritised the fight with the Authority for a better package over the desire of some of the individual villagers to receive the Allowance earlier. The defendant says that whether or not there had been a consensus during the September 2016 village assembly, the villagers were entitled to consider the plaintiff’s priority in the wrong order as the negotiation had already taken years and the package desired by the plaintiff had not been achieved. This view of “未能盡心盡力” was reasonable. (ii) Meaning of “顛倒黑白” 60.The defendant contended that in the relevant sentence containing the phrase “顛倒黑白” in the last paragraph of the 8 July Letter, the signatories (including the defendant) were not talking about the plaintiff’s reason for refusing to witness or sign the Application Forms but her attack or criticism against the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee. The meaning was plainly that the plaintiff had failed to judge what was right and what was wrong. 61.Further, the defendant contended that although the phrase touches on the colours of black and white, generally this phrase, in Chinese, does not just touch on twisting matters of fact or universal understanding but also matters of value judgment. The defendant says that the issue here was whether the plaintiff was right or wrong in attacking or criticising the Chairman and Vice-Chairman as “interfering with the affairs of the Village”. The defendant says that as long as there are two different possible answers to this question with some objective support and within the spectrum of reasonable opinion, the defendant and others were entitled to comment that the plaintiff was misinterpreting the facts. 62.I agree with this submission. One needs to read such references in the 3rd Sentence in the context of the entire letter. One perspective in viewing the 3rd Sentence would be with reference to the allegation whether the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman was doing a commendable thing or was, as the plaintiff thought, interfering with the internal affairs of the Village. It would seem, therefore, that the 3rd Sentence does not necessarily carry the meaning that the plaintiff was lying or was deceitful, least to say having a conflict of interest as suggested by the plaintiff. The same applies to the assertion by the plaintiff that the phrase about putting the cart before the horse (“本末倒置”) means nothing short of accusing her of lying about obvious facts. It would appear to me that this phrase does not mean lying about obvious facts, but rather it means focusing on matters in the wrong order, or priority. Putting the 3rd Sentence in its proper context, therefore, it does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff was lying as pleaded and submitted by the plaintiff, nor do I find that there is such innuendo. (iii) Other contents of the 8 July Letter 63.The defendant also further contended that it is common ground the reference to “我們” (“us”) is a reference to the signatories of the 8 July Letter. However, the defendant contends that reading the letter in its context, it did not carry the meaning that every signatory had himself or herself approached the plaintiff and had been rejected by the plaintiff for witnessing and signing their Application Forms. Further, the defendant submitted that the signatories to the 8 July Letter, even if they were not applicants themselves, would have an interest in the matter through their family members who were applicants or potential applicants. Logically thus, insofar as they supported the position set out in the 8 July Letter, had learnt of what happened and believed it was true, it was completely natural and ordinary for them to bundle their viewpoints with those who had approached the Plaintiff and got refused. In any event, so the defendant says, the plaintiff had already refused some villagers, so that it would make no sense for each and every one of the signatories to the 8 July Letter to have been required to approach the plaintiff anymore. In this context, the reference to “us” or “we” in relation to the refusal by the plaintiff to witness or sign the Application Forms cannot reasonably be a reference to each and every signatory to the 8 July Letter. I am inclined to agree with the defendant’s submission in this regard, as the context of the letter would seem to suggest that the focus of the letter was to express the views of the villagers rather than a letter that sets out the fact that each and every one of the signatories had been refused by the plaintiff to act as their witness. In fact, the context of the letter could mean that each one of the signatories had been particularly refused, but could equally mean that the plaintiff had generally refused to act as witness for all the villagers on the whole. At the end of the day, the important issue is the meaning of the substative statements made in the letter. 64.The defendant submitted, which I accept, that the overall meaning of the 8 July Letter, in short, was that the plaintiff had failed to perform her duty, misinterpreted the facts and done things in the wrong order. The signing villagers came to these views because of the plaintiff’s then position of not witnessing or signing the Application Forms and her attack on the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Justification 65.The applicable legal principles are not really in dispute. Firstly, as a defamatory imputation is presumed to be false, the burden is upon the defendant to show that it is “substantially” true (Gatley, at §11.4). Further, in relation to the defence of justification, the defendant submitted that to establish the defence, a defendant needs not prove every word he or she published was true, but only to establish the “essential” or “substantial” truth of the sting in the libel, see Gatley §11.2. The defendant’s contentions 66.First of all, the defendant submitted that at the trial, the plaintiff mentioned she had a telephone conversation with one Ms Wong Hoi Yan (黃凱茵), who was an officer of the Authority in or around March 2017. During this conversation, Ms Wong told the plaintiff that the plaintiff could witness and sign the Application Forms for the villagers which were issued on around 8 March 2017. The plaintiff said she was not satisfied with Ms Wong’s answer to her query about her potential legal liability that might arise from the witnessing and certifying of the Application Forms. She later instructed solicitors to issue a letter to the Authority on 13 April 2017. The plaintiff received the Authority’s response dated 2 May 2017, stating that anyone above the age of 18 could be a witness of the Application Forms. In the cases involving issues of succession, the applicants could either approach the Home Affairs Office for making a declaration, or the Village Representatives, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman of the Committee for certifying the succession form. There could be no misunderstanding of the Authority’s stance in this respect. 67.In relation to the reference in the 8 July Letter to a failure to understand the plaintiff’s reason for refusal, the defendant’s case is that he and his two witnesses were all informed of the plaintiff’s claimed reason for not witnessing or signing, and they positively said so in their witness statements. However, the defendant and Mr Ho found it difficult to understand why the plaintiff was concerned about the alleged legal liability. Leaving aside situations involving succession, where the names of the applicants are not the same as the names of the owners or licensees of the relevant land lots (an issue which the plaintiff herself said to be not her primary concern in any event), it is submitted by the defendant that as long as an applicant has his or her name and information registered as owning or being licensed with a land lot, there was simply no difficulty to witness the signature of that form, especially when the plaintiff personally knew the applicants. Thus, it is submitted by the defendant that on its proper meaning, the reference in the 8 July Letter to a lack of understanding of the reason (or true reason) of the plaintiff’s refusal to witness the Application Forms is plainly justified even when the statement-makers had learnt of the plaintiff’s claimed reason. 68.It was thus groundless, so the defendant says, for the plaintiff to attack the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman in her subsequent letters to the Islands District Officer and the 29 June Letter as interfering with the internal affairs of the Village and to frame it as a conspiracy between them possibly with a view to obtaining some kind of benefit. As the defendant submitted, it had become clear by the time of the 8 July Letter that it was for individual villagers entitled to the Allowance to decide on whether to apply for the same. 69.The defendant further contended that in cross-examination, the plaintiff was asked if she would consider an ordinary adult with no public office or the Home Affairs officer witnessing and signing the forms as amounting to interference with the affairs of the Village, no satisfactory answer was given. In fact, the defendant says that no satisfactory answer could be given as the plaintiff’s attack on the Chairman and Vice-Chairman was not based on a reasonable interpretation of the Authority’s stance. The defendant says it was simply grounded on a belief deeply rooted in the plaintiff’s mind that as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee were not members of the Village, they could not even accept the request for assistance from a member of the Village, unless with her consent. This was indeed the stance she maintained during her cross-examination. 70.It is important to note that some villagers had already decided to accept the Allowance as a matter of their individual right, and they then needed to approach someone for assistance in witnessing their Application Forms. There was nothing wrong with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Committee (or indeed any person over the age of 18) being asked to witness the documents for the villagers after they were told of the plaintiff’s stance at that time. 71.It seems that it was a perfectly natural happening that some villagers had considered further negotiation not likely to be fruitful and did not want to further bundle their interests together. The defendant pointed out that it is also not wrong for the plaintiff to want to pursue the negotiation a bit longer, but when the matter had come to a point when some villagers already made up their mind and approached the leaders for completing the procedures, the plaintiff had no reason to hold them up, not to say to criticise those who were willing to help. 72.The defendant further contended that the 8 July Letter was plainly a reply to the 29 June Letter. The evidence of the defendant and Mr Ho supported this. Their description of the way or events leading to the signing of the 8 July Letter has not been contradicted. According to Mr Ho, he accepted that the views of the villagers were sought, and the letter was then drafted and given to the villagers to sign. After it had been signed, it was given to his secretary, Ms Chan Kit Wah (陳潔華), to arrange for its circulation. The defendant says there had been no suggestion the invitation to sign the 8 July Letter did not originate from the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman. 73.Further, the defendant says although the banners were not specifically pleaded as a material fact of the justification, this reinforces why Mr Ho was keen to reply to the attack on him by the 29 June 2017, as similarly worded banners had been hung by the plaintiff in Tai O. It also explains why the villagers were eager to help rebutting the 29 June Letter when requested. The defendant says the plaintiff’s act of hanging up the banners and publishing her baseless attack to the wider public also shows the problem of her character and why she is not a reliable witness. In fact, the defendant has also described the plaintiff to be stubborn, subjective and not willing to accept others’ opinions. The plaintiff’s contentions 74.On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the “circumstantial backbone” of the defendant’s case is premised on the following allegations, which are said to have been proven to be false at the trial:
75.In relation to the first point, the plaintiff contended that the documents supplied by the Authority listing out the details of the applicants for the Allowance for the period from April to July 2017 showed that during that period, only 56 potential applicants saw fit to apply, out of 160. This was a minority rather than a majority at any rate. It was also said that the voting by show of hands at the meeting on 16 September 2016 showed that the overwhelming majority of those present at the meeting had wanted to continue with the fight for a better deal. 76.As for the second point, it is said that the plaintiff had not said at the meeting held on 16 September 2016 that as from 1 April 2017, the villagers could do whatever they wished with regard to applications for the Allowance without having to be bundled together in terms of their interest in negotiating for better package with the Authority. The plaintiff also questioned why on the evidence, Mr Ho seemed to be totally unaware of this statement allegedly made by the plaintiff, as he had not challenged the plaintiff on the same at, e.g. the village assembly held on 1 June 2017. 77.In relation to the third point as to whether the plaintiff had, without cause, refused to witness and certify applications, it is contended by the plaintiff that in the entire context of the defendant’s case, only two names were mentioned[5]. They were not called as witnesses, and on closer scrutiny of the evidence, these two persons had only asked the Committee to contact the plaintiff for them. Not even one villager (including the defendant and Chan) had come forward to say the plaintiff had refused to help without cause. 78.Further, the plaintiff submitted that in the context of available evidence, 13 signatories of the 8 July Letter could not have asked Mr Ho to witness and certify their applications at the material time as their name did not appear on the documents supplied by the Authority showing a list of persons potentially entitled to the Allowance[6]. 79.As for the issue whether the 8 July Letter was in reply to the 29 June Letter, this is also said by the plaintiff to be false. The whole content of the 8 July Letter was settled on 25 May 2017 when the only dispute was the plaintiff’s requests for a meeting. Mr Ho relying on the minutes of meeting agreed that banners only appeared as from 29 May 2017, and the 29 June Letter only appeared a month later. Thus, as a matter of pure logic and time sequence of events, the exact wording of the 8 July Letter existed well before the 29 June Letter and were not and could not have been drafted in response to the same. Ruling on justification 80.Having considered the arguments on both sides, I am persuaded by the defendant’s contentions. 81.In particular, the plaintiff has not denied her stance that she would refuse to witness the villagers’ applications at the outset pending the clarification of the Authority. Even though the Authority had provided a reply dated 2 May 2017 setting out its stance as described above, the plaintiff was not satisfied with the same and took the view that the potential legal liability for witnessing or certifying the applications had not been clarified. Given the circumstances set out above, it is normal for the villagers to find it difficult to understand the claimed reason of the plaintiff to refuse to witness the applications. 82.In such circumstances, it is also difficult to understand why the fact that Mr Ho had been asked to witness some of the villagers’ applications would constitute an interference with the internal affairs of the Village. 83.As for the plaintiff’s contentions, first of all, whether or not the majority of the villagers wanted to obtain the compensation sooner is not a determining factor for the issue of justification. It is not the defendant’s case that the majority of the villagers had wanted to apply for the Allowance. The important thing is that the evidence shows, in any event, that (i) at least a number of villagers had taken that view, and had indeed made such applications, and (ii) the plaintiff has taken a stance that she would refuse or refrain from witnessing the applications. 84.Similarly for the second point raised by the plaintiff, whether or not the plaintiff had said at the meeting on 16 September 2017 that as from April 2017, the villagers would be free to do whatever they wanted with regard to their applications for the Allowance is not crucial for present purposes. The most important factor to take into account in this regard is the fact that the villagers were or should be free at any time to make their applications without hindrance, and to ask for whoever is entitled to act as witness for his or her assistance. In fact, the plaintiff has in her cross-examination accepted this. Yet, she has criticised the Chairman and Vice-Chairman vehemently over their witnessing the applications. 85.Lastly, regarding the third point relied on by the plaintiff, it is not so much as to whether the plaintiff had a cause in her refusal to witness the applications, but whether one can understand the claimed reason. In this regard, the defendant has contended that it is difficult to understand the plaintiff’s claimed reason for the refusal to witness the applications for the reasons set out above, which I will not repeat here. 86.In the circumstances, I find that the defendant is entitled to rely on the defence of justification in this case concerning the use of the Words in the 8 July Letter. The defendant was justified in stating that the plaintiff had not given her best endeavours or efforts in her service as one of the village representatives, that she had misinterpreted the facts and/or had done things in the wrong order, in the context of the matters referred to in paragraphs 66 to 72 and 80 to 86 above. Honest Comment 87.The defence of honest comment is recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Leung Chi Ching Candy v Yeung Hon Sing [2021] 5 HKLRD 684 where the Court of Appeal summarized the 5 elements for the defence at paragraph 26 as follows:
88.The defendant adopted the same grounds of justification examined above as grounds of his honest belief, and submitted that if he is successful on the issue of justification, the comments in the Words must also be regarded as honest, and thus this issue needs not be separately looked into. 89.But the defendant goes further and contended that even if the plaintiff’s action of refusing to witness and sign the Application Forms for the villagers, and of accusing the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee are found to be objectively reasonable, the defendant would still succeed on the defence of honest comment. 90.It is submitted by the defendant, first of all, that the Words were all matters of public interest. They were comments as opposed to imputation of facts. Secondly, they were based on the true and undisputed facts that the plaintiff had refused to sign the Application Forms for the villagers, and that she had criticised the Chairman and Vice-Chairman as “interfering with the affairs of the Village”. These matters of fact have been referred to in the 8 July Letter. I agree with this contention. 91.Further, it is submitted by the defendant, with which I also agree, that the comments in the Words (including the plaintiff had failed to perform her duty, failed to serve the Villagers diligently and wholeheartedly, that her comments on the Chairman and Vice-Chairman were difficult to understand) fell within the spectrum of reasonable comments which honest persons could make. Even if some readers might have disagreed with the comments made in the Words, it cannot be said that the comments in the Words had no reasonable foundation at all. There is a distinction between a comment which is disagreed to by others, and a comment that is dishonest. The defendant says the plaintiff cannot sue her for the comments merely because she disagrees with his viewpoint and considers herself doing the right thing. This is particularly so when the role of the plaintiff is that of a public officer accountable to the villagers. 92.In light of the above, subject to the question of malice to be examined below, I also find that the defendant has made out the defence of honest comment in the present case. Qualified Privilege 93.The plaintiff has referred to the first instance decision in the case of Jonathan Lu v Paul Chan Mo Po [2015] 6 HKC 149, at 811-17 for the legal principles for the defence of qualified privilege summarized as follows:
94.Even if an occasion is privileged, it does not necessarily protect all that is said or written on that occasion. Anything not relevant and pertinent to the discharge of the duty or exercise of the right or the safeguarding of the interest which creates the privilege will not be protected (Gatley, at §14.63). 95.The case of Jonathan Lu v Paul Chan Mo Po went to the Court of Final Appeal. At paragraph 13 of the judgment, Lord Reed NPJ explains that the concept of qualified privilege is attached to “occasions when the law recognizes a need for frank and uninhibited communication which outweighs the need to protect reputation”. There is no closed list of categories of situations which are privileged. In determining whether an occasion is privileged, the court has to (i) consider whether the person who makes the communication has an interest or a legal, social or moral duty to communicate and whether the recipient has a corresponding interest or duty to receive such communication; and (ii) all the circumstances “in which the public interest requires a communication to be protected in the absence of malice”, depending upon current social conditions. 96.It is said in Gatley at §14.59, that “any complaint or information as to such misconduct, neglect of duty, or abuse is privileged, provided that it is made in good faith to the person or body who has the power or duty to remove, punish or reprimand the offender, or merely to inquire into the subject-matter of the complaint”. In this regard, “duty” is not confined to legal duties but also moral or social duties of imperfect obligation – see Harrison v Bush [1855] 5 E & B 344, which was also cited at Gatley §14.60. 97.Further, the principle of qualified privilege is not confined to public officers or persons in authority but extends to statements about the conduct of any person who has responsibilities to the public for the way in which she deals with them (see Gatley §14.62). 98.A reply to attack is a recognised occasion for qualified privilege. When a person’s character or conduct has been attacked, he is entitled to answer such attack, and any defamatory statements he may make about the person who attacked him will be privileged, provided they are bona fide published and fairly relevant to the accusations made (see Gatley at §§14.51 & 14.67, and Tung Lo Court v Tsui Wai Yip [2015] 4 HKLRD 397 at paragraph 55). Counter-attack on credibility can also be privileged when the reply is a relevant and necessary means of repelling a charge to state that the person who made the attack should not be believed – see Gatley at §14.68. 99.Here, the defendant submitted that he claims qualified privilege on the basis of an alleged moral duty towards the Committee. His case is that the 8 July Letter was signed by him and the others upon the invitation of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman in response to the plaintiff’s 29 June Letter, and the same would be circulated to the members of the Committee. There is no dispute the 29 June Letter, which was issued to all representatives in the Committee, contained the plaintiff’s attack on the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. It is also not seriously contested that the executive members of the Committee, or all members of the Committee, had an interest in knowing more about the allegations against the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. In the circumstances, the defendants says that qualified privilege should equally arise as if the 8 July Letter was issued by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. 100.In Wan Chiu Ying v Tam Wai Chu, HCA 3479 of 2002, 27 April 2005, A Cheung J (as the Chief Justice then was), the defendant, who used to be the principal of an institute of vocational education, gave an allegedly defamatory interview (which was published by three newspapers) in order to protect the good name of the institute. The court found the interview a reply to attack or allegations made by plaintiff’s wife to newspaper reporters against the institute for contributing to the plaintiff’s suicide attempt. The court ruled that qualified privilege applied on such occasion. 101.The plaintiff submits, however, that the defendant was not acting pursuant to any alleged moral duties towards the Committee but was acting solely as per the request of Mr Ho. It was a personal request from Mr Ho, not from the Committee. Mr Ho is not from or a member of the Village. The plaintiff stresses that the only possible geographical linkage between the defendant and Mr Ho as Tai O villagers is demonstrably weak and there is no authority to support that this would be enough to ground a moral duty. In any event, the plaintiff says a moral duty would not arise if, with respect, the morality of the defendant is highly questionable (i.e. there being malice and falsity). 102.In the present case, in light of the submissions of the plaintiff that the request had come from Mr Ho himself, although the letter was eventually addressed to the Committee members, there may be some difficulty to identify any moral duty on the part of the defendant to make the statements contained in the 8 July Letter. However, it is also the defendant’s pleaded case that he and the other signatories of the letter, and the Committee members receiving it all had a common interest in the local affairs of the Village under the purview of the Committee, including the payment of the proper compensation as in the present case by the government, and the proper performance of the individual Committee members. 103.In the circumstances, subject to my consideration of the question of malice below, I have no difficulty in ruling that the defendant is entitled to rely on the defence of qualified privilege in the present case. Malice 104.The tests for malice in the context of honest comment and qualified privilege are also summarized in the case of Leung Chi Ching Candy, at §826-37 referred to by the plaintiff:
105.Further, in Tam Heung Man v The Incorporated Owners of Lung Poon Court [2019] HKDC 401, at §193, the language of the defamatory content is relevant to the question of malice. It was ruled that grossly exaggerated words would be strong evidence of malice (at §194). 106.The plaintiff submitted that the case of the defendant is to be defeated by malice. She contended that malice cries out from the wording and structure of the 3 Sentences. Further, according to the plaintiff, the following matters are relevant:
107.The defendant also referred to the case of Jonathan Lu v Paul Chan Mo Po [2018] HKCFA 11; [2018] 21 HKCFAR 94, where Lord Reed gave a detailed explanation of the concept of “malice” (also remarked as “express malice” or “malice in fact”) from paragraphs 15 to 30. His Lordship started with the proposition that malice can be found when a person uses a privileged occasion “for some purpose other than that for which privilege is accorded by the law”, citing the earlier Court of Final Appeal decision in Cheng v Tse Wai Chun (2000) 3 HKCFAR 339 and the well-known English authority on responsible journalism, Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127). It was said that in order to decide whether a communication was published maliciously for the purpose of rebutting a defence of qualified privilege, it is necessary to decide[7]:-
108.The motive with which the defendant made the communication in question is therefore of crucial importance. A person may have more than one reason, motive or purpose for making a communication; the critical question is whether the dominant purpose for which he made the communication was one other than the purpose for which the occasion was privileged[8]. 109.Where the purpose for which the privilege was accorded was consistent only with the communication of a matter which was believed to be true, prejudice, however gross and unreasoning it might be, did not destroy the privilege unless it showed the defendant did not believe what he wrote or said to be true or rendered the defendant indifferent to the truth or falsity of what was stated[9]. 110.Also, at paragraph 39, Lord Reed stressed that “[g]iven the strength of the public interest in the protection of free speech on privileged occasions, it also needs to be made clear to the jury that the burden [of establishing that the defendant had used a privileged occasion for an improper purpose is not easily or lightly satisfied”. 111.The defendant contended that in the present case, the plea of malice and its particulars can be found at paragraph 10 of the Statement of Claim. However, there is no substance in those particulars. There is no explanation, in either the Statement of Claim or in the Reply, as to why the 8 July Letter was issued for purposes other than the privileged basis pleaded by the defendant – that is to say, commenting on the plaintiff’s performance in public office and responding to the plaintiff’s accusation against the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. There is no explanation as to why the defendant did not believe in the Words in the 8 July Letter, or that he had been indifferent to the truth or falsity in it. The mere claim that the Words were without basis or evidence is obviously inadequate for the purpose of establishing malice. 112.I agree with the submissions made in this regard by the defendant. Further, despite the effort by the plaintiff in listing out a number of accusations against or adverse observations about the defendant above, even if one assumes the same to have been established, one cannot conclude that the defendant did not believe in the statements made in the 8 July Letter, or that the dominant purpose for which he made the communication was one other than the purpose for which the occasion was privileged. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to rely on the allegation of malice to defeat the defence of honest comment or qualified privilege. The plaintiff’s bad reputation 113.Concerning the issue of the plaintiff’s reputation, at the outset of the trial, the defendant already accepted the Words had the effect of lowering the reputation of the plaintiff as an ordinary person. The issue remains to be whether the plaintiff had a bad reputation in the Committee and in the Village before the publication of the Words. In this connection, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff had through the circulation of the 29 June Letter demonstrated herself to be lacking the ability to properly conduct herself as a representative of the Village. Her act of hanging up the banners and accusing the Chairman and Vice-Chairman further proved this. 114.Further, the defendant says one can compare the contents of the 29 June Letter and the 8 July Letter and arrive at the conclusion whether the plaintiff, who aggressively accused others first, has indeed suffered any loss or damage as a result of the more mildly and conservatively worded 8 July Letter. 115.There is also evidence of the plaintiff’s failure to safeguard the interest of the villagers and appreciate that many villagers wished to strike a deal with the Authority. The plaintiff’s letter with the Authority, her approach in the negotiation and whether she paid sufficient regard to those having different views are also relevant to this assessment. 116.Having considered the defendant’s submissions, I am satisfied that the plaintiff did have a bad reputation in handling the affairs of the Village, and in the way she had gone about in dealing with other members of the Village or village representatives. This is obvous from her own acts of hanging up posters and banners in the Tai O area with grave criticisms on Mr Lou and Mr Ho, and in the way she has worded the 29 June Letter containing similar criticisms. However, in light of my findings above relating to the defence of justification, honest comment and qualified privilege, there is no need for me to make any additional comments or findings on whether any damage would be suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the defamatory nature of the Words. In my view, there is none. Conclusion and judgment 117.For the reasons given above, I find for the defendant and give judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. 118.I also make a costs order nisi that the costs of the action be to the defendant, with certificate for counsel. The order nisi will become absolute 14 days after this judgment, unless any of the parties shall file and serve written submissions for a variation, whereupon the responding party shall file and serve his or her written submissions in opposition, if any, within 14 days thereafter. The application for variation of the costs order nisi shall be disposed of on paper, unless the court otherwise directs after having regard to the written submissions. 119.Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for their helpful assistance.
Mr Patrick Szeto, instructed by Sammy Ip & Co for the plaintiff Mr Lewis Law, instructed by Vitus Lawyers for the defendant [1] At that time the Committee consisted of 26 members, including 13 executive members. [2] There is no agreed English translation of the full Chinese text, but English translation of the alleged defamatory words have been provided in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim. The English translation is for reference only, and the meaning of the relevant words should be ascertained from the Chinese original text. [3] As pleaded in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim. [4] As extracted and set out in paragraph 6(4) of the Amended Defence. [5] Namely陳品詔 and 李志光. [6] Bundle C, pp.354-356. [7] See paragraph 17 of the judgment. [8] See paragraph 18 of the judgment. [9] See paragraphs 27-28 of the judgment. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 4322/2018