Man King Chuen and Others v. The Personal Representative(S) of Wai Tze Hang Alex, Deceased and Another
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HCA 1463/2010 and [2023] HKCFI 1435 HCA 1463/2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1463 OF 2010 __________________
__________________ HCA 299/2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 299 OF 2011 __________________
__________________ (Heard together)
____________________ JUDGMENT ____________________ Index B. Directions on the trial, and amending the name of D2
1.This is the trial of HCA 1463/2010 (“HCA 1463”) and HCA 299/2011 (“HCA 299”, and collectively the “2 Actions”). 2.The disputes in both actions relate to Lot 357 (“Lot 357” or the “Subject Lot”) in Demarcation District No.7, Tai Po, the New Territories. In gist:
3.Mr Edward Chan SC leading Mr Jeremy Kwong appeared for Ps. D1/1463 did not appear. Ms Denise Souza appeared for D1. Mr Bernard Man SC leading Mr Keith Lam appeared for D2. B. Directions on the trial, and amending the name of D2 4.I record that on the first morning of the trial, I gave the following directions:
5.I record that in the course of Ms Souza’s closing submissions, I sought clarification from her about the current name of D1. According to the Summary of Undisputed Facts prepared by the parties, D1 changed its name in 2020 to International College Hong Kong Hong Lok Yuen Association Limited. Ms Souza confirmed that that is indeed D1’s current name. I note however that no corresponding amendment has been made to the pleadings. With consent from all parties, I allowed liberty to amend D1’s name accordingly. 6.The following background facts are mainly adopted from the Summary of Undisputed Facts and Agreed Chronology of Events. C.1. THE SUBJECT LOT, THE HLY LAND, THE SCHOOL LAND, AND THE PARTIES 7.The Subject Lot is located in Hong Lok Yuen. 8.According to the Block Crown Lease dated 27 March 1905[3], the Subject Lot was granted to 7 individuals: (1) Man Sui Tso, (2) Man Nim Tso, (3) Man Tseung Tso, (4) Man Wing Tso, (5) Man Tsik Hung, (6) Man Wong Shi, (7) Man Wong Ho (“Grantee 1” to “Grantee 7” respectively, and collectively the “Grantees”[4]). 9.The Subject Lot is now co-owned by the 6 Tsos together with P7, each holding 1/7 part or share thereof[5]. 10.The 6 Tsos are all Chinese tsos:
11.P1 Tso to P6 Tso were formed in commemoration of Grantee 1 to Grantee 6 as their respective focal ancestors. 12.The appointments of P1 to P6 as managers of their respective tsos have all been registered pursuant to section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance, Cap 97[6]. 13.P7 are 3 natural persons. They are the successors[7] to the 1/7 share of the Subject Lot previously belonging to the estate of Grantee 7 (文黃好), who passed away on 11 February 1961. 14.D2 is the developer of Hong Lok Yuen:
15.In respect of D1:
16.The School Land has been leased by D2 to D1 since 1 September 1983[11]. The Subject Lot has never been leased as such as part of the School Land. 17.The Subject Lot is of irregular shape. It has been (and is currently still) occupied:
18.The relative location of the School Land, Subject Lot, and the Playground is illustrated in the plans attached to this Judgment as Annexure A[12] and Annexure B[13]. For ease of presentation during the trial, the Subject Lot has been divided into and identified as Portions A, B, and C (“Portion A”, “Portion B” and “Portion C”). Portion A[14], of about 1,640m2 in size, is the portion of the Subject Lot being occupied partly by a flowerbed and a road. Portions B and C[15], of about 2,528m2 in total size, are the Playground (with Portion C[16] being more precisely an outdoor playfield). Except the side which adjoins Portion A, Portions B and C are surrounded by the School Land. 19.The 2 Agreements have been registered in the Land Registry against the Subject Lot since 11 January 1983, the 1st Agreement by Memorial No. TP211048, and the 2nd Agreement by Memorial No. TP211049. 20.In relation to the 1st Agreement:
21.In relation to the 2nd Agreement:
22.Ps first commenced HCA 1463 on 29 September 2010 for vacation of registration of the 2 Agreements from the land register of the Subject Lot. 23.Alex Wai had by then died[21]. No one has ever appeared to represent the estate of Alex Wai in HCA 1463. The proceedings were on 22 December 2015 ordered[22] by Master Hui to be proceeded with in the absence of a person representing the same. 24.HCA 1463 is defended by D2. 25.On 23 February 2011, Ps commenced HCA 299 against D1 and D2 to recover vacant possession of the Subject Lot. As said, D1 and D2 resist the same on the basis of adverse possession. They are counterclaiming on the same basis. 26.In their Re-amended Statement of Claim(“Ps/RA-SOC/1463”), Ps plead and rely, inter alia and principally, on the following matters:
27.Ps therefore seek, on further or alternative bases, declarations to the effect the 1st Agreement has been terminated and that the owners of the Subject Lot are no longer bound by its terms[24], that the 1st Agreement is void[25], that it has been rescinded[26], that any personal representative of the estate of Alex Wai is no longer entitled to complete the same[27], and/or that it has been frustrated[28] and/or abandoned[29] so that the parties thereto are discharged. They seek consequently vacation of the registration of the 1st and 2nd Agreements. 28.As has been mentioned above, no one has appeared to represent the estate of Alex Wai. 29.The current version of D2’s Defence is its Re-Re-Amended Defence (“D2/RRA-Def/1463”). D2 has pleaded a number of defences. It maintained that the 1st Agreement continued to be valid and binding[30], and that it still was willing, ready and able to perform the 1st Agreement in place of Alex Wai[31]. I said “maintained’ and “was” because, as will be explained immediately below, those are no longer D2’s stances. 30.Despite the pleadings, D2’s legal advisers by letter of 28 October 2022 confirmed that D2 is no longer taking any issue on the invalidity and unenforceability of the 1st and 2nd Agreements, and would not contend that they remain registrable. 31.However, as will also become clear below, despite D2’s latest stance, its pleadings in HCA 1463 remain relevant when it comes to parties’ respective cases in HCA 299. Of particular relevance are the following paragraphs of D2/RRA-Def/1463, wherein D2 avers that:
32.Ps first took out the Writ on 23 February 2011. The cause of action is trespass. They seek vacant possession of the Subject Lot, a number of injunctions requiring reinstatement and restraining further entry, and damages. 33.I record that in the course of Mr Man’s oral closing submissions, Mr Chan confirmed that given the long lapse of time, Ps would no longer seek any injunction requiring reinstatement. 34.D1 filed its Defence and Counterclaim on 3 May 2011 (“D1/D&C/299”). It pleads that it has since its establishment in 1983 been a tenant of Lot 1945 RP ss2 from D2, and that it has been occupying part of the Subject Lot and been using it as a playing field (i.e. Portions B and C, as coloured yellow on the plan attached to D1/D&C/299). Relying on the doctrine of adverse possession, it resists Ps’ claim for vacant possession, and seeks amongst others on that same basis a Declaration for possessory title. 35.D2 filed its Defence and Counterclaim also on 3 May 2011. The current version is the Amended Defence and Counterclaim of 17 September 2019 (“D2/A-D&C/299”). D2 has pleaded a number of defences, as follows:
36.One sees therefrom that D2 has in D2/A-D&C/299 referred to its defences pleaded in D2/RRA-Def/1463, and has in effect incorporated the same into D2/A-D&C/299. 37.By letter of 17 October 2022, D2’s legal advisers stated that D2 would no longer rely on the pleaded defences of contractual licence and proprietary estoppel. As confirmed by Mr Man in his written closing[35], D2 does not contend that the 2 Agreements validly gave it the right to possess or occupy the Subject Lot. 38.However, despite D2’s abandonment of the other pleaded defences, Ps aver that D2’s pleadings in relation to those abandoned defences (together with those which D2 has pleaded in HCA 1463 given their incorporation into D2/A-D&C/299) remain relevant to the issues as to whether Ds’ occupation of the Subject Lot was “adverse”, and whether Ds had the requisite intention to possess for the purpose of adverse possession – hence those pleadings have been set out in some details above. 39.Subject to Ps’ application to amend which I will deal with next, Ps’ current replies and defences to counterclaims can be found in their Amended Reply and Amended Defence to Counterclaim of D1 refiled on 27 September 2013 (“Ps/A-R&DC/D1”) and the Re-Amended Reply and Re-Amended Defence to Counterclaim of the D2 refiled on 21 January 2020 (“Ps/RA-R&DC/D2”). 40.The gist of Ps’ replies, insofar as those parts that are still relevant, are as follows:
41.By summons of 9 November 2022 in HCA 299 (the “Summons”), Ps sought leave to amend their Ps/A-R&DC/D1 and Ps/RA-R&DC/D2 as per the drafts attached thereto. 42.The submissions in support and opposition were made as part of counsel’s opening submissions. That made sense as background was important in considering the Summons. On the third day of the trial, upon conclusion of counsel’s oral opening submissions, I refused the application. I indicated that I will give reasons in the Judgment, which I now do. 43.The proposed amendments related to a letter dated 4 May 2001 from the Executive Officer of D1[38] (the “4/5/2001 Letter”). It was first disclosed in Ps’ List of Documents of 11 August 2015 filed in HCA 299. It was written on D1’s letterhead, and signed by Ms Chang Chui Yu Claudia (“Claudia Chang”). Claudia Chang was D1’s business manager at that time. It was addressed to 彭新好女士. It reads:
44.彭新好 used to be a manager of 2 of the 6 Tsos, namely P1 Tso and P6 Tso. She passed away in 1987, some 14 years prior to the issue of that letter. 45.The 4/5/2001 Letter is referred to in §16 of Man King Chuen’s witness statement filed on 19 September 2016 (“MKC/WS/299). Man King Chuen is one of Ps’ witnesses. He says therein that:
46.That letter is also referred to in §9 of Man Chiu Fook’s witness statement filed on 17 January 2020 (“MCF/WS/299), wherein he says that:
47.While the 4/5/2001 Letter has been referred to by Man King Chuen and Man Chiu Fook, acknowledgement of title has not been pleaded in Ps/A-R&DC/D1 or Ps/RA-R&DC/D2. By the Summons, Ps sought leave to add to each of them a paragraph to the effect that the 4/5/2001 Letter constitutes acknowledgment under section 23(1)(a) of the Limitation Ordinance, Cap 347. 48.Relevant to the application, Mr Chan referred this Court to a number of minutes of the meetings of D1’s Board of Governors recently discovered by D1 – see the affirmation of Mr Douglas Stephen Clark filed on 8 November 2022. Mr Chan submitted that reading the 4/5/2001 Letter with those minutes makes it clear that D1 issued that letter with the intention of seeing whether it could purchase the Subject Lot from its owners. 49.Whilst those minutes provided background and context to the 4/5/2001 Letter, it was not Mr Chan’s position that that letter only constitutes acknowledgment when read together with the minutes, or that Ps had not until disclosure of those minutes appreciated what they say are the effects of that letter. In other words, the recent discovery of those minutes does not justify the absence of pleadings in relation to the averment of acknowledgment. Nor do those minutes explain the lateness of the present application, the reason put forward in the course of submissions being simply that despite §16 of MKC/WS/299,the Ps/A-R&DC/D1 and Ps/RA-R&DC/D2 had been omitted and forgotten to be amended along that same line. 50.Mr Chan’s main arguments were that the 4/5/2001 Letter was first disclosed, and the averment of acknowledgment first made, several years ago. Ds had had ample chance to address the issue. Whilst the application for amendment was admittedly made late, Ds could not be said to have been taken by surprise. Mr Chan relied on 廈門新景地集團有限公司v Eton Properties Limited & Ors, (HCMP 13, 15, 18 & 21/2012, 14 February 2012). He relied in particular on §30 thereof, wherein Cheung CJHC (as the Chief Justice then was) observed that lateness does not necessarily mean that the court must refuse the amendments, bearing in mind in particular the “primary aim” in exercising the case management (or other) powers of the court is to secure the “just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties”. 51.Both Ms Souza and Mr Man objected. The main bases of the objection were the unexplained lateness, and the prejudice that Ds would suffer if the proposed amendments were to be allowed at such late stage. They together cited a number of authorities in support of their opposition, which include Kwok Chin Wing v 21 Holdings Ltd & Anor (2013) 16 HKCFAR 663 at §21, Liu Hon Wong & Ors v Liu Chee Kwan & Anor [2022] HKCFI 3157 at §§18-27, China Forestry Holdings Co Limited & Ors v KPMG [2021] HKCFI 1519 at §§19, 22-25, and Securities and Futures Commission v Andrew Liu [2022] HKCFI 697 at §§20-23. 52.Amongst those authorities, the reminder Ma CJ gave in §21 of Kwok Chin Wing is of particular significance, and is worth reciting:
53.For the following reasons, I refused the application:
54.The issues agreed upon between the parties were:
55.On facts, the witness statements that have been filed are:
56.Despite the filing of those statements, counsel in the course of Mr Chan’s oral opening informed this Court that in the light of Ms Souza and Mr Man’s acceptance of the following matters (the “2 Exceptions”), all of the above witness statements may be treated as read in court without cross-examination:
57.On Chinese customary law, upon D2’s application, and after a contentious hearing, Recorder Yvonne Cheng SC (as Her Ladyship then was) granted leave for expert evidence on the following questions (the “CCL Questions”) to be filed[48]:
58.The following expert reports have consequentially been filed on the CCL Questions:
59.On the mesne profit of the Subject Lot, the following expert reports have been filed:
G.2. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTUAL WITNESSES G.2.A. THE EVIDENCE OF MAN KING CHUEN 60.Man King Chuen is a manager of 5 of the 6 Tsos. He is also one of the 3 persons constituting P7. 61.In MKC/WS/1463:
62.In MKC/WS/299:
63.As I have set out above, Man King Chuen in §16 of MKC/WS/299 makes reference to the 4/5/2001 Letter. I have refused the Summons. I ignore the advice which Man King Chuen says he has received in relation to that letter (that Ds have acknowledged Ps’ title). G.2.B. THE EVIDENCE OF MAN CHIU FOOK IN HCA 1463 64.Man Chiu Fook is one of the managers of the 6 Tsos. In MCF/WS/1463, he states that no notice of the 1st Agreement had been given to members of the 6 Tsos, that consent had not been sought form the District Officer, and that the 1st Agreement was not signed in the presence of or attested by any District Officer. His evidence does not add much to that of Man King Chuen. G.2.C. THE EVIDENCE OF MAN WAI CHUNG AND MAN WAI YIP 65.Man Wai Chung is the father of Man Hiu Chung, one of the 6 Descendants. Man Wai Yip is the father of Man Nok Hin, another of the 6 Descendants. They confirm the birth of their respective sons, and their status amongst the 6 Tsos as set out in the table above. 66.Li’s evidence in Li/WS/1463 may be summarized as follows:
67.The contents of Li/WS/299 are materially the same as Li/WS/1463. 68.JAS was between 2010 and 2018 a member of the Board of Governors of D1. Between 2013 and 2018, he served as the Chairman or Co-Chairman of the Board. He has been living in Hong Lok Yuen since 2002. 69.He gave some factual background about the development of Hong Lok Yuen and the School. The School started off as Orchard Kindergarten. It was operating in April or May 1982. Round about that time, Hong Lok Yuen School Associated Limited was incorporated. It was a non-profit making private limited company formed for the purpose of operating a school in Hong Lok Yuen. On 20 July 1982, D2 entered into an agreement with Hong Lok Yuen School Associated Limited. Pursuant thereto, in September 1983, Hong Lok Yuen Primary School was established. In 1984, a 4-storey building (the “Old Block”) was built on Lot 1945 RP ss1 adjacent to the Subject Lot. Part of the Old Block encroached upon the Subject Lot. He mentioned a number of leases between D2 and the School in relation to the School Land. The first one was dated 9 April 1984. The last one he mentioned expired on 31 August 2013. The leases between D1 and D2 has never included any part of the Subject Lot. 70.JAS states that in around 1982, there was an agreement between the School and D2 that the land between the Old Block and the nearby railway line, which included part of the Subject Lot, would be used as a playing field. The School subsequently understood that D2 paid rent to Ps for use of part or the entire Subject Lot from 1984 to about 1997. He also refers to some discussions with D2 about that use, and certain of the School’s early promotional materials relevant to that. 71.D2 started seeding the Subject Lot for grass in about September 1984. By 1986, the Subject Lot had been grassed and turfed. In 1986, a building to the northeast of the Old Block was erected on the School Land for the use of the kindergarten (the “Kindergarten Block”). 72.By 1986, a chain-link fence was built to fence up the playing field and the school area. It was built in order to prevent persons other than the School’s staff members, students and other persons permitted by the School from entering the playing field and the School’s premises. Since the construction of the fence, the only proper way to enter the playing field is through the entrance of the School, which is always guarded during school hours and locked after school hours. The fence remains in place to date. 73.In 1990, a new block between the Old Block and the Kindergarten Block was built as an additional building for the primary school (the “New Block”). In the same year, the School was renamed “Hong Lok Yuen International School”. 74.The School has been maintaining and improving the playing field. Kar Wo Fertilizer & Seed Company had been engaged from about 1998 to at least 2011 for that purpose. Various facilities have been built on the playing field in the meantime: planter concrete wall for flowerbeds in 2007[56], an outdoor playground in 2009[57], a combination house in 2010[58], and a sand pit for long jump also in 2010[59]. 75.As a result of those improvement, the playing field is now an extensive grassed area consisting of:
76.Since about 1986, the School has been using the playing field for physical education lessons and other extra-curricular activities such as open days, sports days, football competitions and various sports team practice. 77.At §56, JAS states that the School has been using the playing field openly, and Members of the 6 Tsos living nearby have been aware of such use. I repeat Ms Souza’s confirmation that the balance of that paragraph will not be relied upon. 78.The School has never paid any rent or fees for the use of the Subject Lot. 79.The Old Block was as said built in 1984. Over the years, there have been no complaint about its encroachment upon the Subject Lot. If the School is now ordered to deliver vacant possession of the Subject Lot to Ps, the Old Block will have to be demolished or re-built. 80.The extensive playing field is a unique feature of the School, and is rare in Hong Kong. It is essential to the students’ development and the School’s future success. G.2.F. THE EVIDENCE OF MAN CHIU FOOK IN HCA 299 81.MCF/WS/299 was filed in reply to JAS/WS/299. Man Chiu Fook states that Man Mo Leung is not a member of any of the 6 Tsos. Ms Souza has accepted that. The contents of MCF/WS/299 otherwise comprise mostly Man Chiu Fook’s comments on JAS/WS/299, which are more akin to submissions as opposed to being factual. I have recorded above that he has referred therein to the 4/5/2001 Letter. Again, save its existence, I ignore his assertion that that letter “shows the acknowledgment of title by the School”. G.3. ACCEPTANCE OF THE FACTUAL EVIDENCE 82.Subject to the 2 Exceptions, all the statements for the factual witnesses have been adduced without cross-examination. 83.I have considered the facts contained therein. They have not been challenged. They are materially consistent with contemporaneous documents and photographs. They are not inherently improbable. There is no material inconsistency amongst themselves, even amongst the evidence and facts adduced by Ps and Ds. I accept them. I will consider their implications as necessary later. 84.I have italicized the word “facts” above. I make clear for avoidance of doubt that it is only the facts contained in the factual witness statement which I accept. Such facts do not include witnesses’ conclusions and opinions drawn from or expressed on those facts. As said, I will consider independently the implications of those facts which I accept. I may ultimately agree with some of the witnesses’ conclusions or opinions. But if so, that will be the result of my own consideration, but not as a result of their say-so. 85.I have set out the questions on which leave for expert evidence was granted. They relate to the operation of the Principle in Leung Kuen Fai. 86.Professor Baker and Professor Palmer have both been called. They have been cross-examined. 87.In the context of the present disputes, the most material difference between the two Professors relates to the nature of the interests which members of a tso have in tso properties. As Professor Palmer puts in at [47] of Palmer Report[60], that “clearly has implications for the way in which periods of adverse possession against a tso or tong is calculated”. 88.On that issue, Professor Palmer summarizes his views by way of Executive Summary at [7] of Palmer Report[61] as follows, with point (e) being the most important point in the context of the present case:
89.Professor Baker takes a different view. As he has stated in §29 of Baker Report[62]:
To the same effects is what Professor Baker has stated at [05] and [07] of the Joint Report[63], which I will come to below. 90.I will consider their opinions and state my findings when I consider Issue #5 below. 91.On mesne profit, Grandmax Report #1 and Grandmax Report #2 have been produced, which I will consider as appropriate below. 92.Although D1/1463 has not entered appearance, and D2 is no longer contending for the validity of the 2 Agreements, Issue #1 still warrants careful consideration. There are 2 reasons for this. 93.Firstly, Ps are seeking declaratory relief. It is not the normal practice of the court to make a declaration without a trial – Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022 §19/7/20. 94.More substantively, D2 has pleaded that at least P5 Tso pursuant to the 1st Agreement had granted to an “irrevocable contractual licence to Mr. Alex Wai to occupy the Subject Lot” who assigned the same to D2 under the 2nd Agreement. Referring to Ps’ unity in possession as co-owner of the Subject Lot, Mr Chan reminded this Court that any one of them had the capacity to grant a valid licence or lease over the Subject Lot. Mr Man acknowledges[64] that, for the duration when the licence remained valid, D2’s possession would not be adverse and time not begin to run. The time when the 2 Agreements became invalid hence will have an impact on D2’s claim of adverse possession. 95.Section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance, in addition to providing for the appointment of managers and the approval of such appointments, stipulates that a manager upon approval and registration:
96.In Light Ocean Investments Ltd v Enway Development Ltd [1994] 3 HKC 31, Litton JA observed[66] that section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance governs the right of sale of tso land, and that every sale of tso land effected by the manager is subject to the consent of the Land Officer, without which any agreement for sale entered into by the manager can, at best, only be a conditional sale and cannot pass a good title. Nazareth JA observed[67] that consent of the Land Officer is on the plain meaning of section 15 necessary, and cannot be dismissed as surplusage or insignificant given the object of the legislation. That object was explained by Litton JA[68], citing the views of Briggs J in Lai Chi Kok Amusement Park Co Ltd (No 2) v Tsang Tin-sun [1966] HKLR 124, 130, as follows:
97.Where there are more than one managers, they must act unanimously – Tang Kam Wah v Tang Ming Yat (HCA 10141/1998, 26 November 2002) per Chu J (as the Vice President then was) at §72. Absence of such unanimous consent renders the instrument or agreement void – Tsang Shu Wo v Person Unknown in Occupation of Lot [2020] 1 HKLRD 1234, §§59 to 60. 98.According to the evidence, Man Chung Yiu was at the time when the 1st Agreement was executed one of the surviving managers of P1 Tso to P4 Tso, and P6 Tso. He was not one of the Vendors. 99.It is Man King Chuen’s evidence that no consent had been given by Man Chung Yiu or all members of the 6 Tsos for the Vendors, whether before or after the execution of the 1st Agreement, to enter into the same. 100.His evidence that Man Chung Yiu had not given his consent is consistent with the terms of the 1st Agreement, and in particular Clauses 3 and 4(iii) thereof, which I have reproduced above. 101.In the absence of Man Chung Yiu’s consent, and for this reason only, the 1st Agreement could not have been binding upon Ps, and could not have passed any title to Alex Wai. 102.The above however did not render the 1st Agreement void ad initio. Man Chung Yiu could subsequently join in the conveyance (though on the evidence he never did). Title could still have passed. Indeed, that was specifically contemplated by the parties – see Clause 4(iii) of the 1st Agreement. 103.The evidence in my view also establishes that section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance had never been complied with. In particular, the 1st Agreement was not executed in the presence of and attested by the Secretary for Home Affairs, and that no consent[69] of the same had been obtained from the Secretary for Home Affairs. 104.But again, such non-compliances did not render the 1st Agreement void ad initio. As observed by Huggins J in Lai Chi Kok Amusement Park at p.140, the intention and effect of requiring execution and attestation of the instrument in the presence of the Land Officer was to provide a method of conclusive proof (1) that the Land Officer had in fact consented to the disposition and (2) the identification of the Land Officer concerned. In Light Ocean Investments, as noted above, the absence of such consent rendered the sale a conditional one, but that if consent were to be obtained subsequently, title could still be passed[70]. I do not accept Mr Man’s submissions to the contrary[71]. 105.The evidence in my view establishes that the 1st Agreement has been frustrated. As observed by Liu JA in Chan Choy Fong v Secretary for Home Affairs [1998] 1 HKLRD 431 at 438I-J, a manager is chosen by a tso for the confidence reposed in him. The relationship is a personal one. Personal service is expected. The authority conferred upon a manager to so act terminates upon the manager’s death. 106.All the Vendors had by 1987 died (one in 1982, the other in 1985, and the last one in 1987). The 1st Agreement had been frustrated latest by then. 107.The evidence also supports the inference that the 1st Agreement had been abandoned sub silentio – see Chitty on Contracts (34th Ed.) at §25-029 and Paal Wilson v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854 at p.924. There had been long inactivity after its execution. The non-compliance of section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance had not been rectified. No subsequent consent from the Secretary for Home Affairs had been obtained. The P6 Leases were (or at least purportedly) granted in 1984 and 1985 (after the death of one of the 3 Vendors). The transaction had remained uncompleted in 1987 when all the Vendors had died. In my view, the clear inference is that the 1st Agreement had been abandoned latest by 1987 when all the Vendors died. H.4. WHETHER ALEX WAI’S CAPACITY TO COMPLETE LAPSED 108.Alex Wai died on 28 December 1991. It is true that there has been a very long lapse of time since then, and no grant of representation has been made in respect of his estate. However, Alex Wai’s role as a purchaser is not a personal one, as in the case of the Vendors in their capacity as managers. No reason has been put forward suggesting why, if representation is now sought and granted, the personal representative may not, ignoring for this purpose all other problems discussed above, seek the performance of the 1st Agreement. I am therefore not persuaded that Alex Wai’s capacity to complete has lapsed. I would rather treat his death and absence of application for grant of representation as evidence of abandonment. H.5. WHETHER RESCISSION AND TERMINATION 109.The theory of rescission and termination is premised upon the alleged breach by Alex Wai of Clause 8 of the 1st Agreement in having failed to pay for the costs and expenses of and incidental to the obtaining of consent of the District Officer, so that Alex Wai had committed a repudiatory breach of the 1st Agreement, which breach was accepted by Ps upon issue and service of the Writ in HCA 1463. 110.I accept Mr Man’s submissions that there is no evidence showing that an application for consent had actually been made, so that there were outstanding costs and expenses to be settled, and which Alex Wai had failed to pay. 111.It should also be noted that it is Ps’ case that whether before or afterwards, Man Chung Yiu had never given his consent to the sale and purchase. That being the case, the inherent probability is that no application had been made to the District Officer for consent. It would have been futile to do so. If no application for consent had been made, there would have been no costs and expenses for Alex Wai to defray. 112.In my view, the pleading point made by Mr Chan in the course of his oral closing (about condition precedent being implied according to Order 18 rule 7) adds nothing to this claim. 113.I am not satisfied that Ps have established any repudiatory breach on the part of Alex Wai as alleged. 114.Further, this limb of Ps’ case is premised upon the extancy of the 1st Agreement up till the issue of the Writ in HCA 1463, so that the option had till then remained open for Ps to choose not to accept the alleged repudiatory breach but to hold Alex Wai to the deal. 115.That premise is inconsistent with my views expressed above, that the 1st Agreement had been frustrated and abandoned by 1987 at the latest when all the Vendors passed away. The 1st Agreement was no longer extant afterwards. In other words, upon my conclusions above on frustration and abandonment, this alternative limb of Ps’ claim based on rescission and termination is simply not engaged. 116.My conclusion on this sub-issue however does not affect my view on the overall unenforceabiliy of the 1st Agreement. As Mr Chan has submitted[72], which I accept, the overall circumstances are such that the 1st Agreement can no longer be performed even without the express termination of the same by Ps. 117.For the reasons set out above, my conclusions on Issue #1 and all its sub-issues are as follows. 118.In relation to Issue #1(i), I am not inclined to declare the 1st Agreement null and void. The 1st Agreement could have been, at best or worst, a conditional one. A better way to describe the situation is to say that the 1st Agreement has never validly passed any title in the Subject Lot to Alex Wai. 119.In relation to Issue #1(ii), I do not accept that the evidence establishes any repudiatory breach as alleged. The premise upon which termination and rescission are contended for is in any event inconsistent with the other conclusions which I have reached. 120.In relation to Issue #1(iii), I find that the 1st Agreement has been frustrated, and had been frustrated by 1987 latest. 121.In relation to Issue #1(iv), and for the reasons set out above, I answer it in the negative. 122.In relation to Issue #1(v), I find that the 1st Agreement has been abandoned, and had been abandoned by 1987 latest. 123.I will set out the consequential Declarations that I am prepared to give at the end of this Judgment. 124.As explained above,the 2nd Agreement was in effect a sub-sale of the 3/4th Shares by Alex Wai to D2. Whether Alex Wai had the title or interest to do so was dependent upon the validity of the 1st Agreement. 125.Under section 2 of the Land Registration Ordinance, Cap 128, only those classes of instruments and judgments stipulated therein by which “any parcels of ground, tenements, or premises in Hong Kong many be affected” could be registered. 126.This Court has the inherent jurisdiction to vacate the registration or purported registration of any instrument in the Land Registry which does not affect or no longer affect lands – Wong Kum Chi v Lee Tit Ying [2003] 1 HKLRD 594 at §16 (and the authorities cited therein). 127.Given my conclusions on Issue #1, the 2 Agreements had by the time when the Writ in HCA 1463 was issued ceased to, and in any event by now no longer, affect the Subject Lot. 128.I order that their registration be vacated. 129.Issue #3 is discussed in this section without reference to the Principle in Leung Kuen Fai, which will be discussed in Section L below. J.1. THE RELEVANT GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON ADVERSE POSSESSION 130.The relevant sections in the Limitation Ordinance are sections 7(2) (no action be brought to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued), 8(1) (accrual of right of action through dispossession or discontinuation of possession), 13(1) (no accrual of right of action unless the land is in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run (labelled[73] as “adverse possession”)), and 17 (extinction of title upon expiration of period). 131.A person claiming adverse possession has to prove 2 elements: (i) factual possession; and (ii) the requisite intention to possess (animus possidendi). They are questions of fact. 132.What they entail, and how the evidence should be approached, have been explained and summarized in many cases, which include,as cited to me, Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 452at p.470-471, Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai & Anor (No 2) (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 55 at 68E to 70B, Pye (2003) at p.436-437, Incorporated Owners of San Po Kong Mansion v Shine Empire Ltd (2007) 10 HKCFAR 588 at §7, Cheung Kwong Yuen at §11, Tsang Foo Keung v Chu Jim Mi Jimmy [2017] 3 HKC 527 at §§2.6 and 2.7, Lau Kwai Ping Joyce, the Executrix of the estate of Tsang Fung Ying (deceased) v Fulland International Limited [2020] HKCFI 1501 at §§13-33, and Jourdan and Radley-Gardner on Adverse Possession (2nd Ed.) §§7-37, 7-39, 7-127, 9-18 to 9-19, 9-23 to 9-24, 13-04, 13-09 to 13-11, 13-23 to 13-29, 13-49 and 13-59. I do not believe another summary of the general principles is called for. 133.On the facts of this case, there are specific aspects of the law on adverse possession that are in issue: and in particular whether “adverse” is an element of adverse possession, occupation by licencees or tenants, occupation under mistaken belief that there was a right to occupy, and the Principle in Leung Kuen Fai. I will address those specific issues in turn below. 134.D1’s case relates to Portions B and C only. 135.I have set out above the unchallenged evidence of Li and JAS. I point in particular to JAS’s unchallenged evidence about the seeding of the Subject Lot in about September 1984, the construction of the Old Block (in 1984), Kindergarten Block (in 1986) and the New Block (in 1990) on adjoining or adjacent land, the construction of a chain-link fence in 1986 around the playing field and the school area (supported by the relevant aerial photograph[74]) to prevent unauthorized entrance, the use of Portions B and C since about that time as playing field and outdoor playground, and the engagement of various contractors over the years to maintain and to build on the playing field various facilities (including planter concrete wall for flowerbeds, an outdoor playground, a combination house, and a sand pit for long jump[75]). His evidence is amply and cogently supported by the aerial photographs between 1984 and 2010[76], and all the contemporaneous documents which he has produced (which include the discussions between D1 and D2 in 1984 on the use of the Portions B and C[77], the School’s early promotional materials in 1983[78], the School’s Board meetings[79], and photographs of the Playground and the activities held thereon[80]). 136.The various leases between April 1984 and August 2017 have been produced[81]. The Subject Lot did not form part of the leases. 137.Mr Chan submits[82] that neither the School nor D2 has given any evidence on the up-to-date position of the landlord and tenant relationship between them, and that this Court could only conclude that the tenancy held by the School has expired on 31 August 2013. Ds have in fact adduced evidence in this regard. In Li/WS/299 at §18, Li says that since the First Lease, “the School Land has all along until today’s date been leased to [D1]”. An extension letter signed by D1 and D2 dated 18 December 2013 extending the preceding lease to 31 August 2017 has also been produced[83]. I note also that according to §14 of the Summary of Undisputed Facts dated 3 November 2022, the “School Land has been leased by D2 to D1 since 1 September 1983” (emphasis added). 138.To the extent shown by the evidence discussed above, I find that D1 has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of Portions B and C since 1984. I also find that D1’s possession, occupation and use of Portions B and C have been to the exclusion of all others (apart from D2 which I will next discuss), including Ps. 139.Has D1 also excluded D2? 140.In the context of adverse possession, the factual possession has to be exclusive physical possession or control. As explained in Powell v McFarlane at p.470-471:
141.The issue hence becomes this, whether the occupation, possession and use by D1 of Portions B and C has been exclusive also of D2 so as to qualifies as sufficient factual possession for the purpose of adverse possession. 142.On the nature of D1’s occupation of Portions B and C and the legal consequences arising, all three parties’ stances differ:
J.2.A. THE DOCTRINE OF ENCROACHMENT APPLICABLE TO A TENANT 143.The doctrine of encroachment has application both in cases involving encroachment upon the landlord’s land beyond the boundary of the demised land, and encroachment upon land which belongs to a third party. Its operation is different in each of the two cases. We are only concerned with the latter scenario. 144.As explained by Ribeiro PJ in Secretary for Justice v Chau Ka Chik Tso(2011) 14 HKCFAR 889 at §20:
145.The fact that the landlord was not aware of the encroachment during the limitation period might not prevent him from acquiring possessory title by virtue of the doctrine upon expiry of the limitation period – Tower Hamlets LBC v Barrett[2006] 1 P & C.R. 9 at §84. 146.That presumption is a rebuttable one. As observed by Lord Scott of Foscote NPJ in Chau Ka Chik Tso at §108, the presumption “can be rebutted by evidence that the tenant intended to occupy the encroached-upon land not simply as tenant but as owner.”[86] 147.Whether the presumption has been rebutted is a factual issue. In Lau Wing Hong v Wong Wor Hung [2006] 4 HKLRD 671, Recorder McCoy SC noted that the lessor wholly disclaimed any interest, right or entitlement to the encroachments, that he “positively washed his hands of the whole issue”, that he did not claim the encroachments, expressly disclaimed them, and disassociated himself from any interest in the encroachments to his land. The learned Recorder further referred to Stackhouse v Wade (1950) 26 MPR 312, wherein Richards CJ of the New Brunswick Supreme Court concluded, which conclusion the learned Recorded observed to be in accordance with A-G v Tomline (No 3) (1880) LR 15 Ch D 150(CA), that the presumption may be rebutted where a lease is renewed and the landlord does not include the encroachment in the new lease. That was what happened in Lau Wing Hong. On the facts before him, the learned Recorder held that the presumption had been rebutted. 148.Tomline was a case involving a copyhold tenement. The Court of Appeal gave no opinion as to whether the doctrine of encroachment could apply to an encroachment acquired by a copyhold tenant, but held that even if it did, the presumption had on the facts of that case been rebutted. Cotton LJ in this regard observed at p.160 that:
J.2.B. OCCUPATION AS A LICENSEE – THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 149.As explained in Jourdan at §§7-127 to 128: “7-127 …if a person takes possession by virtue of a licence granted by another, it is the licensor who is treated as being in possession …
150.Mr Chan submits[88], which I accept, that for the same reason, if a person should claim that he is in occupation by virtue of a right under a license he does not have the necessary intention to possess for the purpose of claiming adverse possession. 151.In Sze To Chun Keung, the squatter came into possession of a piece of land. The Crown, under the mistaken belief that the land was crown land, granted the squatter a permit entitling him to occupy the same. The mistake was subsequently discovered. The land was in fact privately owned. The licence was cancelled. The squatter however remained in possession. The actual owners were not aware of those arrangements between the Crown and the squatter. They subsequently commenced action to evict the squatter. The squatter sought to plead by amendment a defence based on adverse possession. Interlocutory applications for striking out and amendments were made. The appeal ultimately reached the Privy Council. The Privy Council was of the opinion that the proposed defence was an arguable one. Lord Hoffmann observed that the plaintiffs had been dispossessed when the squatter went into possession. On the effects of the permit whilst extant for the purpose of the doctrine of adverse possession, His Lordship observed at p1235 E-G that:
J.2.C. EVIDENCE ON THE NATURE OF D1’S OCCUPATION 152.D1 first came into occupation of the School Land under the First Lease as the tenant of D2. The First Lease, though dated 9 April 1984, commenced on 1 September 1983. 153.The First Lease did not cover Portions B and C. 154.It may be recalled that not long before the First Lease, in December 1982, D2 entered into the 2nd Agreement whereby Alex Wai agreed to sub-sell to it the 3/4th Shares. It may further be recalled that under Clause 4(viii) of the 1st Agreement, Alex Wai “shall be entitled to possession (where this is physically possible)”. 155.Based on the 2nd Agreement, D2 must have expected to become owner of a substantial interest in the Subject Lot, and be able to decide its use. 156.At the early stage when D1 started to occupy the School Land, whether it could also occupy Portions B and C, and if so their uses, had not been decided. 157.As recorded in a document entitled “MEMORANDUM concerning the proposal for joint usage of the school playing field” dated 23 March 1984[89] prepared by D1:
158.According to a letter also of 23 March 1984[91] from Mr John Bent (the School’s then Chairman of Governors) to Mr Clifford Wong, the School expressed its poor reaction to the proposal. It stated that “As a result of assurances received from you in 1982 and subsequently regarding the provision of a playing field, the Board of Governors have had no hesitation in advising parents both verbally and by means of marketing literature as to the early provision of a school playing field.” It was further said that “[u]nrestricted access to a playing field even if it is not adjacent to the school would be far preferable.” 159.D2 replied on 5 April 1984[92]. Amongst other things, it was said that:
160.Given D2’s then recent execution of the 2nd Agreement, and given those records, it is quite clear that the School first came into occupation of Portions B and C upon the agreement and assurances of D2, and that it started to occupy and use the same with D2’s consent and permission. D2 was also in the position to decide on the use of the land to be provided, and whether the School’s use of it was going to be exclusive. The seeding was also intended to be done by D2. 161.According to the minutes of the School’s Board of Governors meeting on 3 May 1984[93], there was suggestion that rather to have any binding agreement with D2 on the use of the “golf driving range/playing field”, it might be better to have one based more on trust. There were further discussions during that meeting as to whether the Adventure Playground should be financed by the School or built by D2. 162.This other way to look at it is this. The evidence is against any conclusion that D1 entered into possession of Portions B and C in its own right as owner. 163.It is apparently that the driving range proposal ultimately did not go ahead. It is not clear why the Playground subsequently became used by the School’s exclusively. 164.But the fact that the Playground has since certain stage become used by the School exclusively cannot alter the fact that it was first allowed into occupation of Portions B and C by D2 and with its consent and permission. 165.There is also no evidence that that initial consent by D2 has at any time been withdrawn. 166.The evidence is not clear as to whether the Playground was fenced off at the School’s costs. Ms Souza at §41.d. of her written closing submits that it was “apparently financed by the School alone”. The evidence is by no means clear. If Ms Souza is relying on the Board minutes of 3 May 1984[94], it should be noted that the relevant discussion during that meeting concerned the Adventure Playground only, but not the entire Playground, as she apparently suggests. 167.The evidence does suggest that the School had been maintaining the Playground at its own costs. But given its exclusive use of the same, that is at best equivocal as to whether it was occupying with D2’s permission or in its (D1’s) own right. 168.Ms Souza further relies on the Board meetings in early 2001 during which the School explored the idea of buying Portions B and C from the paper owners. Those discussions in my view are again equivocal, and does not suggest any revocation of consent by D2. 169.On the other hand, there is the exchange between Ps’ legal advisers and the School in August 2009:
170.Ms Souza relies on Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2007] 2 P&CR 17 §34 for the proposition thatin claims of adverse possession by licensors through their licensee, there must be proof of fees or rent payable under the licence. As Ms Souza has fairly pointed out[97], as discussed in Jourdan at §17-129, it is doubtful whether the payment of fees should always be determinative in this context. I do not accept that it is. If it were intended to be propounded as a rule of law, I respectfully decline to follow it. 171.On the evidence, I accept Mr Man’s submissions[98] that Portions B and C have been used by D1 with D2’s permission given separately from the leases of School Land. There was no encroachment of any nature which triggers the presumption (to the effect that Portions B and C were presumed to be intended to be annexed to the demised School Land). 172.I note that Portions B and C have never been added to the School Land upon the repeated renewals of the First Lease. That is perfectly consistent with the conclusion reached above. Portions B and C have not been occupied as an addition to the School Land. The facts in Lau Wing Hong or Tomline are very different from those in the present case. The facts in Sze To Chun Keung are much closer. Irrespective of whether D2 actually had the interest to grant D1 any licence or permit to occupy Portions B and C, similar to the position of the Crown in Sze To Chun Keung, and borrowing the words of Lord Hoffmann in that case, “the effect of the permit was that [D1] possessed on behalf of [D2]. By accepting the benefit of the permit, [it] became estopped from denying that [D2] had the right to allow [it] to occupy.” The doctrine of encroachment has no application. 173.Insofar as Mr Chan seeking to take a pleading point to the effect that that D2’s case in the regard has not been pleaded, I refer to §15 of D2/A-D&C/299 and disagree. With particular reference to Particulars (c)(ii) under §15 of D2/A-D&C/299, I am of the view that the facts in support of a licence by D2 to D1 to use and occupy Portions B and C have been sufficiently pleaded. J.2.D. CONCLUSION OF D1’S FACTUAL POSSESSION 174.For the reasons set out above, I find and conclude on the evidence that whilst D1’s possession, occupation and use of Portions B and C have since 1984 been exclusive of everyone else, they have not been exclusive of D2. D1 has been occupying the same upon D2’s agreement and permission. I find that that is in effect a license arrangement. D1’s possession, occupation and use of the same are to be viewed in such light. D1 has not“been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so”. 175.I conclude also that the doctrine of encroachment has no application. J.3. D1’S INTENTION TO POSSESS 176.For the same reasons as I have given in Sections J.2. to J.2.c. above, I find and conclude that D1 has been occupying Portions B and C upon D2’s agreement and permission. D1 lacks the requisite intention to possess for the purpose of claiming adverse possession. It lacks the requisite “intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow”[99], or the “intention to occupy and use the land as one’s own” or “using the land in the way one would expect him to use it if he were the true owner”[100]. J.4. WHETHER THE LIMITATION PERIOD HAS EXPIRED 177.For the above reasons, D1’s claim for adverse possession in its own right must fail, irrespective of the issue as to whether the relevant limitation period has expired. This sub-issue is not engaged. However, if necessary, I will adopt the same discussion as I will set out in Section K.3. below. 178.Similar to Issue #3 above, Issue #4 is discussed in this section also without reference to the Principle in Leung Kuen Fai, which will be discussed in Section L below. 179.I have set out the material clauses of the 2 Agreements. I reiterate for this purpose in particular Clause 4(viii) of the 1st Agreement, which stipulated that “The Purchaser shall be entitled to possession (where this is physically possible) …” 180.I find that D2 came to take possession of the Subject Lot as a result of the 2 Agreements and in anticipation of their performance. 181.This context supports the views that D2, anticipating to be the owner of the Subject Lot, would start to use the land in advance of completion, and that it would immediately put the Subject Lot to use as an owner would. 182.The subsequent conduct of D2 is consistent with and support the above. The Subject Lot was land-locked by the HLY Land. It has in effect been used for the purpose of the development of Hong Lok Yuen. 183.I reiterate my findings in respect of the permission given by D2 to HLY Management and then later Horticulture Company to occupy and use Portion A. 184.In respect of Portions B and C, I have found and concluded above that whilst D1’s possession, occupation and use of the same have since 1984 been uninterrupted and exclusive of everyone else, they have not been exclusive of D2. I have also found on the evidence that D1 has been occupying the same upon D2’s agreement and permission, by virtue of what is in effect a license granted by D2 to D1. 185.D1’s “possession was that of the person who gave the permission”[101], namely D2. I apply also Sze To Chun Keung. 186.From those findings, I find and reach the conclusion that D2 has through D1 been in exclusive and uninterrupted possession of Portions B and C since 1984. 187.That leaves Portion A. 188.At §48 of his written closing, Mr Chan points to §10 of Li/WS/299[102] and submits that Li “did not attempt to say for how long before 2004, Portion A of the land had been so used by HLY Management. There is no other evidence to show that D2 was in possession of Portion A. Accordingly, D2 failed to show that Portion A had been in adverse possession for more than 12 years before the writ in [HCA 299]”. 189.I note however that there is in fact other evidence on the point:
190.It is also important and relevant to note, as submitted by Mr Man which I accept,that th eSubject Lot is surrounded and land-locked by other lands owned by D2. According to Li[106], and supported by Annexure A and the number of maps he has produced[107], the Subject Lot is enclosed by HLY Land, that the HLY Land has been fenced off since sometime in or before 1982 by metal fences, and that electric fences were further installed at certain parts in around 2011 to enhance security. The Subject Lot has in practice been incorporated into, and has been used as, part of the Hong Lok Yuen development that was planned and developed by D2. 191.I find on the evidence that the occupation of Portion A has been continuous, uninterrupted and exclusive. 192.On the evidence, I find that D2 has through initially HLY Management and then later Horticulture Company (upon its incorporation in 2004) been in exclusive and uninterrupted possession of Portion A since 1990. K.2. D2’S INTENTION TO POSSESS K.2.A. COMING INTO POSSESSION AS A RESULT OF THE 2 AGREEMENTS 193.I have set out above D2’s pleaded case in HCA 299. I have also summarized above the principal basis of Ps’ case against D2 on the question of animus possidendi, which is that D2’s averments in D2/RRA-Def/1463 are inconsistent with any intention to possess in any claim for adverse possession of the Subject Lot. Mr Chan submits[108] that:
194.On the evidence, I have found that D2 indeed came to take possession of the Subject Lot as a result of the 2 Agreements and in anticipation of their performance. 195.As submitted by Mr Chan[109], a purchaser entering into occupation under an uncompleted sale and purchase agreement before the full payment of the purchase price could only do so as a licencee of the vendor. 196.That in fact is also D2’s pleaded position. See §12 of D2/A-D&C/299 and Clause 4(viii) of the 1st Agreement which I have set out above. 197.Relevant to §12 of D2/A-D&C/299 I observe also this. I reiterate the evidence that Man Chung Yiu was at the time when the 1st Agreement was executed one of the surviving managers of P1 Tso to P4 Tso and P6 Tso, but that he was not one of the Vendors. What D2 has pleaded in §12 of D2/A-D&C/299 (with emphasis added, that “by clause 4(viii) of the 1st Agreement, at least one tenant in common, i.e. [the P5 Tso], had granted an irrevocable contractual licence to Mr. Alex Wai to occupy the Subject Lot”) should be understood against that evidence. It is not D2’s pleaded case that the P5 Tso had separately granted any licence to Alex Wai. To the extent of Mr Chan submitting that that was so[110], I do not accept that. 198.I have found that the 1st Agreement was not void ad initio, but that it was frustrated and abandoned by 1987 latest. 199.Flowing from those findings, I find that any interest D1 had in the Subject Lot that might have arisen from the 2 Agreements, including any license by Clause 4(viii) of the 1st Agreement, ceased to exist by or came to an end in 1987 latest. 200.In the meantime, there were the P6 Leases. I have set out above D2’s pleaded case in respect of the P6 Leases, and how Ps say they may affect Ds’ claim for adverse possession. 201.I accept that the P6 Leases were meant to have been granted. It is evidenced by 3 receipts for payment of rent, covering the periods from 1 January 1984 to 31 December 1984, and from 28 March 1985 to 30 December 1997. 202.P6 is one of the tenants in common. The concept of unity of possession was explained by Lord Hope in Pye (2003) at §70 as follows:
203.Hence, even though the other tenants in common had not joined in, P6 could in law grant the P6 Leases itself. 204.Whilst I have accepted that the P6 Leases were meant to have been granted, there are some niceties in law as to whether they had been validly granted, in terms of whether the consent of the authority under section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance had been obtained. In Man Ping Nam v Man Mei Kwan (CACV 193/2002, 11 December 2002), Le Pichon JA observed obiter with Stone J agreeing that letting of land did not require the consent of the Land Officer. Cheung JA however in a dissenting judgment took the contrary view. In Tang Man Kit v Hip Hing Timber Co Ltd [2003] 4 HKC 278, the Court of Appeal held that renting of land did not require such consent, but that decision was held by the Court of Final Appeal on appeal[111] as being a nullity. In Tang Man Kit v Hip Hing Timber Co Ltd (rehearing) (CACV 137/2012, 13 May 2005), Cheung JA at §79 maintained his dissenting view expressed in Man Ping Nam, but accepted that the majority in Man Ping Nam prevailed as a matter of legal precedence. 205.In the end, I accept Mr Chan’s submission[112] that the better view is that there is no need for a manager of a Tso to get the consent of the authority for letting the property of the Tso. 206.There are in any event Mr Chan’s further submissions that even if the P6 Leases were for any reasons not legally valid, there is no reason not to conclude that at least the underlying agreement would have amounted to a licence agreement, so that the right on the part of P6 to evict D2 would not have accrued until 31 December 1997. I see clear force in these submissions, which I accept. 207.On the evidence before this Court, the P6 Leases expired in the end of 1997. I refer in particular to the notice to quit of 7 October 1997[113] served upon D2 by Messrs Lawrence Ong & Chung (who claimed to be “instructed by [the Subject Lot’s] owners”). 208.However, D2 did not quit, and possession of the Subject Lot was not surrendered. 209.Upon the expiry of the P6 Leases, and as submitted by Mr Man which I accept, D2 became in effect an overholding tenant. 210.The net result of the above is that from early 1998, D2 remained in possession of the Subject Lot as an overholding tenant, but with a mistaken belief arising from the 2 Agreements as to its title or interest. 211.The issue then is this: what the effects if any of such a mistaken belief has upon D2’s intention to possess. K.2.C. MISTAKEN BELIEF – CHEUNG KWONG YUEN 212.In Cheung Kwong Yuen, Kwan JA held at §§11 that there is no rule of law that the elements requisite to a claim of adverse possession cannot be established for a person who occupied the trespassed land with a mistaken belief of their title or status as tenant. “Adverse” is not an element of adverse possession. Her Ladyship’s observation at §§10 to 14 are important in this regard, which I shall cite in full:
213.In the earlier case of Ho Hang-wan v Ma Ting-cheung [1990] 1 HKLR 649, the issue was whether the belief by the occupier that she had a licence to occupy from the landowner which had since without his knowledge been terminated in law upon the subsequent death of the landlord negatived the occupier’s animus possidendi. The Court of Appeal held that the claimant’s possession after the death of the landlord was certain and unequivocal, and attributable to no continuing licence, and that the “mental reservations sought to be attributed to her as a hypothetical honest or reasonable licensee”[114]was not effective to negative animus possidendi. 214.In Ofulue v Bossert [2009] Ch 1 Arden LJ observed at §63 that:
215.That view was endorsed and reiterated by the House of Lords on appeal[115], wherein Lord Neuberger observed at §67 that:
216.As Mr Man has set out at §65 of his written closing, which cases cited therein I have considered, Cheung Kwong Yuen has been followed and applied in a number of subsequent cases, which include Pang Yiu Chor v Wong Wai Leung [2017] 4 HKLRD 761,per Anthony Chan J at §§47-54, Ng Yuk Pui Kelly v Dung Wai Man [2019] HKCFI 210, per L Chan J at §§485-487, and Lee Yin Mui Catherine v Lau Sau Kong John [2019] HKCFI 2462, per Deputy Judge Leung at §22. 217.I have considered Wong Tak Yue:
218.With the above in mind, I come back to the facts. 219.As I have said, from the outset, D2 took possession in anticipation of the completion of the 2 Agreements. In that context, D2 is expected to possess and use the Subject Lot as an owner would. Its subsequent conduct has been consistent with that. 220.As suggested in Jourdan at §13-08:
221.Between 1984 and 1997 when the P6 Leases were extant, D2 remained in possession of the Subject Lot as a tenant having exclusive possession of the same. 222.After the expiry of the P6 Leases, D2 remained in possession in effect as an overholding tenant who used to have exclusive possession under the P6 Leases. 223.This feature of the present case distinguishes it from Cheung Chun Yan v Chan Man Kwong (unrep., CACV 268/2003 12 February 2004). I accept Mr Man’s submissions[116] in this regard. 224.Any mistaken belief or mental reservations which the 2 Agreements had given rise, whilst a relevant factor, in my view does not negative D2’s intention to possess. If anything, any belief on D2’s part that it would be the future owner, though mistaken since 1987 latest, would have reinforced its intention, in its own name and on its own behalf, to exclude the world at large. 225.All the above, together with the objective evidence of possession, occupation and use by D1, HLY Management and Horticulture Company which D2 permitted, in my view support the conclusion that D2’s intention to possess has been established. K.2.E. CONCLUSION ON INTENTION TO POSSESS 226.For the above reasons, and as analyzed, I make the factual finding that as from early 1998 upon the expiry of the P6 Leases, D2 had the animus possidendi required for its claim for adverse possession. 227.The P6 Leases expired on 31 December 1997. The cause of action for possession therefore accrued after July 1991. The applicable limitation period is hence 12 years[117] from January 1998, which had expired by the time when HCA 299 was commenced on 23 February 2011. L.1. THE EFFECTS AND REASONING OF LEUNG KUEN FAI 228.I first of all consider the effects and reasoning of Leung Kuen Fai. 229.In that case Deputy Judge Johnson Lam (as the Permanent Judge then was) considered the application of the doctrine of adverse possession to land registered in the name of a tso. 230.The learned Deputy Judge first of all considered the nature of a tso and the interest of its members. He considered a number of authorities, which included Chu Tak-hing & Ors v Chu Chan Cheung-kiu & Ors [1968] HKLR 542, Tang Kai-chung & Anor v Tang Chik-shang & Ors [1970] HKLR 276, Kan Fat-tat v Kan Yin-tat [1987] HKLR 516 and Tang Yau Yi Tong & Anor v Tang Mou Shau Tso & Ors [1996] 2 HKLR 212. Of importance are the following observations of Mills-Owens J in Tang Kai-chung at pp.279 to 280, which the learned Deputy Judge cited at §16, that:
231.From those authorities, the learned Deputy Judge derived, inter alia, the following propositions (§24):
232.Specifically in relation to the positon of existing members, and on the authorities cited before him, the learned Deputy Judge observed at §32 that it is obvious that the existing members of the tso have beneficial interests in the tso, and that such interests come within the meaning of equitable interest in land in section 10(1) of the Limitation Ordinance. 233.The learned Deputy Judge then considered the Limitation Ordinance, and in particular sections 2, 7, 10, 20 and 22 thereof. He held at §§43 to 44 that members of a tso do not need to claim through the managers in seeking to recover the tso land against strangers. It follows that on the question of limitation, the interests of the members have to be considered independently from the rights of the managers. Further, even amongst members of the tso, limitation periods could be different for different members since one does not claim through another. 234.The learned Deputy Judge then held at §§45 and 46 of the judgment that:
235.For ease of reference, I set out the relevant parts of sections 10 and 22(1) of the Limitation Ordinance:
L.2. LEAVE TO ADDUCE EXPERT EVIDENCE 236.As said, leave for expert evidence was granted by Recorder Yvonne Cheng SC on the CCL Questions after a contested hearing. The main reasons for the learned Recorder’s decision are:
237.Mr Man effectively accepts that on the facts of the present case, and given in particular the birth of the 6 Descendants, if this Court is to apply the Principle in Leung Kuen Fai, Ds would not have a limitation defence[119]. Mr Man however submits that this Court should not apply Leung Kuen Fai. He submits that Leung Kuen Fai was the result of the learned Deputy Judge having done his best he could without the assistance of any expert assistance to reach a view on the issue, basing the decision as the learned Deputy Judge did on foreign trust concepts. Given the evidence of Professor Palmer now before this Court, which Mr Man submits should be preferred to that of Professor Baker’s, and despite previous authorities suggesting otherwise, Mr Man invites this Court to accept the following propositions[120]:
238.Mr Chan’s submissions on Leung Kuen Fai may be summarized as follows:
239.Whilst section 13 of the New Territories Ordinance says that “the court shall have power to”, the Courts are in fact mandated to and must recognise and enforce in any proceedings in relation to land in the New Territories any Chinese custom or customary right affecting such land. 240.Due mainly to the reasons that judges and lawyers might not have been formally trained in respect of such Chinese law and custom, and the possibility of their local variance and changes over time, a practice has developed over the years allowing such Chinese law and custom to be proved by expert witnesses. 241.The development of such a practice however does not affect the status of Chinese law and custom as being part of the domestic law of Hong Kong on particulars areas of the law and on land in the New Territories. 242.Indeed, the practice of allowing expert witnesses to prove part of the domestic law has been described as being “a curious feature of our legal system” – per Roger JA in Chan Chiu Lam v Yau Yee Ping [2000] 3 HKLRD 443 at p.454F. 243.Hence, whilst Chinese law and custom can be proved by expert evidence, their proof is not confined to such. They can be subject-matters of judicial notice, and can also be ascertained from previous judicial decisions, textbooks and other sources in manner similar to the ascertaining of common law – see Wong Yu Shi v Wong Ying Kuen [1957] HKLR 420 at p.438, To Kan Chi v Pui Man Yau (HCMP 562/1992, 26 November 1998) at §4.7, and Tang Tak Sum v Tang Kai Chung [2015] 1 HKLRD 286 at §25. 244.Given the other means open to ascertain Chinese law and custom, this practice of calling expert witnesses for proof may perhaps be more important in the older days when reported decisions on them were scant and sketchy. 245.Parties are in dispute as to whether certain decided cases on Chinese law and custom constitute “binding” precedents on the question in issue, and whether expert evidence should be admissible on the same point if there are such “binding” precedents. Related to them, Mr Man has further argued that given the decision of Recorder Yvonne Cheng SC granting leave for the CCL Questions, the doctrine of issue estoppel precludes Ps from taking any point to the effect that consideration of Chinese law and custom evidence is precluded by previous binding decisions. 246.However, seeking to describe whether a prior decision as simply binding or not in a binary manner in my view over-simplifies the “curious feature of our legal system” in proving Chinese law and custom. 247.In Ng Kuk Mui v Yu Bik Fong Rebecca (HCAP 2/1997, 29 April 2000), a decision cited by the learned Recorder[121], Deputy Judge Carlye Chu (as the V-P then was) observed that:
248.When granting leave for the CCL Questions, and as is obvious from §39 of her Decision, the learned Recorder clearly had the considerations in Ng Kuk Mui in mind. At that stage of the proceedings, the learned Recorder was, in my respectful view, correct in doing so. 249.Now this Court has had the opportunity to consider the expert evidence filed and adduced. This Court is in a much better position to gauge the binding nature of any decided cases in the light of the nature of the issues in dispute, whether the issues involved are facts sensitive, and whether there is any local variance or evolution over time. 250.If not, and if the issue involved is a point of law which a higher court has considered and decided, I see no reason why the decision ought not to be a binding precedent on that point applying the usual stare decisis considerations. 251.The existence of that “curious feature of our legal system” may have to be considered when applying the rules on stare decisis, but it cannot alter them. 252.Relevant to the Principle in Leung Kuen Fai, issues have been raised as to the nature of a tso, the nature of members’ interest in the tso’s properties, and the relationship between its managers and members. D2 has not pleaded any local variance, or time evolution, or how that relationship is otherwise facts sensitive. 253.In my view, those issues as explored before this Court are matters of law. They are not facts-sensitive, at least not in the present case. I agree with Mr Chan in this regard. I am of the view that prior decisions on those same issues are proper judicial precedents. Otherwise, it would in effect become permissible for a Chinese law expert to be called in a subsequent case to overrule a previous judicial decision on a question of domestic law. That cannot be right. 254.In fact, Professor Palmer at [39] of Palmer Report[122] says that:
255.There is a long line of cases discussing, recognizing and confirming tso as a form of trust and the manager of the tso registered under section 15 of the New Territories Ordinanc eatrustee:Tang Kai-chung at pp.279-280 and 304-305 per Mills-Owens J, Secretary for Justice v To Kan Chi & Ors (2000) 3 HKCFAR 481 at p.486 wherein Bokhary and Chan JJA cited with approval the dicta of Mills-Owens J in Tang Kai-chung at pp.279-280[123], Kan Fat-tat per Deputy Judge Robert Tang (as he then was) at pp.533-534, Light Ocean Investments Ltd at p.36F-G per Nazareth JA, Tang Yau Yi Tong, where Liu JA at 215 E observed that “Manager, trustee and Sze lei are synonymous”, Tang Kam Wah at §68 per Chu J, Tang Che Tai & Ors v Tang On Kwai [2007] 5 HKC 277 at §43 per Deputy Judge To, Ho Kang Yau v Ho Chun Wing [2011] 3 HKLRD 491 at §§21-22 per Cheung JA, and Tsang Shu Wo at §45 per Anthony Chan J. 256.From the above list of cases, I highlight the following:
257.I have considered the submissions made in section F8 of Mr Man’s written closing seeking to distinguish those cases in that line on their facts or the issues, or that in some of them no expert evidence was called. 258.In respect of the Courts’ explanations on the nature of a tso and the relationship between the managers and members of a tso, I do not accept that the specific issues and facts before the Courts in those earlier cases affect their validity and authoritative. Borrowing the words of Cheung JA in Ho Kang Yau, there is not any room for challenge of those well-recognised principles. 259.Mr Man submits[126] in relation to the consideration of the Principle in Leung Kuen Fai, that “the correct approach must be to ask what the nature of a Tso is and the nature of the interest of a member of the Tso under Chinese customary law, and then consider whether the English or common law concepts of trust would apply to them, or how the relevant provisions of the [Limitation Ordinance] should be applied to lands held by a Tso”. 260.Given the line of authorities discussed above, and in particular on the nature of a tso, the relationship between the managers and members of a tso, and that every male descendant of the common ancestor automatically becomes entitled at birth to an interest in the land for his life-time, I do not accept that that is the correct approach. This Court in my view can and indeed should, as Deputy Judge Johnson Lam did in Leung Kuen Fai, consider the nature a tso and the relationship between the managers and members in the light of the authorities, and then to decide in that light the operation and effects of sections 10 and 22 of the Limitation Ordinance. In my view, given the strength and state of the authorities and the nature of the issues, that is the only correct approach. 261.With the above discussions in mind, I accept Mr Chan’s submissions that the decision of Leung Kuen Fai is sound. It is consistent with decided authorities on the nature of tsos. I respectfully also agree with the reasoning of Deputy Judge Johnson Lam as explained therein. 262.Leung Kuen Fai has been applied by the Court of Appeal in Wong Shing Chau and Tsang Kwong Kuen. Although Leung Kuen Fai was not challenged in those appeals, those two Court of Appeal decisions are at the very least highly persuasive. L.4.B. THE PROFESSORS’ OPINIONS 263.The 2 Professors agree on most matters. In particular and relevantly:
264.They disagree on 2 main areas. The first one relates to tso property holding:
265.The second main area of disagreement is the most important one for the purpose of this hearing, and relates to the interests of tso members:
266.For the above reasons, I prefer the opinions of Professor Baker to those of Professor Palmer in cases of differences. I do not find the analogy with family property principles helpful. In particular, in relation to the interests of tso members, I accept Professor Baker’s opinion as stated at [07] of the Joint Report. L.5. ISSUE #5 – CONCLUSION 267.For the reasons set out above, I with respect conclude that Leung Kuen Fai is good law. I reach the same conclusion whether on the strength of the authorities, or on the evidence before me, or when they are considered and analysed together. 268.I apply the Principle in Leung Kuen Fai. Given the birthdates of the 6 Descendants, I conclude that Ps’ right and title to the Subject Lot has not been extinguished. 269.For the reasons set out above, Ps shall have vacant possession of the Subject Lot. 270.As recorded above, Mr Chan is no longer seeking any injunction compelling reinstatement. I refuse Prayers (b), (c) and (d). 271.By Prayer (e), Ps seek an injunction against any entrance or use. I bear in mind Ds’ long occupation of the Subject Lot and the uses which they have been put to. There is also no evidence at this stage that Ds would not orderly surrender vacant possession of the same. I am of the further view that in the circumstances, an injunction with immediate effect will bring upon hardship in particular to D1. I in my discretion decline in the circumstances to make one at this stage. Needless to say, should Ps deem it necessary, enforcement action may be taken. This is however a matter for them. 272.I next consider the question of damages or mesne profit. 273.Mr Chan is seeking damages for trespass only from 23 February 2005 (6 years before the issue of the Writ in HCA 299). 274.I have considered Grandmax Reports #1 and #2. 275.Grandmax Report #1 does not take into account the factor that the Subject Lot is “land-locked, in the sense that it is surrounded completely by land owned by [D2] (and/or its associated companies) with no free access to the Subject Lot other than through such land”[136]. 276.I accept Mr Man’s submissions that the Subject Lot is clearly landlocked in the sense as described in Grandmax Report #2. 277.With that factor in mind, Mr Wong readjusted his original assessments as set out in Grandmax Report #2. I adopt those readjusted assessments, which are, relevantly:
278.Adopting those assessments, the damages from 23 February 2005 are therefore calculated as follows:
279.I now come back to HCA 1463. 280.For the reasons above, I make the following declarations:
281.In respect of HCA 1463, I grant Ps judgment against both D1/1463 and D2 as follows, that:
282.In respect of HCA 299, I grant Ps judgment against both D1 and D2 as follows, that:
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Annexure A
Relative location of the School Land, Subject Lot, and the Playground
Annexure B
Relative location of the School Land, Subject Lot, and the Playground
[1] [C1/14-22].
[2] [C1/23-34].
[3] [C1/1-5].
[4] Grantees 1 to Grantee 4 were individuals but not Chinese tsos (祖), just that their names contained the word祖.
[5] See the land search record at [C1/103-112].
[6] See Approvals of Appointment of Managers at [C1/60-64] and [C1/78-85].
[7] See the Approval of Succession dated 2 October 2009 at [C1/86-87].
[8] [C1/202-303].
[9] [C1/202-303], [C2/304-378] and [C2/407-408], and see the plan of the School Land at [C2/320].
[10] [C2/407-408].
[11] [C2/304-378, 420-520].
[12] [C2/391].
[13] [B/102], being part of Grandmax Report #1 (as defined below).
[14] Coloured yellow on Annexure B.
[15] Both coloured red on Annexure B.
[16] Coloured solid pink on Annexure A.
[17] Recital 2(iii) is accepted to be incorrect, in that Grantee 6’s share had in fact by then been succeeded to by P6 Tso (in 1952).
[18] By Clause 2.
[19] [C/17-20].
[20] Clause (2).
[21] Who died on 28 December 1991, [C1/97].
[22] [A/115-118].
[23] [C1/131-133], one of which covered the term between 28 March 1985 and 30 December 1997, [C1/131, 133].
[24] Prayer (a).
[25] Prayer (b).
[26] Prayer (c).
[27] Prayer (d).
[28] Prayer (dA).
[29] Prayer (dB).
[30] §13.
[31] §18.
[32] [A/68].
[33] §§14(3) to (5) D2/A-D&C/299, [A/71-72].
[34] §15 of D2/A-D&C/299, and see §16 of the same.
[35] §44.
[36] §§5(b) and (c), [A/90].
[37] §5C(b), [A/95].
[38] [C1/47].
[39] [A/209-238].
[40] [A/239-245].
[41] [A/246-258].
[42] [A/259-273].
[43] [A/274-279].
[44] [A/280-285].
[45] [A/286-293].
[46] [A/294-306].
[47] [A/307-319].
[49] [B/1-29].
[50] [B/30-52].
[51] [B/53-60].
[52] [B/61-170].
[53] [B/171-191].
[54] §19, [A/224].
[55] Full dates of birth provided, but not reproduced here.
[56] By Yiu Kee Decoration Co Ltd.
[57] By Play Concept Ltd.
[58] By Evergood Combination House Co Ltd.
[59] By Yiu Kee Decoration Co Ltd.
[60] [B/27].
[61] [B/5-6].
[62] [B/50].
[63] [B/58-59].
[64] §88 of his written closing.
[65] Then known as Secretary for Home Affairs.
[66] At page 38F-H and 39B.
[67] At page 37G-I.
[68] At page 40E-G.
[69] See reply from the Tai Po District Office confirming from the record that District Officer (Tai Po) did not give any consent to the 1st Agreement.
[70] See in particular p.38 line I.
[71] §92 of his written closing.
[72] §29 of his written closing.
[73] See J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 (“Pye (2003)”), per Lord Hope at §69, and Cheung Kwong Yuen v Sun Hui Fang [2016] 1 HKLRD 464, per Kwan JA (as she then was) at §11.
[74] [C3/552].
[75] See the invoices issued by the various contractors [C3/576-596].
[76] [C2/409-419]
[77] [C2/521-536].
[78] [C3/537-538].
[79] [C3/539-551].
[80] [C3/632-725].
[81] Amongst Item 62 of [C2].
[82] §88 of his written closing.
[83] [C2/375-378].
[84] §113 and 114 of Mr Man’s written closing.
[85] At §95 of his written closing.
[86] And see also the observation of Ribeiro PJ at §60.
[87] I.e. Sze To Chun Keung v Kung Kwok Wai David [1997] 1 WLR 1232 (Privy Council from Hong Kong)
[88] §105 of his written closing.
[89] [C2/521-525].
[90] [C2/525].
[91] [C2/526-527].
[92] [C2/528-529].
[93] [C3/540-541].
[94] Which she apparently does – see §41.c. of her written closing.
[95] [C1/91].
[96] [C1/92].
[97] At §43 of her written closing.
[98] At §119 of his written closing.
[99] See Powell v McFarlane at p.471-472.
[100] Pye (2003), §71.
[101] Borrowing the words of Jourdan at §7-128.
[102] [A/309].
[103] [A/312-313].
[104] [C2/413-415].
[105] [C2/419].
[106] Li/WS/299, §9, at [A/309].
[107] [C2/379-388].
[108] §109 of his written closing.
[109] §105 of his written closing.
[110] See §110 of his written closing.
[111] (2004) 7 HKCFAR 212.
[112] §44 of his written closing.
[113] [C1/128].
[114] See 654 E to F.
[115] [2009] 1 AC 990.
[116] Section D6 of his written closing.
[117] Section 38A of the Limitation Ordinance.
[118] §§49, 52 and 53 of the judgment.
[119] §145 of his written closing.
[120] §§170 and 171 of his written closing.
[121] §24.
[122] [B/24].
[123] Cited in §230 above.
[124] At p.486B-E.
[125] Set out in §230 above.
[126] At section F4 of his written closing, repeated at §216.
[127] [B/58].
[128] At §172.1 of his written closing.
[129] At §172.2 to 172.5 of his written closing, respectively the “2nd to 5th Propositions”.
[130] See Kan Fat-tat, p.530C-E.
[131] As cited in Kan Fat Tat at p.528
[132] At p.529B-E.
[133] §16 of Baker Report, [B/40].
[134] At p.536F.
[135] At p.539B-D.
[136] Pages 1 and 3 of Grandmax Report #2, [B/172 and 174].
Cases cited in this judgment
Lee Charles Goon Lok v. Lee Kwok Ching and Others
Anthony Francis Li and Clarence a Li, Managers of Li To Wan Tso v. Kwok Wui Knitters Ltd
Man King Chuen and Others v. International College Hong Kong Hong Lok Yuen Association Ltd (Formerly Known As Hong Lok Yuen International School Association Ltd) and Another
Man King Chuen and Others v. International College Hong Kong Hong Lok Yuen Association Ltd (Formerly Known As Hong Lok Yuen International School Association Ltd) and Another
Man King Chuen and Others v. International College Hong Kong Hong Lok Yuen Association Ltd (Formerly Known As Hong Lok Yuen International School Association Ltd) and Another
Lok Kin Chuen v. The Incorporated Owners of Lockhart House
文直南及另一人 對 容海華及另一人
Lee Charles Goon Lok v. Lee Kwok Ching and Others
Man King Chuen and Others v. Hong Lok Yuen International School Association Ltd and Another
Ng Sew Hoi and Another v. Chong Yin Sing and Another
Ng Yuk Pui Kelly v. Dung Wai Man and Others
Lee Sun Kiu v. Ho Kay Fuk
Tang Kun Nin, Tony Manager of Hung Shing Temple v. Cheng Wai Fong and Others
Man Chung Lap v. Man Shui Tong Wui With Man Ping-name and Man Tai-sang As Managers
Tang Kam Wah and Others v. Tang Ming Yat and Another
Tang Chun Kit (Minor) By Tang Man Lok and Another v. Tang Lo Ping
Lee Sun Kiu v. Ho Kay Fuk
Cheung Kwong Yuen v. Sun Hui Fang
Man Leung and Others v. Man Yuet Kwai and Others
Tin Hau Wui also known as Tang Tin Hau Wui With Tang Fuk Leung As the Manager v. Ting Wai Ming and Another
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 1463/2010