Re Salman Shah
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 272/2022 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 7 July 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s renewed application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“the Judge”) dated 10 November 2021 [1] refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review.
Cites 4 cases
|
CAMP 272/2022, [2023] HKCA 802 On appeal from [2021] HKCFI 3341 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 272 OF 2022 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 1195 OF 2018) __________________________
__________________________
________________ JUDGMENT ________________ Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is the applicant’s renewed application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“the Judge”) dated 10 November 2021[1] refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. 2.The applicant has filed an affirmation and lodged a written submission to support his application. 3.Under Order 59 rule 14A(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A, this Court may determine an application for leave to appeal without an oral hearing. Having considered the papers filed in the application and the applicant’s written submission, we are of the view that it is appropriate to determine the present application on paper without a hearing. 4.The applicant’s intended judicial review is against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) which rejected his non-refoulement claim. 5.The applicant is a national of Pakistan aged 52. He last arrived in Hong Kong on 5 October 2001 and was given permission to remain as a visitor for 14 days. He overstayed and was arrested by the police on 25 October 2007. In November 2007, he made a torture claim[2], which was rejected on 17 July 2012. His petition against the decision was dismissed on 8 August 2012. In August 2016 and January 2017, he was convicted of several immigration and criminal offences and sentenced to 6 months’ and 22 months’ imprisonment respectively. By way of written representations dated 11 September 2017 and 1 November 2017, he raised a non-refoulement claim based on fear of being harmed or killed by three Sunni Muslims with whom he had a religious conflict because he is a Shia. The details of the applicant’s claim were set out in the decision of the Director at [8]. We will not repeat them. 6.By his decision dated 24 January 2018, the Director rejected the applicant’s claim having regard to the BOR 3 risk[3], persecution risk[4] and BOR 2 risk[5] grounds. There was no assessment under the torture risk ground in view of the rejection of his previous torture claim. 7.The applicant appealed the Director’s decision to the Board. The Board heard the appeal at an oral hearing held on 4 May 2018, during which the applicant elected to give evidence and answered questions put by the Board. By its decision dated 21 June 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal. For the reasons given in [30] to [39] of the decision, the Board considered the applicant evasive and there were numerous inconsistencies and discrepancies in his account. The Board found the applicant’s evidence incredible, rejected his claim that there had been threats, attack and torture to him and his family, and did not accept he would face a genuine and substantial risk of being subjected to ill-treatment or his fear was well founded. The Board further held that, even accepting his case, his dispute with the three Sunni Muslims was private in nature, the past attacks did not meet a minimum level of severity and the level of risk of harm upon return was low. The Board concluded that the applicant’s claim failed on all applicable grounds. 8.On 25 June 2018, the applicant filed a Form 86 together with an affirmation to apply for leave for judicial review. He did not put forward any ground for seeking relief. 9.The Judge dealt with the application on paper. By a Form CALL-1 dated 10 November 2021, he refused to give the applicant leave to apply for judicial review and gave his reasons in [12] to [17] as follows:
10.Pursuant to Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, the applicant may appeal to the Court of Appeal against the Judge’s decision within 14 days after it was made. The 14-day period ended on 24 November 2021. 11.By a summons and an affirmation filed on 9 June 2022, the applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal the Judge’s decision. The Judge dealt with the application on paper, and by his decision handed down on 14 July 2022[6] refused the application. 12.On 25 July 2022, the applicant filed the present summons together with an affirmation to make a renewed application to extend the time to appeal the Judge’s dismissal of his leave application. 13.In considering whether to extend time for appealing against the refusal of leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted. 14.The applicant was late for over six months. This is a very serious delay. In the summons and affirmation filed in the court below, he explained that he did not receive the documents from the court and it was until June 2022 that he learnt from the immigration officer the outcome of his case. He also stated that he had poor command of English and Chinese, did not understand the judicial system of Hong Kong and needed to ask for help, which he eventually received from a NGO. We note from the court record that the Form CALL-1 and the court order were posted to the address provided by the applicant in his Form 86, which was the same address stated in all his subsequent summonses and affirmations. They had not been returned by the Post Office. In the circumstances, we do not consider the serious delay to have been satisfactorily explained. The applicant must therefore show that his intended appeal enjoys real prospect of success. 15.In assessing the merits of the intended appeal, we would adopt the legal principles which have been set out comprehensively by the Court of Appeal in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. 16.In an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of this court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if it is a fresh application for judicial review. 17.The applicant did not provide any grounds for his application or the intended appeal in either the summons or the supporting affirmation. He merely stated that the Court disregarded the dangerous situation in his home country. 18.In his written submissions, the applicant stated the following as his grounds of appeal:
19.For the reasons set out below, we are of the view that the grounds of appeal put forward in the written submission are unarguable:
20.We have separately considered the Board’s decision. We do not discern any viable ground to disturb the Board’s decision. We agree with the Judge that the applicant’s intended judicial review has no prospect of success and that leave to apply for judicial review should be refused. 21.As the applicant’s intended appeal against the Judge’s decision has no prospect of success, it would be futile to extend the time to appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the applicant’s summons filed on 25 July 2022.
The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person. [2] As defined in Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which definition is the same as that found in Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. [3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [5] This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under Article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. |
Cases cited in this judgment