Ta Duy Tham v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 515/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 12 July 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 3 March 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 487 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 515/2023 [2023] HKCFI 1758 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 515 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 3 March 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 487 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 3 May 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Vietnam. On 24 March 2016, he surrendered to the Immigration Department, admitting that he had come to Hong Kong illegally from Shenzhen. On 10 May 2015, he lodged his non-refoulement claim on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 29 November 2016 on all applicable grounds of his claim. 6.He appealed to the Torture Claims Board (the “Board”). By Decision dated 11 January 2019, the Board dismissed his appeal. 7.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and his application was rejected by the Court of First Instance’s Order dated 9 March 2021 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.His application to the Court of Appeal to appeal out of time against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 15 November 2021. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 January 2022. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 7 November 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 29 December 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.The factual basis of his previous claim is that if he is refouled, he feared that he would be harmed or killed by his creditor or his subordinates because he was unable to repay the loan. 14.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. He appealed to the Board. 15.The Board considered the applicant’s evidence. The Board found that the applicant did not have genuine fear of risk if he returned to Vietnam. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 17.In support of his application, the applicant had submitted additional information to the immigration officer. The applicant relied upon the same fears as in his previous claim as the creditor is the same creditor and he was unable to repay the loan. But the creditor did not have intention of harming or killing him. 18.The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Thus, he refused the applicant’s application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 19.The applicant has attached to the Form 86 the reasons below to support his application.
Discussion 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he had relied on the same facts in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim. 22.As the applicant had admitted that he relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim, the grounds in paragraph 19 have become irrelevant and warrant no further consideration. 23.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 24.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said he had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 12th day of July 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment