Wiwin Rudianingsih v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 1748/2020

[2023] HKCFI 2117

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1748 OF 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;   or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court / the Applicant being absent in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

1.   The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed; and

2.   A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 16 July 2020 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after her previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.   

2.The Applicant is a 47-year-old national of Indonesia who arrived in Hong Kong on 30 May 2008 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract on 30 May 2010 or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her employment was prematurely terminated on 18 June 2008, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and more than 6 years later on 17 July 2014 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia she would be harmed or killed by her father or brother for marrying a non-Muslim in Hong Kong.

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim    

3.By a Notice of Decision dated 17 June 2016 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 17 July 2017 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.In his decisions the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from her father or brother upon her return to Indonesia as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that it was just one verbal threat made on the telephone without any real intention to seriously harm or kill her, that in any event it was a private family dispute between them without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 256 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 1.9 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from her home district in large cities such as Jakarta where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate her.

5.The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decisions was dismissed by the Board on 3 November 2017 after hearing her in evidence and submissions and upon finding no merits in her claim or her appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decisions.

6.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by this Court on 13 July 2018 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for her intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in her process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in her intended application (HCAL 852/2017 [2018] HKCFI 1457).

7.The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the Court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23 October 2018 (CACV 331/2018 [2018] HKCA 742).

8.The Applicant’s Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 21 January 2019 ([2019] HKCA 52), and then by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal on 17 December 2019 under Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap 484A.

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

9.Just 3 weeks after on 7 January 2020 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that her father and brother are still looking to kill her, while her former husband has also demanded money from her to enable him to pay off his debts to a local loan shark or else he will kill her upon her return to Indonesia, and hence she still fears of being harmed or killed if refouled to her home country.

10.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

 (5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

11.Accordingly, on 20 January 2020 the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently did via his lawyer from Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

12.By a Notice of Decision dated 16 July 2020 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that the basis thereof was essentially the same as that of her previous claim, and that she failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since her previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of her previous claim would give her subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success, as even if her alleged claim of threats from her former husband were real, and there is no evidence to support her such bare assertion, that such risk would still be negated by state/police protection and internal relocation available to her upon her refoulement to her home country as correctly found by both the Director and the Board in her previous claim.

13.On 31 August 2020 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, and in her supporting affirmation filed on the same day she put forth the following grounds for her intended challenge:

(1)  That the Director had erred in determining that there is no realistic prospect of success in the Applicant’s subsequent claim by placing an unnecessarily high threshold in its determination;

(2)  That the Director had failed to take the Applicant’s unique situation into account fairly or carefully;

(3)  That the Director’s decision not to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim is erroneous and biased and without relying on any facts of the case and was purely targeting her for a situation which the Director or the Immigration Officer had not experienced first hand;

(4)  That the Immigration Officer erred in believing that it was out of the Applicant’s own imagination that her former husband’s loan shark would come after her which is in fact real;

(5)  That the decision made by the Director was biased and was based on wrong case management power by merely trying to dispose of the Applicant’s case as quickly as possible without carefully considering all the information and evidence available as claimed by the Applicant.

14.These grounds are however all just some vague and bare assertions of the Applicant without any necessary or relevant details or particulars or elaboration as to how they would apply to her case or how did the Director or the Immigration Officer err in the decision, or in what way was the Immigration Officer biased against the Applicant or fail to conduct the assessment and determination of her subsequent claim properly or fairly. As such and as none of these assertions are properly elaborated with any relevant details or particulars by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for her intended challenge.   

15.In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request for subsequent claim which as correctly found by the Director that even if her claimed risk were real that it is again a private dispute between the Applicant and her former husband without any official involvement that would be similarly negated by the availability of state protection and internal relocation as correctly found by both the Director and the Board in her previous claim that there is simply no prospect of success in her intended application for judicial review that I accordingly refuse her leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

16.Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal dated 17 December 2019, but that the Applicant is still trying to re-litigate her case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same or similar facts and basis as before, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against her.

17.Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)   The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a)   it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b)   it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a)   may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b)   may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

18.Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:

“(1) Leave for the institution or continuance of any legal proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under section 2791) shall not be given unless the Court of First Instance is satisfied that –

(a) the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(2) No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting or refusing leave required under this section, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance.”

19.In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.  

20.His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] - [10]).

21.In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] - [40]). 

22.In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate her non-refoulement claim without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against her, to which she was unable to raise any valid objection in writing, I am convinced that the Applicant would likely continue to do so and/or to make vexatious appeals, thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

23.I should note that the Applicant did recently on 23 May 2023 file an affirmation requesting to withdraw her application as she claimed to want to return to her home country but without providing any further details or explanation as to why a sudden change of mind when for the past 7 years she had consistently claimed to be at risk of being harmed or killed if refouled to her home country that it smacks of an attempt to delay her inevitable removal from Hong Kong by making this last minute withdrawal and then subsequently applying for reinstatement of the application. If on the other hand that her application is indeed genuine, I am sure that the Applicant would not be prejudiced in any way by the RPO which I propose to make. 

24.Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to or touching upon or leading to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, or any appeal, including this Order, without the leave of a Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with her said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave under this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge;

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition 

25.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

26.A RPO in terms of paragraph 24 be made against the Applicant.  

Dated the 16^th day of August 2023

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1