Nguyen Hai Au v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 599/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 12 September 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 13 December 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 541 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 599/2023 [2023] HKCFI 2207 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 599 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 13 December 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 541 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 14 June 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Vietnam. On 7 August 2016, he was arrested by police for illegal remaining in Hong Kong. On 8 August 2016, he was transferred to the Immigration Department. He lodged a non-refoulement by a written signification on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 31 May 2017 on all applicable grounds of his claim. 6.He appealed to the Torture Claims Board (the “Board”). By Decision dated 29 March 2018, the Board dismissed his appeal. 7.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and his application was rejected by the Court of First Instance’s Order dated 14 September 2020 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.His application to the Court of Appeal to appeal out of time against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 August 2021. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 12 November 2021. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 12 July 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 20 September 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.The factual basis of his previous claim is that if he is refouled, he feared that he would be harmed or killed by his creditor because he was unable to pay his debt. 14.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. He appealed to the Board. 15.Having considered his evidence, the Board found that his evidence was incredible; that state protection should be available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. It therefore dismissed his appeal. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 17.In support of his application, the applicant had submitted a letter and a leaflet from the creditor to the Director. The Director, having considered his evidence, found that he relies upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim. 18.The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Thus, he refused the applicant’s application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 19.The applicant has raised the grounds in support of this application that the Director did not consider the right to life or police acquiescence; that he placed no weight on the COI in his favour; that he did not give him chance to response to his questions and failed to give weight to his arguments and he had failed to attain high standard of fairness. Discussion 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant agreed that he relies upon the same facts of his previous in support of his subsequent claim. 22.Since the applicant admitted that he relies on the same facts in his previous claim or his subsequent claim, those reasons in paragraph 19 are not valid reasons to challenge the Director’s Decision. 23.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant confirmed that he understood the proposed RPO and said that he said he had no comment. 28.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant. Dated the 12th day of September 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment