Ali Malik v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 667/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 12 September 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 January 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2915 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 667/2023 [2023] HKCFI 2208 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 667 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 January 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2915 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant first appeared before the Court on 5 June 2023. He had agreed that his problems are the same problems raised in his previous claim. However, he had not stated why the RPO should not be imposed on him. For this purpose, the Court re-listed the case to be heard on 19 July 2023. He appeared before the court on the scheduled date. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He came to Hong Kong illegally from Mainland China by speedboat on 25 May 2006. On 3 February 2008, he was arrested by police for indecent assault and illegal remaining in Hong Kong. He was convicted of the offences and was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment. He lodged a torture claim by a written signification dated 18 July 2008, which was then assessed on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 14 November 2014 and by a Notice of Further Decision dated 9 October 2017 on all applicable grounds. 6.He appealed to the Torture Claims Board (the “Board”). By Decision dated 7 March 2018, the Board dismissed his appeal. 7.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and failed. He then pursued the matter to the appellate courts up to the Court of Final Appeal. 8.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 10 October 2022. 9.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 28 November 2022. 10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of his previous claim is that if he is refouled, he would be harmed or killed by Mr Abbas, Mr Akram (Mr Abbas’s father) and/or his gang, (“collectively called his enemies”) because he had hit Mr Abbas with a wicket in a cricket match in 2006. 12.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. He appealed to the Board. 13.Having considered his evidence, the Board found that even if the applicant’s account of fact was true, there was no evidence on which it found that there was a risk to him if he returned to Pakistan. 14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 15.In support of his application, the applicant had submitted his statement and copies of his recognizance, his wife’s recognizance and his daughter’s recognizance issued by the Immigration Department; his daughter’s birth certificate; his marriage certificate and the medical records of his wife. Having considered the evidence, the immigration officer concluded:
16.The Director thus refused the applicant’s application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application, in which he did not set out any specific ground. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant agreed that he had relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim application and that his enemies are getting stronger. He also said that he now has a wife in Hong Kong, though she is not a Hong Kong citizen. 20.There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim. I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has admitted that he relies on the same facts in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim application. 25.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 26.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 27.RPO in terms of paragraph 25 be made against the applicant. Dated the 12th day of September 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment