Nursanti v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1106/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 24 October 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 14 June 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1299 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 1106/2023 [2023] HKCFI 2564 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1106 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 14 June 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1299 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 7 August 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She came to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper on 13 September 2013. After she finished her contract, she did not leave Hong Kong. She surrendered to the Immigration Department on 18 May 2016. On 12 October 2016, she lodged her non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 20 February 2017 on all applicable grounds of her claim. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Board (the “Board”). By Decision dated 29 June 2018, the Board dismissed her appeal. 7.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and pursue the matter in the High Court. Her applications to the Court of the First Instance, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal were refused. 8.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 17 April 2023. 9.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 10.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if she is refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her father’s creditor, who asked her to marry him for her father’s debt. 11.The Director found that her previous claim was not substantiated. She appealed to the Board. 12.The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and found that it accepted major parts of her evidence on the facts of her case. However, it considered that the sexual assaults by the creditor was not a systemic risk of harm; state protection was available to her and internal relocation was an option open to her. It dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 14.In support of her application, the applicant had submitted her statement to the immigration officer. The immigration officer, having considered her evidence, concluded that there was no significant change of the circumstances since her previous claim was finally determined. Furthermore, the immigration officer found that state protection and internal relocation were viable options to her. 15.The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Thus, he refused her application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicant filed Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. She also filed an affirmation in support of her application, in which she did not raise any specific grounds. Discussion 17.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 18.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she had relied on the same facts in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim. 19.The applicant has not been raised any valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 20.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 25.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 26.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 27.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant. Dated the 24th day of October 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment