Soni Pratik v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1265/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 24 October 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 July 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1527 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 1265/2023 [2023] HKCFI 2575 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1265 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 July 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1527 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The court’s notice was sent to the applicant’s last known address without being returned from the Post Office. 3.However, the applicant was absent at the hearing without prior notice to the Court. The Court will therefore assume that he had abandoned his right to be heard in respect of the RPO and proceed to consider his applicant on paper. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of India. He arrived in Hong Kong on 10 January 2016 and was permitted to stay as a visitor until 24 January 2016. He did not depart and had overstayed since 25 January 2016. On 27 January 2016, he surrendered to the Immigration Department. He raised non-refoulement claim by way of a written signification dated 26 May 2016 on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 5.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 29 May 2017. 6.He appealed to the Torture Claims Board (the “Board”). By Decision dated 9 July 2018, the Board dismissed his appeal. 7.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and failed. He then pursued the matter to the appellate courts up to the Court of Final Appeal. 8.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed on 9 May 2023. 9.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 17 May 2023. 10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of his previous claim is that if he is refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the creditors because he was unable to repay the loan. 12.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. He appealed to the Board. The applicant appealed to the Board. 13.Having considered his evidence, the Board did not accept the applicant’s evidence on the facts of his claim and dismissed his appeal. 14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 15.In support of his application, the applicant had, with the assistance of the duty lawyer, submitted his statement to the Director. In gist, the applicant’s source of fear are as follows:
16.Having considered the materials, the immigration officer considered that the reasons put forward for his consideration were far-fetched and without evidence in support or had been considered in the applicant’s previous claim. The immigration officer did not accept that there had been significant change of circumstances since the applicant’s previous claim was finally determined. The Director thus refused the applicant’s application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 17.The applicant has filed Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application, in which he did not set out any specific ground. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. There is nothing from the applicant to challenge the Director’s Decision. 20.There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim. I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant was absent and there is no reason from the applicant that the proposed RPO should not be imposed on the applicant. 25.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 26.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 27.RPO in terms of paragraph 25 be made against the applicant. Dated the 24th day of October 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment