Emma Loizaga Llanes Alias Llanes Emma L v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1229/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 October 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 3 July 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2630 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 1229/2023 [2023] HKCFI 2596 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1229 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 3 July 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2630 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 21 August 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of the Philippines. On 10 November 1992, she came to Hong Kong as a domestic helper. Her employment contract terminated on 24 January 1997. Since then, she overstayed. She was convicted of the offence of overstaying without the Director’s permission and was sentenced to 11 months’ imprisonment. 5.By a written signification dated 6 February 2015, she lodged her non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. She claimed that if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her ex-boyfriend. 6.Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 31 January 2018 on all applicable grounds of her claim. 7.She appealed to the Torture Claims Board (the “Board”). By Decision dated 26 October 2018, the Board dismissed her appeal. 8.She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and pursue the matter in the High Court. Her applications to the Court of the First Instance, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal were refused. 9.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 27 March 2023. 10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 11.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if she was refouled, she feared that she would be harmed or even killed by her ex-boyfriend, Alfredo, who was a member of the New People’s Army (“NPA”) because she refused to marry him. 12.The Director found that her previous claim was not substantiated. She appealed to the Board. 13.The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and, for the reasons set out in the Board’s Decision, found that the applicant was not a truthful witness and it refused to accept her evidence on the facts of her claim. 14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 15.In support of her application, the applicant had submitted her statements to the immigration officer. Her alleged fear is that if she returns to the Philippines, she will be harmed or killed by Alfredo and the people from the NPA and also by her cousin, Nelson due to a land dispute. Her fear of her cousin was not raised in her previous claim. 16.In respect of her fear from her ex-boyfriend, the Board had already found that it was a made-up story for her claim for non-refoulement protection. It is unreliable. As to her fear from her cousin, Nelson, the immigration officer was of the view that there was no evidence to support the existence of such person and even if such a person existed, state protection and internal relocation would be available to her. Her fear is therefore unfounded. 17.The immigration officer, having considered her evidence, concluded that there was no significant change of the circumstances since her previous claim was finally determined. 18.The Director therefore did not accept that there is significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the material in her previous claim, would give her subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Thus, he refused her application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 19.The applicant filed Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. She also filed an affidavit in support of her application, in which she raised the following grounds:
Discussion 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same facts in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim. 22.As to the grounds in support of her application under paragraph 19, they are irrelevant as the applicant had admitted that she relies upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. 23.There is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 28.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 25th day of October 2023
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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