Ripon Mohammed v. Director of Immigration

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1478/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 October 2023.

1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 12 July 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2030 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

Cites 6 cases

Case No.HCAL 1478/2023[2023] HKCFI 2607
Court
High Court CFI
Date25 Oct 2023
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 1478/2023

[2023] HKCFI 2607

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1478 of 2023

BETWEEN    
  Ripon Mohammed Applicant
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative Respondent

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

    consideration of documents only;          or
    consideration of documents and Applicant being present in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.   Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.   A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 12 July 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2030 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 25 September 2023.  Before the Court, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same facts in his previous claim to support his application.

The procedural history

4.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh.  He came to Hong Kong in 28 August 2006 as a visitor.  He was permitted to stay until 7 September 2006.  He overstayed and was arrested by immigration officers on 20 April 2012.  His application for a torture claim was refused by the Director on 30 November 2012.  He lodged his non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on 29 May 2012 on the grounds of BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention.  

5.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 19 July 2016 and Notice of Further Decision dated 1 December 2016.

6.He appealed to the Torture Claims Board (the “Board”).  By Decision dated 27 March 2019 and Decision dated 17 May 2019 of the Board, the Board dismissed his appeal.

7.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and failed.  He then pursued the matter to the High Court.  He applied to the Court of the First Instance for extension of time to apply for leave for judicial review of the Board’s 2nd Decision.  On 22 July 2022, the Court of the First Instance refused his application.

8.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 20 April 2023.

9.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.

The subsequent claim application

10.The factual basis of his previous claim is that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by the family of Mr Mijanur Rahaman because he was accused by them to be responsible for the death of Rathaman.  He also claimed that he would be killed by Mr Rahmatullah because he got in his way of realizing his investment in Hong Kong.

11.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated and rejected his application.  He appealed the Director’s Decisions to the Board. However, he was late in filing his notices of appeal.  For his appeal against the Director’s 1st Decision on BOR 2 risk and Persecution risk, the Board was not satisfied that he had good reason for the delay and rejected his application for extension of time.  For his appeal against the Director’s 2nd Decision on BOR 2 risk, the Board was satisfied that he had good reason and extended time for filing his notice of appeal.

12.The Board considered the facts of the applicant’s case and finally dismissed his appeal for the reasons that he had fabricated the story of being accused of mrudereing Rathaman; that he had given inconsistent evidence on the alleged false charge of murder and that he had delayed making the claim for protection for over 5 years and he only raised the claim after he was arrested by police.  The Board therefore found that he had failed to establish that he would be subjected to any real risk of being harmed or killed by his enemies.

13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success.

14.The applicant has submitted a statement of additional information to the immigration officer in support of his application.  Having considered the statement, the immigration was of the view that the information was hearsay and it did not constitute significant change of circumstances which, considered together with his previous claim, would give the intended subsequent claim a reasonable prospect of success.  Even if his information were accepted, internal relocation was still a viable option for him.  His allegations that he would be subjected to police torture or by the triad members and the hired killers were speculative and rejected by the immigration officer.

15.The immigration officer therefore did not accept that there had been significant change of circumstances since the applicant’s previous claim was finally determined.  The Director thus refused the applicant’s application for the subsequent claim.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

16.The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 22 August 2023 to apply for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

17.The applicant has not provided any specific reason in his affirmation in support of his application.  However, he had, shortly before the hearing, submitted a bundle of documents which he said are to prove that he had stayed in Hong Kong.

Discussion

18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power.  See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.

20.Before me, the applicant admitted that he had relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim application.

21.There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim.  I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

22.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process.  The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him.  See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

23.RPO is appropriate for the present case.  See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

24.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

25.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him.  The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing.  The applicant said he had nothing to say.

26.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only.  I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

27.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 25th day of October 2023

  (M.O. WONG)(Ms)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 25/10/2023

Ripon Mohammed
 
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 25/10/2023
 
Director of Immigration
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
L/M (27410) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (formerly RBCZ/609/12, RBCZ/2000830/14 & RBCZ/9000581/16)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)


Form CALL-1