Lili Hu v. New Nordic Management International Ltd
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 332/2022 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 12 January 2024.
1. Before me are three applications, two by the plaintiff (“Hu”), and one by the defendant (“NN Hong Kong”). Those from Hu are:-
Cites 10 cases
|
DCCJ 332/2022 [2024] HKDC 9 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 332 OF 2022 ----------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
-------------------------- DECISION -------------------------- INTRODUCTION 1.Before me are three applications, two by the plaintiff (“Hu”), and one by the defendant (“NN Hong Kong”). Those from Hu are:-
2.By a Summons filed on 29 April 2022 (the “Jurisdiction Application”), the NN Hong Kong seeks the following:-
3.The Continuation Application, Variation Application, and Jurisdiction Application (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Applications” where appropriate) came before me on 21 and 22 November 2023 for arguments. Hu was represented by counsel Ms Madeleine Booth (“Ms Booth”), and Mr Tom Ng of counsel (“Mr Ng”) represented NN Hong Kong. At the end of the two-day hearing, I reserved my decision on the Applications. This is my decision. 4.In the section below, I will first set out Hu’s claims and the bases of the same for better understanding of the parties’ arguments. HU’S CLAIMS The pleaded case 5.According to the Statement of Claim (“SOC”), Hu is a Chinese national who resides in Hong Kong. 6.NN Hong Kong is incorporated locally, and part of a group of companies owned and controlled by Mr Kurt Svendheim (“Kurt”). The companies as a group is known as New Nordic Group (“NN Group”). It is said that a Thailand incorporated company, VIP Developer Phuket Co., Ltd (“VIP”) is also amongst the NN Group. Hu adds that Kurt is the sole director and shareholder of NN Hong Kong. 7.Hu’s narratives then brought us to the root of the disputes in this case. On 16 July 2019, she entered into a Preliminary Purchase and Sales Agreement (“PPSA”) with VIP, under which she agreed to purchase from NN Hong Kong, and NN Hong Kong agreed to sell to Hu, a unit to be constructed by VIP, known as “Apartment N-BWC-C-312” (the “Unit”), of a real estate project called “New Nordic’s Bangtao Water World Condominium (the “Water World Condo”). 8.The PPSA contains the following terms:-
9.Hu paid the Deposit on 15 July 2019. It is pleaded that she paid USD175,991.34 on 16 July 2019, and claimed that it was the total sum paid for the Unit. Pausing here, one can see that this is clearly wrong. As per the §§8(2) and (3) above, the total purchase price should be USD177,491.34 (the “Funds”). This is evidenced by the remittance advice and receipts adduced by Hu. 10.Hu received CBR on 11 October 2019 (USD2,983.18), 10 January 2020 (USD4,474.77), and 9 April 2020 (USD3,430.66). Hu says, only the payment on 10 January 2020 had the correct amount of CBR paid. Since the payment on 9 April 2020, she received no CBR from NN Hong Kong. 11.Except for a newsletter from the NN Group in July 2020, Hu received no further update on the construction of the Water World Condo. In fact, up to the date of the SOC, the Water World Condo remained unconstructed. 12.For the above reasons, Hu alleges that NN Hong Kong obtained the Funds by fraud. She asserts that the Unit was neither constructed, nor was there any genuine progress regarding the construction of the Unit after payment of the Funds. She also points to the NN Group being reported to have defaulted in multiple development projects around the world, and had not returned monies to any of its investors. 13.Moreover, Hu says she has grounds to believe that Kurt, the NN Group, and by extension VIP, never had any genuine intention to construct the Water World Condo or the Unit. In support, she points to:-
14.On these bases, Hu says the PPSA is voidable ab initio by fraud, and the Funds in NN Hong Kong’s Account are held by NN Hong Kong on resulting or constructive trust for her benefit. Affirmations of Foucault Guillaume Jean-Rene Andre 15.Mr Foucault Guillaume Jean-Rene Andre (the “Husband”), the husband of Hu, had filed his affirmations for the Applications:-
16.I will use the evidence provided in the Husband’s 1st and 3rd Affirmations to set out Hu’s case. 17.Husband’s 1st Affirmation regurgitates the same facts pleaded in the SOC, with the following additional evidence:-
18.The Husband’s 3rd Affirmation was filed in reply to Kurt’s affidavits filed on 19 May 2022 (“Kurt’s 1st Affidavit” and “Kurt’s 2nd Affidavit”). Kurt’s 1st Affidavit supported the Jurisdiction Application, whereas Kurt’s 2nd Affidavit was filed in opposition of the Continuation Application. The contents of Kurt’s 1st and 2nd Affidavits are almost identical. 19.The Husband’s 3rd Affirmation contains, in a nutshell, the following evidence:-
NN HONG KONG’S CASE 20.Understandably, NN Hong Kong has not filed a defence in this case. Hence, its case is presented by Kurt via his affidavits. 21.In Kurt’s 1st Affidavit, he first provides explanations concerning the operations of NN Hong Kong. He says that NN Hong Kong has subsidiaries in various Southeast Asia countries (the “Title Holders”), that in turn own different operational companies and/or property development projects in their respective country. These Title Holders would develop resorts, hotels and serviced apartments, and NN Hong Kong served as their administration company. That being so, Kurt adds that NN Hong Kong hires neither staff nor does it have an office in Hong Kong. All corporate documents were kept by its company secretary[6]. 22.Apart from this, NN Hong Kong was used as an alternative payment hub, to receive payments from investors for the Title Holders. Kurt adds that there were 3 payment options for investors. For investments in Thailand, the first option was for the investors to make payments by instalments directly to the Title Holders in Thailand. Second, they could pay the full price also directly to the Title Holders in Thailand. Third, should they prefer not to pay in Thai baht (the currency to be used for the first and second payment options), the investors could make the full payment to NN Hong Kong. In the present case, Kurt explains, Hu opted for the third payment option. 23.Kurt then stresses on the genuineness of VIP in constructing the Water World Condo. He listed out the permit received from the Environment Impact Assessment and Building Permit as evidence of some of the works done by VIP. In addition, by April 2020, a number of other works at the Site were completed. 24.Regarding the construction at Water World Condo, Kurt blames COVID-19 and the lockdown policy of the Thailand Government as the causes of its stoppage. He elaborates that the policy was so strict that workers from Cambodia and Myanmar were forced to return to their motherland since late March 2020. 25.Kurt says that, the COVID-19 outbreak and the lockdown policy adopted by the Thailand Government, constituted reasons for the Force Majeure clause under the PPSA to take effect. Hence, payment of the CBR was suspended, and the construction of the Water World Condo halted. These measures were duly informed to the investors via the NN Group’s newsletters. 26.Although the lockdown policy was lifted after 2 years, it took time for the resumption of construction. 27.Kurt highlights the fact that NN Hong Kong was not a contractual party to PPSA. The same was signed between Hu and VIP. Moreover, he supplements that, in accordance with Clause 5 of the PPSA, the deadline for the completion of the construction had not expired at the time when Kurt’s 1st Affidavit was filed, if one includes the grace period which would extend the deadline for completion from May 2021 to May 2022. 28.As aforementioned, Kurt’s 2nd Affidavit contains basically the same evidence given in Kurt’s 1st Affidavit. 29.Kurt filed his third affidavit on 11 January 2023 (“Kurt’s 3rd Affidavit”) in reply to the Husband’s 3rd Affirmation. In it, Kurt exhibited documents in support of the alleged works done by VIP at the Site amid construction of the Water World Condo[7]. He relies on the same to refute the Husband’s allegation that the construction of the Water World Condo was not genuine. He explains that, when Kurt’s 1st Affidavit was made, he was not in Thailand, and the documents were kept at the administrative office building of NN Thailand, hence the delay in exhibiting the same. 30.Kurt admits that the court rejected the rehabilitation application for the NN Thailand, but such decision was under appeal. In reply to the Husband’s assertion that the NN Hong Kong Account was emptied, Kurt shrugs it off as a normal business operation, as the funds would have to be transferred to the Title Holders for the construction projects. He adds that the NN Hong Kong Account was rarely used after the start of COVID-19 pandemic. Come what may, Kurt says, these are irrelevant to the question of whether the construction of the Water World Condo is a fraud perpetrated by NN Hong Kong. OBSERVATIONS 31.I will first set out some observations that I have on Hu’s case. As one will eventually see, they are vital to the outcomes of the Applications. Parties to the PPSA and the SOC 32.Kurt is correct to say that the contractual parties to the PPSA are Hu and VIP[8]. The terms contained in the PPSA also clearly set out the duties and obligations of the VIP[9], not NN Hong Kong. Obviously, Hu’s pleaded case[10], as reproduced in §7 of this Decision, is, at the very least, inaccurate. Moreover, notwithstanding Hu’s claim that NN Hong Kong was the seller of the Unit, she then says NN Hong Kong was the receiving agent of VIP[11]. She adds that NN Hong Kong obtained the Funds by fraud, because Kurt, NN Group (which, according to the SOC, includes NN Hong Kong) and, by extension, VIP, had no genuine intention to construct the Unit, and the NN Group was found to have defaulted in various development projects. 33.In spite of the confusion as to the role played by NN Hong Kong, ultimately, Hu is claiming against NN Hong Kong for money had and received, and/or for the return of the Funds under constructive trust or resulting trust. To achieve these purposes, it is a prerequisite for the court to, as pleaded in the SOC, rule that the PPSA with VIP is voidable (and voided) ab initio due to the alleged fraud. At the hearing, I had raised my reservation as to how such ruling could be made by the court when VIP is not a party to this action. In my view, this is an imperative step Hu should take, bearing in mind that this is not a commonly seen cyber-fraud case where the main culprit could not be located. In answer to my question, Ms Booth suggested that I should lift the corporate veil and find that NN Hong Kong and VIP are the same. Notwithstanding there are evidence to show that they are connected[12], I am not ready to conduct such an exercise, when there is no proper submissions on this from Hu’s side[13], and a chance for NN Hong Kong and Mr Ng to answer them. 34.In the circumstances, the present case remains one for Hu to establish a primary case of fraud against VIP, and it is for VIP to answer such allegation. In order for her to do, she would have to either do so in Thailand, where VIP is incorporated and located and where the alleged fraud was committed[14], or in Hong Kong if she could successfully apply for leave to have a writ issued and served on VIP outside jurisdiction under O. 11 of the Rules of the District Court, Cap. 366H (“RDC”). Other terms of the PPSA 35.Before moving on to my next observation, I wish to highlight the other terms in the PPSA apart from those reproduced in §8 of this Decision. They are as follows:-
Breach of the PPSA 36.I wish to touch on this topic before turning to the other key observations that I have. 37.As aforestated, Kurt’s excuse for the stoppage of work at the Water World Condo is the COVID-19 pandemic and the Thailand Government’s policy to lockdown all activities within the country. Putting aside the veracity of these allegations, it is his evidence that the lockdown policy was lifted after 2 years, i.e., in or around 2022. 38.On the literal reading of the FM Clause, one queries whether the obligation to pay the CBR during the pandemic and lockdown would be exempted by it. On the assumptions that the COVID-19 pandemic fell with the definition of natural disaster, and the lockdown policy constituted government sanction, the parties’ obligation to pay should continue despite the force majeure circumstances, as it is expressly excluded from the FM Clause. The indisputable fact that the CBR payment had stopped after 9 April 2020 could be a breach of the payment obligation on the part of VIP, unsalvageable by the FM Clause. In any event, there is no reason given as to why payment of the CBR has not resumed after lifting of the lockdown measure in around 2022. 39.In addition, Clause 10 provides that construction period could be extended for up to 12 months (i.e., May 2022), if the construction was suspended without any fault of VIP. Hence, when 31 May 2022 came and passed, regardless of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown policy, VIP was already in breach of the PPSA when the construction of the Unit was not completed by the extended deadline. 40.Pursuant to clause 7b, Hu could, by written notice, and for the above reasons, terminate the PPSA, seek a return of the Funds, and claim interest on the same from VIP. Understandably, such cause of action and the remedy that flows from it are not available at the time when the Writ was issued. Governing law 41.Coming back to the salient points in our case, assuming I were wrong on the observations under §§32-34 above, and NN Hong Kong, the NN Group, and the VIP, should be regarded as the same entity (with or without the need to pierce the corporate veil), it means that the PPSA would be binding on NN Hong Kong. 42.Clause 12 of the PPSA provides that the governing law for the dispute arising from it is the laws of Thailand. Hence, issues between Hu and NN Hong Kong would be determined by applying the Thailand laws. If this was the case, the legal arguments made by Ms Booth and Mr Ng in the Applications, for example: (1) PPSA being voidable ab initio; (2) constructive trust or resulting trust; (3) rescission of the PPSA; (4) counter-restitution; (4) the principles on separate legal entity amongst associated companies; and (5) the lifting of corporate veil; could all be futile. Any of these discussions is subject to the ultimate questions: What are the Thailand laws on these topics? Are they even topics under the Thailand laws? These are questions inevitable even if the action is tried by Hong Kong court (and experts’ evidence on Thailand laws would be required). 43.Ms Booth has not covered this in her written submissions. At the hearing, she relied on the presumption of similarity, citing §11/1/106 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2024[15](“HKCP 2024”), where it is said that “where a trial court is bound to decide on a hard issue of foreign law in order to dispose of a matter, in the absence of evidence it may have no practical choice but to assume the foreign law is the same as Hong Kong law, and that maybe the choice of the parties”. 44.However, in the same passage, it is further commented that: “But if a case clearly raises many complex issues of, say, Thai or mainland Chinese land, company and agency law, it is difficult to see why the court should not simply take judicial notice of the fact that the content of the foreign law is certain to be different from Hong Kong law and costly and difficult to try in Hong Kong”. 45.Neither Ms Booth nor Mr Ng was able to locate the origins of the commentary that I have quoted in the preceding paragraph. The only case that I could find involving Thailand law being the governing law required no discussion on the presumption of similarity[16]. But, in the case of Ko Lai Kuen v Li Tak Ming & Ors[17], Suffiad J presumed that the Indonesian law (most probably not adopting the common law system) as to interpretation of a contractual clause is no different from Hong Kong law on the matter, in the absence of evidence of the Indonesian law relevant to this. In doing so, Suffiad J adopted the decision of Hartmann J in the case of Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Laser Media International Limited[18], where his Lordship said:-
46.In our case, NN Hong Kong has not adduced evidence on Thailand law relevant to the legal principles as highlighted in §42 above. Together with the unknown origins for the commentary in §11/1/106 of HKCP 2024, i.e., that the presumption of similarity may not be applicable to Thailand law, I shall adopt the conventional approach, and presume that Thailand law is no different from Hong Kong law on the matters discussed in §§32-34 above, and to be discussed below. Proprietary claim 47.My observations in §§32-34 tie in with that under this head. Taking her case to the highest, and assuming Hu could establish fraud was committed by VIP, Hu still has another hurdle to overcome, that is, whether she has a proprietary claim. 48.Mr Ng, in his submissions, placed great emphasis on the lack of it to oppose the Continuation Application. I think this point goes beyond the Continuation Application; it is central to Hu’s claim as a whole. 49.Mr Ng’s criticism stemmed from Hu’s failure to plead in the SOC and to adduce evidence showing that she has informed VIP of her decision to rescind the voidable PPSA for fraudulent misrepresentation. In fact, in Husband’s 1st Affirmation, he has openly admitted that he did not follow up on the matter with the NN Group (presumably including VIP)[19]. The key question here is why Hu’s case is said to be a product of fraudulent misrepresentation instead of the seemingly simple fraud as pleaded[20]. On this point, Mr Ng referred to the case of China Cruise Line Ltd v Star Yield Corporation Ltd[21], where Mr Recorder Victor Dawes SC said:-
50.The principles set out by the learned Recorder accords with the established principles[22]. 51.Mr Ng added that, for Hu to rescind the PPSA, she would also need to make counter-restitution of the USD10,888.61 received as the CBR[23]. This is not done. 52.In reply, Ms Booth referred to Zimmer Sweden AB v KPN Hong Kong Limited & Anor[24] and Predicine Holdings Ltd v Bianchi (Hong Kong) Limited & Ors[25], where in both cases the learned judges adopted the principles in the Westdeutsche case and required no rescission of the transaction before imposing on the recipient a constructive trust. Nevertheless, I see the 2 cases cited by her respectively concerned telephone fraud and email fraud, where the fraudsters pretended to be someone that they were not, in inducing payments from the plaintiffs. They fall within the category of “fraudulent taking” as defined in §37 of the China Cruise Line case. These are unlike in the present case where Hu and VIP had entered into the PPSA, allegedly upon the misrepresentation of AL[26]. On this point, I shall again refer to the summaries provided by Mr Recorder Dawes SC in §38 of the China Cruise Line case. 53.Ms Booth also tried to overcome this obstacle by relying on the cases of Shalson & Ors v Russo & Ors[27] and Leung Ping Shing Roger v Lee Kwok Kei[28], where the courts respectively accepted commencement of an action, and a complaint to the Thailand police of which the culprit was informed, as implied rescission of the contract. I agree that these acts could constitute implied recession and termination of the contract. However, the difference is that, in the present case, the action is not commenced against VIP. Although the Husband had in September 2021 completed an online survey published by the police in Thailand, and provided them with the particulars of his purchase of the Unit from VIP, there is nothing to show that VIP was informed or made aware of such complaint. 54.In any event, Hu has not made any counter-restitution of the USD10,888.61 received as the CBR. 55.For these reasons, I agree with Mr Ng that Hu’s proprietary claim, founded solely on fraudulent misrepresentation, has not been made out. 56.With these observations in mind, I now turn to the Applications. DISCUSSIONS ON THE APPLICATIONS 57.For the reasons given in §§32-34 and 47-55, Hu has yet to avail herself to a proprietary claim against VIP and/or NN Hong Kong. As the PPSA has not been rescinded, it remains valid and binding on the parties. The Funds transferred to NN Hong Kong under the voidable PPSA allegedly induced by fraud will not immediately (and prior to any rescission) be held on trust for Hu. 58.Without a properly constituted action against NN Hong Kong, discussion under the Jurisdiction Application on whether the court should have jurisdiction over it is not engaged. In the same vein, further consideration of the Continuation and Variation Applications is redundant, as the Order is bound to be discharged; without a valid proprietary claim, no duty of trust would be imposed on NN Hong Kong. I do not see there is any serious issue to be tried[29]. 59.For these reasons, the extensive and forceful arguments from Ms Booth and Mr Ng on the other aspects of the Applications, and my discussions on them, would be purely academic. Moreover, there is a chance that Hu may seek to rectify the inherent defects in her claim, or even issue a fresh action (with perhaps a new cause of action as I have mentioned in §§36-40 above) against VIP, NN Hong Kong, and/or NN Group. If so, these arguments may be repeated before, and considered by, another judge. I thus do not find it appropriate to express my views on them in this Decision. 60.In the circumstances, I will discharge the Order, and dismiss the Continuation and Variation Applications. As to the Jurisdiction Application, strictly speaking, the orders sought under it are not suitable in light of my findings above[30]. That being so, the marginal note of the same does refer to section 48(5) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap. 366 (“DCO”), and O. 1B, r. 1(2)(e) of the RDC, that provide this court with the power to stay the action generally. I shall exercise such power in the present case, perhaps giving Hu some leeway to rectify, if rectifiable, the problems in her claim as identified. CONCLUSION 61.For the above reasons, I order that:-
62.I find that, overall, NN Hong Kong is successful in its Jurisdiction Application, and in opposition of the Continuation and Variation Applications. I therefore order on nisi basis that costs of the Applications should be paid by Hu to NN Hong Kong, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel. The costs order nisi shall become absolute unless any party applies to vary it within 14 days of this Decision. 63.I thank Ms Booth and Mr Ng for their assistance.
Ms Madeleine Booth, instructed by Oldham, Li & Nie, for the plaintiff Mr Tom Ng, instructed by Tanner De Witt, for the defendant [1] Summons filed on 31 January 2022. [2] The Order was continued by HH Judge H. Au-Yeung on 11 February 2022, and later by HH Judge MK Liu on 23 February 2022. As per the latter, the Order would continue up to and until the determination of the Continuation Application. [3] Account no. 1068888006. [4] The year of payments are wrongly pleaded. They were actually made in 2019. See §9 of this Decision where 2019 was pleaded as the year of payment. See also the receipts and remittance advice at pp. 65-71 of Hearing Bundle. Hu seeks to correct this error, amongst others, in the Variation Application. [5] As per such special offer, the total costs for acquisition of the Unit were therefore USD177,491.34 [USD1,500 + (USD177,491.34 – USD1,500)]. The amount totally paid by Hu became another aspect of correction under the Variation Application. [6] See Annual Return of NN Hong Kong dated 9 September 2021, at pp. 146-153 of the Hearing Bundle. The registered address of NN Hong Kong is the address of its company secretary. [7] See §15 a to k. [8] See PPSA at p. 36 of the Hearing Bundle. [9] See §§5.3 to 5.8 of the SOC. [10] See §4 of the SOC. [11] See §6 of the SOC. [12] However, I also note that, notwithstanding Hu’s allegation that VIP is part of NN Group, the projects of NN Thailand reported and submitted to the Thailand court for the rehabilitation application had not included the Water World Condo or any construction project in Phuket. [13] For completeness sake, see the useful discussions of the legal principles applicable to lifting of the corporate veil by To J in the case of Winland Enterprises Group Inc v Wex Pharmaceuticals Inc & Anor (unreported, CACV 154/2011, 29 March 2012), at §§43-54. His Lordship, at §54, provided a succinct summary on them: “In summary, the court will lift the corporate veil of a company if it is a façade or a puppet of the parent company used to perpetrate fraud or evade legal obligation and liability. Fraud and concealment which may have such effect are valid grounds for lifting the corporate veil. That a company is a façade or a puppet of its parent company by itself is neither here nor there. It is just some evidence from which the inference of illegitimate purpose may be drawn or on which to support a finding of the illegitimate purpose behind the façade. Unless the use of a corporate veil for such illegitimate purpose is proved, the use of a façade or that a company is a puppet of its parent company without more does not justify lifting of the corporate veil.” [14] Mr Ng mentioned in §25 of his written submissions that, should there be a proceedings against VIP in Thailand, Hu could consider applying to the Court of First Instance under section 21M of the High Court Ordinance (Cap.4) for an injunction in aid of such foreign proceedings. [15] Vol 1, at p. 178. [16] See Samuel Hutchison Canavan v Brenton George Battenfeld & Anor (unreported, HCA 2139/2009, Master de Souza, 12 August 2010). [17] (unreported, HCA 1731/2010), 16 May 2011); §27. [18] (unreported, HCA 19408/1999, 20 July 2000). [19] At §38. [20] I also note from §52 of Ms Booth’s written submissions that Hu’s case is founded on fraudulent misrepresentation. [22] See, for example: (1) Chitty on Contracts, 34th Ed, Vol 1, §32-179; (2) Goff & Jones on Unjust Enrichment, 10th Ed, §40-18; (3) Independent Trustee Service Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] 3 WLR 597, pp. 618- 619, §53, citing §99 of the Court of Appeal case of Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 436. [23] See again the Independent Trustee Services Ltd case, §54, where Patten LJ said: “The necessary condition for obtaining the assistance of equity in the rescission process is that the representee should make counter-restitution. In a contractual case this will ordinarily involve him restoring to the representor any benefits which he has himself received under the contract or their equivalent value”. [24] (unreported, HCA 2264/2013, DHCJ Yee, 2 May 2014), at §§81-86 and 89-94. [25] [2021] HKCFI 123, at §§89-92. [26] See §§17(4) and 19(1) of this Decision. [27] [2005] ChD 281, at §§120, 122 and 127. [28] (unreported, HCA 778/2007, Mr Recorder Shieh SC, 16 June 2011), at §§115-116. [29] See Zhang Yan v Asa Bullion Ltd et al [2019] HKCFI 179, §11, the first element that a plaintiff has to demonstrate for the grant of proprietary injunction following the American Cyanamid approach. [30] Under RDC: O. 1B, r. 1(2)(k); O. 2, r. 2(2). | ||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment